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FROM THE EDITORS
At the Twentieth International Seapower Symposium, held at the Naval War 
College in October 2011, one thing was strikingly clear: among the leaders of 
many of the world’s navies today there is a growing embrace of the vision of 
maritime security cooperation first enunciated by former Chief of Naval Op-
erations Admiral Michael Mullen under the label of the “thousand-ship navy.” 
In our lead article, “Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,” Stephanie 
Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton explore this vi-
sion and the obstacles that continue to stand in the way of its realization. The 
rapid evolution of communications and sensor technologies is, ironically, one 
such obstacle, because one of its major effects is to increase the gap between the 
capabilities enjoyed by the U.S. Navy in this area and the capabilities of allied and 
partner navies. The authors offer a model for intensified regional collaboration 
in technology development that can help overcome this problem: The Technical 
Cooperation Program, a long-standing though little-known five-nation (United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) umbrella organi-
zation involving a network of 170 research entities and some 1,200 scientists and 
engineers.
Since World War II, more U.S. naval vessels have been destroyed or seriously 
damaged by sea mines than by all other forms of enemy action combined. Sea 
mines are the naval weapon of choice for nations of limited resources and tech-
nological capacity, as we have been reminded recently by the Iranian navy. Today, 
the People’s Republic of China has a robust mining capability and an arsenal of 
sea mines that may number as many as a hundred thousand. In “Taking Mines 
Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Scott C. Truver provides an au-
thoritative, detailed survey of contemporary mine warfare and mine counter-
measures generally and explores the implications of China’s potential use of this 
most “asymmetric” of naval weapons in any conflict with the United States and 
its allies in the western Pacific. He argues that it is time the U.S. Navy took sea 
mines seriously—not only from a defensive perspective but also as an offensive 
instrument in the context of its emerging “AirSea Battle” concept. 
Recent apparent frictions between American military commanders and the 
Obama administration over troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a 
reminder that the civil-military relationship in the United States remains fraught 
9
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with controversy and misunderstanding. Two articles in this issue address this 
subject. In “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Rela-
tions,” Mackubin Thomas Owens provides a succinct overview and guide to how 
to think about civil-military relations in a realistic and responsible fashion. He 
argues that many military officers continue to draw the wrong conclusions from 
the Vietnam War concerning the proper role of civilian authority in managing 
military operations, and he sounds an important cautionary note about the ten-
dency observable in today’s military to abuse the notion of “operational art” by 
using it as a device for excluding perceived civilian meddling in military decision 
making. A proper understanding of “strategy,” by contrast, shows the necessity of 
civil-military collaboration in a sustained process aimed at preserving the always 
delicate balance between military and political considerations. Dayne E. Nix, 
in “American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political 
Dimensions of Military Professionalism,” complements Owens’s account by ex-
ploring the various senses in which, given today’s evolving strategic environment, 
military officers must themselves acquire “political” expertise in order to perform 
their own jobs effectively. Professors Owens and Nix are both on the faculty of 
the Naval War College.
If the Korean War as a whole remains a dim memory at best for most Ameri-
cans, many have heard of its most famous feat of arms—General Douglas Mac-
Arthur’s amphibious assault at Inchon, behind the lines of the invading North 
Koreans. In “A Remarkable Military Feat: The Hungnam Redeployment, Decem-
ber 1950,” Donald Chisholm, of the Naval War College’s Joint Military Opera-
tions Department, offers an account of a similar feat that has been undeservedly 
forgotten—the withdrawal of elements of three American divisions from north-
eastern Korea under pressure from advancing Chinese Communist forces after 
their victory at the battle of the Chosen Reservoir. Chisholm argues that this 
brilliantly orchestrated “amphibious withdrawal” deserves to be carefully studied 
as a resource for the reconstruction of an aspect of amphibious warfare doctrine 
that scarcely exists in today’s American military.
Finally, as part of our long-standing effort to understand capabilities and 
current trends within foreign middle-power navies, consonant with the U.S. 
Navy’s continuing emphasis on global maritime security cooperation, we offer 
Deane-Peter Baker’s “The South African Navy and African Maritime Security.” 
Baker, currently a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, argues that South Africa’s 
naval past (focusing on guardianship of the Cape sea line of communication) 
continues to shape its current maritime outlook, at the expense of a focus on the 
current challenges of maritime security that South Africa faces, in common with 
other African littoral nations. South Africa, he believes, can play an important 
continent-wide role in this regard. 
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 F RO M  T H E  E D I TO R S  5
HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH 19
The nineteenth book in our Historical Monograph series—Talking about Naval 
History: A Collection of Essays, by John B. Hattendorf, the Naval War College’s 
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History—is available for sale by the Gov-
ernment Printing Office’s online bookstore. This collection of twenty articles on 
naval and maritime history selected from the recent work of Professor Hatten-
dorf is published to mark the more than twenty-five years that he has occupied 
the College’s prestigious Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History. Professor 
Hattendorf ’s articles and essays range widely across five hundred years of history 
and deal with four major themes: maritime history as a field of academic and 
professional study, European naval history in the classic age of sail, American 
naval history, and naval theory. 
IF YOU VISIT US 
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 334, 
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main 
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third Presi-
dent of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011. 
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a 
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), De-
stroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), 
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN 
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President, 
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the 
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion 
as sistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Com-
mander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach 
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF 
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer, 
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of 
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times 
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers 
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served 
as Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine 
Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also 
served at the U.S. Naval Academy as a company of-
ficer, celestial navigation instructor, assistant varsity 
soccer coach, and member of the admissions board; 
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in the Strategic 
Initiatives Group; and on the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strate-
gic Plans and Policy) and as executive assistant to the 
assistant chairman. 
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from 
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in 
national security and strategic studies. He was also a 
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the De-
fense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five 
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), 
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and 
the Navy Achievement Medal.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
REALITY—THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE is over 127 years old, and since 
its establishment it has made a powerful difference in America’s 
wars, in the prevention of wars, and in those cherished but too-infrequent peri-
ods of peace. For as long as the United States has a navy, the Naval War College 
will continue to make a powerful difference while remaining the Navy’s home of 
thought.
Thank you—We just updated our Missions, Functions, and Tasks Statement. I 
want to lay out the four missions of the Naval War College and link them to the 
four incredible deans primarily responsible for accomplishing those missions—
and to say thank you. 
Before I get to the missions and deans, I want to say thank you as well to the 
two people who lead the Naval War College. First is our provost and our Chief 
Operating Officer, Ambassador (Ret.) Mary Ann Peters. Second is my deputy 
and our Chief of Staff, Captain Russ Knight, USN. Ambassador Peters has served 
three Presidents here, after a distinguished career in the State Department, span-
ning from assignment in Moscow at the height of the Cold War to service as 
ambassador to the world’s seventh-most-populous country, Bangladesh. Captain 
Knight began his distinguished naval aviation career flying the original “war-
horse,” the A-6 Intruder, before commanding an F/A-18 Hornet squadron. He 
also commanded Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, where he taught, flew, 
led, and perfected his skills in maintaining a complex installation. 
Mission 1: Educate and Develop Leaders. The College shall provide current, rig-
orous and relevant professional military education programs supporting the Na-
vy’s Professional Military Education (PME) Continuum. The Dean of Academic 
Affairs, who accomplishes this mission, is Dr. John Garofano. The College’s 
The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality. The last is to say 
thank you.
MAX DE PREE
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“smokestack industry” is to produce graduates who know military history, how 
our national security policy is formulated, and how joint military operations are 
executed.
Mission 2: Help CNO Define the Future Navy and Its Roles and Missions. The 
College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of 
the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the combatant command-
ers, the Navy component commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders, 
other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. intelligence community, and 
other departments/agencies of the U.S. government. The Dean, Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies, who accomplishes this mission, is Professor Robert C. “Barney” 
Rubel. The College’s “venture capitalist of ideas,” from war gaming to strategic 
research, the center has a long history of thinking hard about the future, inno-
vating, writing, and making a difference.
Mission 3: Support Combat Readiness. The College shall conduct Operational 
Level of War education, leadership and professional ethics training, education, 
and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commanders (JFMCCs) and Navy component commanders to func-
tion effectively as operational commanders. The Dean, College of Operational and 
Strategic Leadership, who accomplishes this mission, is Rear Admiral Jamie Kelly
(Ret.). This college—the part of our institution to which the salt water flows 
most directly from the fleet, and then back—imbues in all our students knowl-
edge of leadership and ethics, as well as meets the fleet’s demand for confident, 
competent planners at the operational level of war. 
Mission 4: Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation. The College shall bring 
together flag, senior and intermediate level naval leaders from other countries to 
develop them for high command in their navies; promote an open exchange of views 
between international security professionals which encourages friendship and coop-
eration and builds trust and confidence; and study operational planning methods 
and common maritime security challenges. The Dean, International Programs 
and Maritime Security Cooperation, who accomplishes this mission, is Professor 
Tom Mangold. One of every six students here at the Naval War College is an in-
ternational officer. This program truly embodies the spirit of the Navy’s “Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” It has built, year by year, a network 
of thousands of graduates, officers who have established deep and mutual trust 
and confidence through their shared experiences in the classroom and in travel, 
in Newport and as far as the Golden Gate Bridge. 
{LINE-SPACE}
Supported firmly by the Navy, we nevertheless benefit every day from the gener-
ous support of the Naval War College Foundation, led by its distinguished chair-
man, Mr. Peter Pelletier.
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 P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  9
Finally, we must thank our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan 
Greenert, who has kept up the impressive record of his predecessor, Admiral 
Gary Roughead, of frequent trips to Newport. Uniquely among the services, as 
President of the Naval War College, I report directly to the CNO, with all the 
enormous benefit that brings.
Four important missions, incredible leadership in Newport and Washington, 
and friends around the world—to all of you, I say again, thank you.
JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
15
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Dr. Hszieh is a Corporate Strategy Group Strate-
gic Analyst at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Center Pacific, San Diego, California. She earned a 
PhD in political science at the University of Southern 
California and is the author or coauthor of numerous 
articles.
Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is Director, Corpo-
rate Strategy Group, at the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Center Pacific in San Diego, California. He 
is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and holds 
master’s degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School 
(oceanography) and the University of San Diego (in-
ternational relations). Additionally, he is a graduate 
of both the junior and senior courses at the Naval War 
College as well as the MIT Sloan School’s Program 
for Senior Executives. His most recent book is Leave 
No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and 
Rescue.
Mr. McKearney is the president and founder of The 
Ranger Group. A retired naval officer whose service 
spanned the Vietnam era to the post–Cold War era, 
he holds master’s degrees from the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School and San Diego State University. He is 
president of the Military Operations Research Society 
(MORS) and is past chairman of the MORS sympo-
sium composite group on joint warfare.
Dr. Sutton is Head, Combat Systems Simulation 
and Analysis, Maritime Operations Division, in the 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation. He is 
also the science and technology adviser to the Royal 
Australian Navy’s Air Warfare Destroyer Project. Dr. 
Sutton earned his doctor of philosophy in science (la-
ser diagnostics for hypersonic f lows) from the Austra-
lian National University.
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NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME 
PARTNERSHIP
ix years after Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations, pro-
posed his “thousand-ship navy” concept at the Seventeenth International 
Seapower Symposium at the U.S. Naval War College in 2005, his notion of a 
Global Maritime Partnership is gaining increasing currency within, between, and 
among navies.1 As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, noted 
in his remarks at the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium in 2009, 
navies worldwide are working mightily to enhance cooperation and interoper-
ability on the global commons.2
Real-world operations, especially in the Pacific Rim, have demonstrated that 
networking maritime forces is crucial to the effectiveness of operations that 
run the gamut from humanitarian operations to dealing with insurgencies, to 
nation-building, to state-on-state conflict. Additionally, these operations often 
involve nations and navies that come together on short—or no—notice, and, 
as a necessary condition for success in these operations, this networking must be 
immediately available and robust.
The central themes of this article are that the technical challenges of netting 
maritime forces together are not trivial and that overcoming these challenges is 
more daunting today than at any time in history. Why? Simply because unlike the 
days when flag hoists or simple radio transmissions were all that navies needed 
to effectively work together, rapid technological change has reached nations and 
navies unevenly and has actually impeded the effective networking of coalition 
partners. To maintain the growth and development of global maritime partner-
ships around the world, this article proposes leveraging an example of one effort 
S
Stephanie Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton
We will be prepared to support and defend our freedom of navigation 
and access to the global commons. Our partners and allies are our great-
est strategic asset.
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN 
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among long-standing partners to address the issue of naval interoperability at the 
defense laboratory level. 
Coalitions at sea are not new. However, globalization—one of the macro-
trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—has prompted many 
nations to join together to maintain the security and stability of the maritime 
domain. Globalization—generally understood as “the integration of the political, 
economic, and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated 
peoples”—involves the international interaction of information, financial capi-
tal, commerce, technology, and labor at significantly greater speeds and volumes 
than previously thought, and it impacts the lives and fortunes of all humanity.3 It 
is important to recognize that globalization has a significant impact in the mari-
time domain, where events in one part of the world can swiftly impact peoples 
and societies across the globe.
As globalization has grown over the past two decades, we have witnessed an 
increase in maritime trade on the global commons. The tonnage of goods carried 
across the oceans by the rapidly growing merchant fleets of the world has more 
than quadrupled in the past four decades. This global exchange of goods has 
brought ever-increasing prosperity to the community of nations.
With globalization and the concomitant dependence on reliable oceanic com-
merce come vulnerabilities. Those who would disrupt this trade and the rule of 
law on the global commons, whether for economic or political gain, now have 
far more opportunities to attack vessels on the high seas or in near-shore waters 
than ever before. The dramatic increase in this century of piracy, a scourge many 
thought no longer existed, is but one manifestation of the threat to the rule of 
law on the global commons that the international community—and especially 
navies—must address today.
Concurrently, the nexus of climate change, growing populations, and a de-
mographic shift to coastal and near-coastal regions has resulted in a significant 
increase in the impact of natural disasters—hurricanes, tsunamis, coastal flood-
ing, volcanic events, earthquakes, and a host of others—that bring suffering to 
millions. Often, only naval forces are capable of delivering relief supplies in a 
timely fashion and in the volumes necessary to relieve disaster victims.
No single navy—of any nation—is robust enough to enforce the rule of law 
on the global commons alone or respond adequately to a major natural disaster. 
Today, through practice, global maritime partnerships have become the sine qua 
non for nations working together as global forces for good in support of ever-
increasing levels of security, stability, and trust. 
When navies assemble as a global force for good, a prerequisite for their abil-
ity to work together is that their ships, submarines, aircraft, command centers, 
and forces ashore have the ability to exchange data and information—often in 
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vast quantities—freely and seamlessly. Their effectiveness is directly proportional 
to their ability not only to communicate but to network, at sea and ashore. But 
as nations and navies proceed along different technological development paths, 
the challenges to effective networking are greater today than they were years 
ago, when navies used simpler—and more common—communications and 
rudimentary networking means. Because of this, their ability to interoperate ef-
fectively is often challenged.
There are core reasons why na-
vies have been especially impeded 
in their attempts to network ef-
fectively in this new century. While 
the will is there, and though these 
navies are aligned through doc-
trine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to work and network together at sea, the 
technical means to realize the promise of “network-centric operations” throughout 
coalitions remain elusive.4 Achieving that promise means dealing with the com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance (C4ISR) issues that currently complicate this effective networking. 
Navies have overcome similar challenges in the past, however, and understanding 
where we have been can help the members of today’s naval coalition avoid be-
coming “victims of limited experience.”5
Naval coalitions have long been an important part of maintaining sea power 
and good order on the seas. During the Cold War it was a naval alliance, under the 
auspices of NATO, that was able, through the building of a credible nuclear and 
conventional deterrent, to check Soviet encroachment into Europe.6 However, 
coalition operations have taken on renewed importance as the maintenance of 
good order at sea has become a pressing concern for the international commu-
nity. Naval coalitions today tend to be heterogeneous with respect to the types 
of navies represented, while the operations naval coalitions undertake have also 
expanded to include antipiracy patrols, as well as disaster relief and humanitarian 
missions. The importance of the ability to communicate with coalition partners 
transcends warfare and impacts coalition naval partners in literally every endeav-
or. This was dramatically demonstrated in December 2004 and early 2005 during 
the Indian Ocean tsunami response, where eighteen nations worked together, 
primarily on and from the sea, to deliver relief supplies.7
As they do for naval coalitions in general, naval communications continue to 
represent an integral part of successful naval operations, because they allow com-
manders to create the all-important “operational picture.” In the arena of naval war-
fare, communications are needed to maintain “dominant battlespace awareness”
—knowledge of where one’s enemies and one’s own forces are. Out of this 
Nations and navies are proceeding along dif-
ferent technological development paths. As a 
result of this inexorable trend, naval coopera-
tion is under increasing stress.
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knowledge comes the ability to plan and strategize to defeat the enemy. In 1904, 
Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, took advantage of the new 
communications technology of his time—the telegraph—and developed what 
Norman Friedman calls “picture-based warfare.”8 Admiral Fisher established two 
war rooms—one for the world, the other focused on the North Sea—to collate 
information received from telegraphic messages to plot where French commerce 
raiders were attacking British merchant ships. Armed with this picture-based 
view of the world, Admiral Fisher was able to direct battle cruisers to the spots.9 
Future British commanders built on Admiral Fisher’s successful harnessing of 
communications technologies to construct a global tactical picture—one that 
served them well in the years leading up to World War I, as well as during that 
conflict. 
The innovative use of communications technologies to better conduct picture-
based warfare continues in contemporary naval operations. Throughout the 
1990s and into the twenty-first century, other initiatives have included the Na-
tional Defense University’s Dominant Battlespace Concept; Admiral William 
Owens’s “system of systems”; military transformation and the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA); and the concept of “network-centric warfare” popular-
ized by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka. All these have led to 
significant focus on using communications to provide U.S. forces and their coali-
tion partners a better ability to build a common picture to conduct picture-based 
warfare and, in so doing, secure the tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. 
But what these reformers—and others like them—have really been talking about 
is moving beyond merely communicating between and among units to network-
ing forces and forming them into single fighting entities.
COMMUNICATING EVOLVES INTO NETWORKING FOR MODERN 
NAVIES
Above all, the picture is what matters. Creating effective tactical pictures 
makes systems work, and it supports a new kind of warfare. The better 
the picture, the more efficient the operation. 
DR. NORMAN FRIEDMAN
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the U.S. Navy, reflecting its traditional 
style of operations—which entailed the continuous forward deployment of a 
distributed force far from U.S. territory or supporting infrastructure—developed 
the concept of “networking” to ensure timely and reliable communications to 
enable the most effective employment of scattered forces.10 This effort included 
experimentation with the Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS), 
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which was the progenitor of the tactical data systems, such as Link 11, shared by 
many navies today.
Armed with increasingly reliable tactical data links, global navies began to 
recognize the potential of this ability to link ships across vast distances to revolu-
tionize naval warfare. As Loren Thompson pointed out in 2003, however, many 
of the concepts driving the networking of military forces today arose two decades 
ago:
In 1990, long before network-centric warfare became a central feature of joint 
doctrine, the Navy established a program called “Copernicus” to assimilate emerging 
information technologies. . . . The admirals managing Copernicus understood that 
information technologies had the potential to revolutionize naval operations. The 
Navy adopted the phrase “network-centric warfare” to describe this nascent warfight-
ing paradigm, because it stressed integration and communications over autonomy in 
conducting naval operations.11
Eight years later, Vice Admiral Cebrowski and John Garstka built on Coper-
nicus to envision war fighting in the twenty-first century. Their 1998 U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings article, “Network-centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” 
described the potential of network-centric concepts to alter the nature of warfare 
itself. Although the article was published well over a decade ago, their vision of 
network-centric warfare proved remarkably prescient:
Network-centric warfare derives its power from the strong networking of a well-
informed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-
performance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources, 
weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding 
command and control (C2) processes—to include high-speed automated assignment 
of resources to need—and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters 
and C2 processes. Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and 
contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is transparent to 
mission, force size and composition, and geography.12
Theory met reality in the early part of the twenty-first century, when the Unit-
ed States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, launched Op-
eration ENDURING FREEDOM (known as OEF) to attack terrorist strongholds in 
Afghanistan. The ensuing campaign vindicated what the proponents of network-
centric warfare had been advocating. As Admiral Vern Clark, then Chief of Naval 
Operations, later observed regarding the U.S. Navy’s experience in OEF, “Eighty 
percent of the Navy strike sorties attacked targets that were unknown to the air-
crews when they left the carriers. They relied upon networked sensors and joint 
communications to swiftly respond to targets of opportunity.”13
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Admiral Clark evolved a vision for the U.S. Navy called “Sea Power 21: Opera-
tional Concepts for a New Era.”14 Some critics described the three pillars of Sea 
Power 21 (Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing) as “old wine in new bottles,” but 
with them Admiral Clark introduced a new term, “FORCEnet,” which referred to 
“an initiative to tie together naval, joint and national information grids to achieve 
unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management.”15 FORCEnet 
was clearly the next step in the evolution of the Navy’s networking capabilities. 
Thompson noted that “Forcenet [sic] was the greatest system-integration chal-
lenge ever proposed in the history of warfare.”16 Whether this is true or not, the 
U.S. Navy made an enormous capital investment in FORCEnet and in the wide 
array of programs that instantiate the network-centric warfare concept.17 
The ability of navies to network vast amounts of data at high speed over 
great distances—due to the advancement of C4ISR technologies over the past 
decades—has ushered in new capabilities, pushed the “information envelope,” 
and expanded the “art of the possible” at sea. It is not an overstatement to say that 
C4ISR systems have become the sine qua non of success for most modern navies. 
In fact, navies have found conclusively that their effectiveness is proportional to 
their ability to network at sea and ashore. Accordingly, every modern navy has 
sought to install C4ISR networking technologies—often as rapidly as they can 
afford them—in order to gain that technological edge at sea.
Drawing on real-world results from the U.S.-led coalition conflicts in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government 
Accountability Office) summed up the results of these conflicts:
Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation aware-
ness for commanders and their forces. DoD [the U.S. Department of Defense] has 
indicated that technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow 
commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements pro-
vide for greater shared situational awareness, which, in turn, speeds command and 
control. . . . Improvements in networking the force and the use of precision weapons 
are the primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent 
operations.18 
C4ISR advances not only benefit so-called high-end navies, but any navy invest-
ing in naval C4ISR technologies can gain a tactical edge. As pointed out by Paul 
Mitchell in 2003 in this journal, 
Network-centric warfare aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of maritime 
information among participating units (or nodes). By optimizing the efficiency of 
operations through information exchange, even small naval formations can generate 
additional combat power. Data is manipulated by a series of dynamic and interlinked 
“grids”: sensor grids gather the data, information grids fuse and process it, and en-
gagement grids manage the operations generated.19
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Network-centric concepts are also being applied to developing local and re-
gional maritime situational awareness, through various maritime domain aware-
ness (MDA) information-sharing efforts. In short, MDA efforts are also part of 
building global maritime partnerships, as various regional information-sharing 
partnerships are netting up the global maritime commons. Efforts such as the 
establishment of Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers 
(MHQ/MOC) for the numbered fleets in the U.S. Navy are geared to provide the 
capability to support MDA operations globally. National programs in the United 
States—such as the Container Security Initiative, Automatic Identification Sys-
tem (AIS), Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and Mari-
time Safety and Security Information System (MISSIS)—are part of the multi-
agency effort to build MDA capability to support the defense of the homeland.20
Other nations have similar efforts to build up regional situational awareness 
of the maritime domain. In the pirate-infested waters of the Malacca Strait, the 
trinational effort of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (MALSINDO) began as 
a means of protecting the sea-lanes in the region from illegal activities—piracy, 
smuggling, etc. The regional cooperation also brought about Project SURPIC 
in 2005, when Singapore and Indonesia developed a joint surveillance system to 
share information regarding vessel movements in the Singapore Straits.21 Singa-
pore also established the ACCESS system and the Regional Maritime Information 
Exchange (ReMIX) Internet-based system to encourage information exchanges 
with other nations in the region.22
The U.S. Navy is actively engaged with regional partners and longtime allies 
to build information-exchange agreements and relationships to enhance global 
maritime partnerships in order to support global maritime domain awareness. 
There is currently work under way between the U.S. Navy and the French Minis-
try of Defense to share information obtained from the U.S. Navy’s AIS Program 
of Record and France’s SPATIONAV coastal systems. This information-sharing 
agreement, spearheaded by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Center Pacific (SSC Pacific), will extend U.S. awareness of vessel movement in 
the European region and also the French Caribbean. The latter will provide the 
United States with valuable information to support drug interdiction efforts 
in the Caribbean. The final phase of the plan would allow the United States 
and France to exchange information and analysis regarding noncooperative, or 
“dark,” targets in order to identify maritime threats. Work is also under way with 
another partner nation, Singapore, to integrate satellite imagery with AIS infor-
mation to track vessel movements. 
Maritime domain awareness efforts within the U.S. Navy have also been ex-
tended to developing regions to build new partnerships. One example of this is 
a Sixth Fleet–sponsored project to provide the government of Ghana with the 
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ability to characterize vessel traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. SSC Pacific scientists 
and engineers supporting the Sixth Fleet work with the University of Ghana to 
train students on open-source image processing. There is also a project going on 
with the University of Ghana to track canoes fitted with radar reflectors and AIS 
transmitters. The small-boat detection trials and training of imagery analysts in 
that region help not only to build new relationships but also to develop a capabil-
ity for persistent maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Through these and other MDA efforts, the maritime domain is being netted 
and global maritime partnerships are being strengthened with these emerging 
information-sharing agreements. However, the ability of different naval forces to 
engage in similar information-sharing activities at sea remains a work in progress. 
As mentioned earlier, new C4ISR technologies have had a dramatic impact on the 
ability of many navies to network with their own ships, submarines, aircraft, and 
command centers. This has led to a situation where various components within 
each navy can exchange large amounts of information. In doing so, these navies 
have found that they become more effective across the spectrum of conflict, from 
peacemaking to counterinsurgency, to major conflict.
However, this rush to install cutting-edge technology in each navy has had just 
the opposite effect on its ability to network effectively with assets of other navies. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that nations and navies are proceeding 
along different technological development paths. As a result of this inexorable 
trend, naval cooperation is under increasing stress.
NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP: HOW BIG A 
CHALLENGE?
In today’s world, nothing significant can get done outside of a coalition 
context, but we have been humbled by the challenges of devising effective 
coalition communications. 
DR. DAVID ALBERTS 
The experience of the Canadian navy in numerous deployments with U.S. Navy 
carrier strike groups (CSGs) suggests the issues that persist even among two 
modern, technologically advanced navies, let alone between and among multiple 
navies at various levels of technological maturity.23 This documented experience
—as well as other compelling data—illustrates how the very technology that has 
helped each navy communicate internally has impeded effective communica-
tions with forces of other navies. Paul Mitchell, then director of academics at 
the Canadian Forces College, puts this dilemma in stark terms: “Is there a place 
for small navies in network-centric warfare? Will they be able to make any sort 
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of contribution in multinational naval operations of the future? Or will they be 
relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, encouraged to 
stay out of the way—or stay at home? . . . The ‘need for speed’ in network-centric 
operations places the whole notion of multinational operations at risk.”24 
In 2010 General James Mattis, then commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
echoed Mitchell’s themes as well as more general concerns regarding network-
ing: “In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if 
you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based 
on trust across service lines, across 
coalition and national lines, and 
across civilian/military lines, you 
really need to go home, because 
your leadership style is obsolete.”25
But how important is coalition 
networking, and what is the “state of play” today, as U.S. Navy combat formations 
attempt to communicate and share data with coalition partners and to achieve 
shared situational awareness?26 Some would say that it is not yet what it should 
be. As Mitchell predicts, absent more effective means to network and exchange 
data, navies may even stop attempting to operate together. He raises what is per-
haps the most important question regarding coalition naval communications: 
What level of communications and networking is required to make coalition 
operations at sea effective?
Mitchell did not ask this question offhandedly. For a number of years the Ca-
nadian navy has deployed surface combatants with U.S. Navy CSGs for six-month 
deployments. In that environment the effectiveness of coalition interoperability 
moves from theory to the reality of high-tempo, forward naval operations—
operations that often involved combat. Mitchell has interviewed the command-
ing officers of seven Canadian ships that deployed with U.S. Navy CSGs to 
determine how effectively they were able to communicate with their U.S. Navy 
partners. The results indicated that while significant progress has been made, 
more work needs to be done.
The experience of these Canadian commanding officers, as well as of others 
working with U.S. naval forces in NATO exercises or operations, is that the “need 
for speed” in network-centric operations may result in the exclusion of even 
close allies. Thus, Mitchell asserts, while the guiding principle of network-centric 
warfare is to increase the speed and efficiency of operations, coalitions as such 
are rarely concerned about combat efficiency. Rather, their fundamental realities 
are always the scarcity of operational resources or the limits of their political le-
gitimacy, or both. This point led Mitchell to conclude that because of the impact 
What reformers have really been talking about 
is moving beyond merely communicating 
between and among units to networking forces 
and forming them into single fighting entities.
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of slower networks or non-networked ships in a dynamic coalition environment, 
the prospects of the U.S. Navy’s keeping “in step” with coalition partners is not 
high—absent enlightened efforts by all governments concerned.27
At a 2003 international C4ISR symposium, Mitchell put it directly during a 
question-and-answer period:
We have been trying to work with the U.S. Navy for a long time. Ten years ago when 
we basically communicated by the red phone [tactical voice nets] we did all right 
because it was pretty much a level playing field. Five years ago, with CHALLENGE 
ATHENA and the beginnings of networked communications, it started to become 
more difficult for us as the U.S. Navy sped away from its partners. Today, with the 
emerging FORCEnet, the U.S. Navy is in danger of leaving behind other navies 
because all of the background and decision making that goes on over networks like 
SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] is lost to us [;] thus, when the 
order is given to do something we have none of the background for it and we are not 
in the battle rhythm of the operation.28 
The situation Mitchell describes represents the reality of current coalition 
operations at sea and indicates that there is important work yet to be done. This 
is consistent with what proponents of network-centric operations have been pro-
fessing for some time. In a capstone publication of the Department of Defense 
Office of Force Transformation, the late Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski opined, 
“The United States wants its partners to be as interoperable as possible. Not being 
interoperable means you are not on the net, so you are not in a position to derive 
power from the information age.”29
If this is such an important issue, why have naval professionals not worked 
harder and more vigorously to solve it, and why have we not found a solution 
yet? Part of the problem lies in the differing relative success that navies have had 
networking at sea. Even in the days of signal flags, ships at sea found ways to 
communicate to some degree. As technology advanced from flashing lights to 
radio Morse code, to tactical radio voice circuits, to tactical data links, ships at 
sea often had it better than forces ashore on expanded battlefields. The assurance 
that “we’ve communicated at sea before and we’re doing so today” obscures how 
well we could communicate and exchange data if the right technology, doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures were in place.
The importance of coalition partners effectively networking has perhaps been 
best articulated by Commander Alberto Soto, of the Chilean navy, in an article 
in this journal: “The availability of a cooperatively created tactical picture has 
long been a ‘dream of naval commanders who wanted to be able to see what was 
over the horizon.’”30 He argues the criticality of building and sharing an effec-
tive common operational picture within a coalition, noting that “regional navies 
have disparate capabilities, with major differences in terms of C4ISR. . . . [A]llies 
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do not acquire or develop command-and-control systems or surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets with the main goal of exchanging information with other 
potential allies.”31
For the U.S. Navy, there is another complicating factor. Almost all officers who 
attain high rank in that service have served as carrier strike group commanders, 
typically as their first afloat assignments as flag officers. As a CSG commander, 
they experienced the “best of the best” in the way of communications and data-
exchange capabilities—with robust displays, ample switching and routing ca-
pabilities, and high bandwidth. Additionally, coalition nets such as CENTRIXS 
are likely to be installed on the flagship, the aircraft carrier, and that is where 
coalition naval officers embark for most exercises.32 Thus, as carrier strike group 
commanders advance through policy and acquisition assignments, their col-
lective memories of coalition communications and data-exchange capabilities 
are often quite positive, their operational experience rarely having given them 
first-person knowledge of significant problems. But their experiences constitute 
the exception—not the rule—for they have generally not experienced coalition 
networking from the position of international surface combatants attempting to 
work with U.S. Navy ships. 
There is another, perhaps more important, reason why an effective solution 
still eludes operators who want to solve this issue. Coalition interoperability does 
not fit into any requirements “bin,” for either the U.S. Navy or, most likely, coali-
tion partners. It does not fly, float, or operate beneath the seas. It does not strike 
the enemy from afar, like cruise missiles. It does not enhance readiness, like spare 
parts or training. It therefore often does not have the requisite degree of high-
level advocacy. This is not to imply that those in charge of setting requirements 
or acquiring weapons systems are not keen on doing the right thing—clearly they 
are. However, the definition of operational needs, the requirements-generation 
process, and acquisition practices have grown up over decades, even generations, 
and changing them to factor in coalition communications adequately takes a 
great deal of time and attention. 
As yet, this is a journey that is incomplete, and part of the reason is an in-
ability to quantify the “goodness” derived from coalition networking. With naval 
establishments and acquisition bureaucracies increasingly driven by the rules of 
the marketplace—measures of effectiveness, returns on investment, best business 
practices, and efficiency—the absence of quantification makes it difficult to argue 
for scarce research and development, and especially acquisition dollars. 
But it is a process that must take place if the U.S. Navy and its likely coalition 
partners are to operate at sea effectively for the next century. As Mitchell points 
out, “In network-centric warfare information is the cornerstone of all action; 
the existence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an 
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undeniable impact on battle rhythms.”33 Clearly, overcoming uneven or unco-
ordinated application of C4ISR technology by nations that would work together 
to form a global maritime partnership is an essential first step in making that 
partnership a reality.34 
HARNESSING THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY: THE 
AUSCANNZUKUS WAY
We will win—or lose—the next series of wars in our nation’s laboratories.
ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS
For the U.S. Navy, the technical challenges of networking effectively with likely 
coalition partners are not trivial.35 The problem is twofold in nature: first, quan-
tifying the difference in operational effectiveness between that of a coalition force 
networked via U.S. Navy infrastructure provided by the Consolidated Afloat 
Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES, discussed below) and that of a coali-
tion force less robustly networked; and second, finding a way for likely coalition 
partners to coevolve maritime systems in a way that enables maximum network-
ing among ships and other platforms.36
The issue of coevolution is an important one, because for navies determined 
to work with other, often smaller, navies as global maritime partners, a coop-
erative arrangement regarding technology development is crucial.37 This implies 
early and frequent collaboration among scientists and engineers in the laborato-
ries of these navies, as well as those of other prospective global maritime partners.
One vehicle for such cooperation among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States—the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations
—is The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). Although it has existed in 
various forms for over half a century, TTCP is not well-known, even among 
AUSCANNZUKUS naval personnel. Importantly, while an analysis of coalition 
interoperability along other lines is certainly possible, TTCP’s organization and 
infrastructure provide a ready-made medium that makes success probable.
TTCP is a forum for defense science and technology collaboration. Established 
as a joint effort between the defense organizations of the partner nations, TTCP 
is one of the largest collaborative defense science and technology activities in the 
world. The statistics give some indication of its scope: five nations, eleven tech-
nology and systems groups, eighty technical panels and action groups, 170 orga-
nizations, and 1,200 scientists and engineers are involved. The forum’s purpose 
is to enhance national defense and reduce costs. To this end, TTCP provides a 
formal framework that scientists and technologists can use to share information.
Collaboration within TTCP acquaints participants with each other’s defense 
research and development programs so that national programs may be planned 
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in concert. TTCP has its center of gravity in the applied research domain but also 
encompasses basic research and technology development. Its scope extends to ex-
ploration of alternative concepts prior to development of specific systems; collab-
orative research; sharing of data, equipment, material and facilities; joint trials and 
exercises; and advanced technology demonstrations. Cooperation within TTCP 
can catalyze project-specific collaboration farther along the acquisition path.
Enhancing Coalition Interoperability: MAR AG-1 and AG-6
In response to a mutually perceived need to assess the quantitative value of 
network-centric naval forces, in 2002 TTCP’s Maritime Systems Group (MAR) 
established Action Group One (AG-1) to conduct a three-year “Network-centric 
Maritime Warfare” collaborative study. The study produced robust quantitative as-
sessments of the benefits of the adoption by coalition naval forces of a networked 
force structure. The report of AG-1 prompted leaders of the MAR in 2005 to char-
ter a second investigative team, Action Group Six (AG-6), to examine the impact 
the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet concept would have on coalition operations.38
In establishing the basic requirements for the technologies to be included in 
the study, AG-6 began by seeking a common understanding of the operational 
environment facing a coalition naval force. The group developed a scenario that 
evolved from a disaster assistance/humanitarian relief effort to a counterterror-
ism operation, and finally a high-tempo conflict at sea. Four principal measures 
of effectiveness were devised to compare the success of a coalition force that fully 
leveraged the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet capability to that of one not networked.
In addition, AG-6 members shared the “technology on-ramps” of their respec-
tive national acquisition programs in order to find where complementary tech-
nological capabilities could be inserted into naval C4ISR systems. The impacts 
and value of alternative coalition network structures were modeled and assessed. 
The result was a set of quantitative tools that could be adopted by the acquisition 
branches of the AG-6 nations. 
Similarly, TTCP nations have come to regard the early manifestations of 
maritime net-centricity, such as FORCEnet, as stepping-stones on a path—a 
path marked out by the TTCP’s “Maritime Net-centric Roadmap”—to becom-
ing “fully net-enabled.” The next step is the implementation of an information 
architecture to deliver the military capabilities and benefits that nations perceive 
as offered by network-centric warfare. 
For its part, the U.S. Navy is committed to transforming, over the next several 
years, its current afloat network capability and global C2 infrastructure into the 
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services. The development of 
CANES will produce a “service-oriented architecture” (SOA), wherein applica-
tions, services, and data are provided to “communities of interest.” SOA lever-
ages a “publish and subscribe” messaging pattern in which information services, 
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often external to any given system, are published to the network, which can then 
be subscribed to (i.e., utilized) by other systems and users. CANES incorporates 
information technology and network services currently provided to coalition 
partners under the CENTRIXS umbrella, making the development of CANES 
a critical concern to the AUSCANNZUKUS community as the pathway to the 
Maritime Net-centric Roadmap’s goal of full net enablement and ultimate con-
vergence with the future Global Information Grid.39 
The AG-6 study quantified how 
disparities in C4I capability within 
a U.S.-led coalition force under-
mine its effectiveness in a range 
of missions, ultimately disenfran-
chising less capable units. The mi-
gration of U.S. Navy networking 
capabilities to new architectures like CANES could increase that disparity, even 
introduce invasive and disruptive effects not well understood by the United States 
or its allies. The conclusions of the AG-1 and AG-6 studies, as well as ongoing 
TTCP studies, should help allied nations stay aligned as the U.S. Navy transitions 
to CANES. The AG-1 and AG-6 studies have given the MAR an excellent appre-
ciation of U.S. and allied maritime capabilities, along with modeling frameworks 
and tools that can support recommendations to national leaderships. A further 
MAR study is under way that will provide an analytical assessment of require-
ments, funding, and execution of national programs to sustain U.S.-allied in-
teroperability in a CANES SOA environment. It will clarify for national decision 
makers the impact of such technologies upon future network architecture.
As it relates to the planned integration of coalition network services (e.g., 
CENTRIXS), this new study will inform the U.S. Navy’s CANES development 
process by raising awareness of the value and impact of C4I technologies poten-
tially incorporated into CANES. (It will raise the awareness of allied navies as 
well—such inclusive efforts are often more useful for informing important con-
stituencies than for providing prescient new information.) Like previous studies, 
it will inform national acquisition agencies of what will be required, in terms of 
coalition SOA, to enable TTCP navies to participate in future global maritime 
partnership (GMP) net-enabled maritime operations. Also, it will provide vali-
dated analytical tools and techniques that nations can reuse to explore national 
service-oriented architectures for their own interservice operations.
Leveraging TTCP Efforts across Global and Regional Maritime Partnerships
TTCP represents the work of only five nations, and the MAR AG-1/AG-6 effort 
represents only a small fraction of that work. Nonetheless, the issue of coalition 
networking is sufficiently compelling and the TTCP process so plainly worthy of 
Networking maritime forces is crucial to the 
effectiveness of operations that run the gamut 
from humanitarian operations to dealing with 
insurgencies, to nation-building, to state-on-
state conflict.
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emulation that outside observers consider it a best-practices example and argue 
for similar efforts by other national groups. Commander Soto writes, 
Since 2002 the Technical Cooperation Program . . . has focused the efforts of its Mari-
time Systems Group (MSG) on “Networking Maritime Coalitions” and “FORCEnet 
and Coalitions Implications.” The MSG has become an important link among 
national naval C4ISR acquisition programs. . . . For that very reason these [Latin 
American and Caribbean] nations should tenaciously strive to become involved in 
initiatives like the MSG.40
Other nations and navies, in natural clusters, can indeed take advantage of the 
policies and processes that TTCP has instituted within the AUSCANNZUKUS 
nations. They can replicate the TTCP model where it makes the most sense for 
them. As Commander Soto suggests, the navies of South America represent one 
such grouping. The ASEAN nations offer another, one that already has several 
collaborative forums. NATO offers yet another, and given the wide range of simi-
lar efforts already under way there, such as the NATO Network Enabled Capabil-
ity (NEC) C2 Maturity Model, the way forward may be easier than some think.
{LINE-SPACE} 
It is important and necessary to use work such as TTCP or NATO’s NEC as a 
means to harmonize national C4ISR acquisition programs, because the challenge 
is so great. This challenge has persisted for quite some time, as pointed out over a 
decade ago in an analysis of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, in Bosnia:
Coalition operations such as Joint Endeavor present a complex set of challenges for 
the military C4ISR system planners, implementers, and operators. The most difficult 
challenge is the provision of integrated C4ISR services and capabilities to support 
the needs of ad hoc multinational military force structures and politically driven 
command arrangements. Although integrated C4ISR services are the desired objec-
tive, the realities tend to drive the solution to stove-piped implementations. In spite 
of technology advances, this will likely be the case for some time to come. There will 
continue to be uneven C4ISR capabilities among coalition members who will con-
tinue to rely on systems with which they are most comfortable—their own.41 
Lest anyone think this issue is already solved in 2012 (or will solve itself short-
ly), effective networking is now a “wicked problem” for navies attempting to deal 
not with a “high end” environment like antisubmarine, antiair, or antisurface 
warfare but with the basic task of combating piracy. The editors of a recent col-
lected work on piracy and maritime crime highlight the importance of effective 
maritime surveillance in countering piracy: “Clearly, maritime surveillance is the 
key to gaining a better understanding of what is happening on the oceans, but 
currently, systems are not integrated within each country, let alone at regional or 
global levels.”42 
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It is beyond debate that the U.S. Navy will continue to partner with other 
navies to secure the rule of law on the global commons and that the effectiveness 
of this combined global force will rise or fall on its ability to network at sea. The 
Technical Cooperation Program provides an example of how nations can plant 
the technological seed in making C4ISR systems compatible with their partners, 
just as they have been able to do within their own fleets. It is a model that must be 
applied—and quickly—to the navies with which the U.S. Navy will work at sea. If 
these networking challenges are not addressed, the Global Maritime Partnership 
will remain only a concept and never deliver its promise.
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mine is a terrible thing that waits. The easy way is always mined. Any ship can 
be a minesweeper—once. Sea mines and the need to counter them have been 
constants for the U.S. Navy since the earliest days of the Republic. In January 
1778, patriot David Bushnell used floating kegs of gunpowder fitted with con-
tact firing mechanisms to attack a British fleet anchored in the Delaware River 
above Philadelphia. Four British sailors died trying to retrieve the kegs—an 
early example of the challenges of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) against an 
unknown threat—but the ships were unscathed. Since that uncertain beginning, 
mines and mine countermeasures (MCM) have figured prominently in the Civil 
War, Spanish-American War, both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, numerous Cold 
War crises, and Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM.1
In February 1991, the U.S. Navy lost command of 
the northern Arabian Gulf to more than 1,300 mines 
that had been sown by Iraqi forces virtually under 
the “noses” of multinational coalition naval forces 
constrained by their rules of engagement. Mines se-
verely damaged two Navy warships, and commanders 
aborted an amphibious assault for fear of more casual-
ties. That mirrored the Navy’s experience four decades 
earlier, off the east coast of North Korea, when more 
than three thousand mines (put in place in a matter 
of weeks) utterly frustrated an October 1950 assault 
on Wonsan by a 250-ship United Nations amphibi-
ous task force. Its commander, Rear Admiral Allen E. 
A
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Smith, lamented, “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, 
using pre–World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time 
of the birth of Christ.”2 The initial clearance operations saw three mine coun-
termeasures vessels sunk by mines and more than a hundred personnel dead or 
wounded. By the end of hostilities in July 1953, coalition MCM forces, which 
accounted for just 2 percent of all UN naval forces, had suffered 20 percent of all 
naval casualties.
The Korean War experience served as the catalyst for the U.S. Navy’s MCM 
renaissance in the 1950s and early 1960s, as did the Operation DESERT STORM 
MCM debacle for a renaissance that began in the mid-1990s and continues today 
(the latter revival much less extensive than the former, however). As Rear Admiral 
David G. Farragut wrote on 25 March 1864 to the Secretary of the Navy, “it does 
not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”3
Traditional navies as well as maritime terrorists can and have used mines and 
underwater improvised explosive devices (UWIEDs) to challenge military and 
commercial uses of the seas. These “weapons that wait” are the quintessential 
naval asymmetric threat, pitting adversaries’ strengths against what they perceive 
as naval and maritime weaknesses. Indeed, sea mines are key to regional navies’ 
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and sea-control strategies and operations. Per-
haps a million mines of more than three hundred types are in the inventories of 
more than sixty navies worldwide, not counting U.S. weapons.4 More than thirty 
countries produce mines, and twenty countries export them; highly sophisticated 
weapons are available in the international arms trade. Worse, these figures are for 
sea mines proper; they do not include UWIEDs that can be fashioned from fifty-
five-gallon drums, other containers, and even discarded refrigerators.
Mines and underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build and are cheap, but 
their low cost belies their potential for harm. With costs measured from a few 
hundred to several thousands of dollars, they are the weapons of choice for a 
“poor man’s navy,” providing an excellent return on investment: low cost but 
high effects. On 18 February 1991, for example, the billion-dollar Aegis cruiser 
USS Princeton (CG 59) suffered a “mission kill” from an Iraqi-laid Italian Manta 
multiple-influence bottom mine costing about $25,000; the warship was out of 
service for the duration of Operation DESERT STORM and longer. Several hours 
earlier that same day, USS Tripoli (LPH 10) struck an Iraqi contact mine, which 
ripped a twenty-three-foot hole in the hull and came close to sinking the ship. 
During the 1980s “tanker war” in the Arabian Gulf, only the heroic efforts of its 
crew saved USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) from sinking on 14 April 1988 after 
it struck a contact mine of World War I design.5 The warship’s damage-repair 
bill came in at more than $96 million, in fiscal year (FY) 1993 dollars. In an 
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accounting that usually comes as a surprise, since the end of World War II mines 
have seriously damaged or sunk almost four times more U.S. Navy ships than all 
other means of attack combined:6
• Mines, fifteen ships
• Missiles, one ship
• Torpedoes/aircraft, two ships
• Small-boat terrorist attack, one ship
While mines and even UWIEDs might not be naval power–projection “show-
stoppers,” they could certainly be “speed bumps” in critical waterways and 
regions, slowing the movement of warships, military sealift, and humanitarian 
response in crisis and conflict.7
FOCUS ON CHINESE MINE WARFARE
The mine warfare experiences of America and other nations are not lost on the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).8 Chinese naval analysts and historians 
understand the asymmetric potential for mine warfare to “baffle the enemy, and 
thus achieve exceptional combat results.”9 Mines provide what some have de-
scribed as “affordable security via asymmetric means.”10
The Chinese note that hundreds of thousands of mines served tactical sea- 
denial and strategic ends in both world wars. Throughout the Great War, Russia, 
Germany, Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States relied on sea mines. Their 
mining campaigns culminated in the “North Sea Mine Barrage” of June–October 
1918, when British and American ships laid more than seventy-three thousand 
mines, sinking thirteen U-boats and keeping more in home ports until the armi-
stice. Mines were also used successfully in all World War II theaters. Remarkably, 
Nazi submarines laid 327 mines from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the Mississippi 
Delta, closing several North American ports for a total of forty days and sinking 
or damaging eleven ships. Toward the end of the war in the Pacific, Operation 
STARVATION showed the strategic value of mines. From March to August 1945, 
U.S. Army Air Forces heavy bombers and Navy submarines laid some 12,200 
mines in Japan’s shipping routes and territorial waters and ports. The results 
were unequivocal: mines sank or severely damaged some 670 Japanese ships and 
strangled all maritime commerce around the home islands.
Testimony in 2007 before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission by a member of the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Stud-
ies Institute can serve as a prelude to this discussion:
We have recently completed a two-year-long study of over 1,000 Chinese language ar-
ticles concerning naval mine warfare (MIW). Our three most important findings are: 
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(1) China has a large inventory of naval mines, many of which are obsolete but still 
deadly, and somewhat more limited numbers of sophisticated modern mines, some 
of which are optimized to destroy enemy submarines. (2) We think that China would 
rely heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario. (3) If China were able to em-
ploy these mines (and we think that they could), it would greatly hinder operations, 
for an extended time, in waters where the mines were thought to have been laid. The 
obvious means of employing mines are through submarines and surface ships. Use 
of civilian assets should not be discounted. But we also see signs of Chinese recogni-
tion of the fact that aircraft offer the best means of quickly laying mines in significant 
quantity. These aircraft would be useless, however, without air superiority.11
With that as framework, this article addresses four broad areas of concern:
• What are the current and projected statuses of China’s naval mine technolo-
gies and of its inventory, delivery systems, doctrine, and training? 
• How might China employ naval mines in “Near Seas” scenarios?12
• To what extent are the U.S. Navy and allied/partner navies prepared to cope 
with Chinese mine warfare strategies and operations?
• How might the U.S. Navy employ mine warfare in Near Seas combat against 
Chinese forces?
There are broad MIW implications for U.S. strategies, plans, and programs, 
generally, but particularly for the nascent AirSea Battle Concept, which has 
captured the attention of the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations. As outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, the Air Force and Navy are formulating this concept to defeat 
adversaries that possess sophisticated A2/AD capabilities.13 The concept is meant 
to help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power 
projection, including our own mines to defeat our adversaries’ naval forces and 
strategies. Before turning to these questions, however, some mine warfare terms 
of reference will be useful.
AN MIW “PRIMER”
Mine warfare—at sea as well as on land—comprises two broad categories 
of capabilities and operations: first, mines and mining, and second, mine 
countermeasures.
Damn, “Torpedoes”!
The fundamental goal of a minefield is to deny access, not to damage or destroy 
a specific ship or submarine. Mines, or simply psychological uncertainty about 
them (what weapons are actually in the water, and where?) can have intended 
effects even without firing.14
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Although mines or underwater IEDs can be constructed in virtually any 
configuration, there are four primary types: bottom (or “ground”) mines, buoy-
ant moored mines, floating (or drifting) mines, and limpet mines. They can be 
put in place by aircraft, surface ships, pleasure boats, submarines, or combat or 
suicide divers, even from pickup trucks crossing bridges over critical waterways. 
They are designed for operations anywhere from the surf and craft-landing zone 
(less than ten-foot water depth) to deep water (greater than two hundred feet), 
and their payloads can range from a few pounds to several tons of high explosive 
(see the figure). The same weapon can be used in offensive or defensive modes
—to attack directly an adversary’s ships or submarines or to protect one’s own 
ships, submarines, or critical sea areas, ports, or waterways.
Bottom mines, resting on the seafloor (described as “proud”), are held in place 
by their own weight but can also be buried under sediment to confound mine 
hunting; strong tides and currents can result in mine “creep.” Bottom mines 
range from thirty-six-inch cone-shaped devices to weapons twelve feet in length. 
Those intended to target surface ships are most effective in relatively shallow wa-
ter, less than two hundred feet, although bottom mines remain effective against 
submarines even in deep water.
Moored mines are buoyant cases held in place by anchors. There are three 
types: close-close-tethered and close-tethered mines, near the seafloor; in-volume 
mines; and near-surface mines. A moored mine requires a large internal air space 
to make its case buoyant, which limits the amount of explosives it can contain. As 
a result, the damage radius of a moored mine is usually less than that of a bottom 
mine. However, they can be fitted with influence sensors or armed with torpedoes 
or rockets, greatly increasing their “reach.”  
Floating mines are positively buoyant and float on or near the surface, but they 
are generally anchored in place. If allowed to drift they are completely indiscrimi-
nate. A variant, the oscillating mine, drifts beneath the surface between two set 
depths or maintains a constant depth. International law requires that automatic 
contact mines—mines that fire themselves—must become inert within an hour 
after becoming free of their anchors.15 Clearly, drifting mines that are not de-
signed to become inert are prohibited, but they continue to be used. 
Finally, combat or terrorist/suicide divers can attach limpet mines directly to 
hulls of targets, set to explode minutes, days, or longer after being put in place. 
For example, in July 1985 two time-delay limpet mines sank the Greenpeace 
vessel Rainbow Warrior in the Auckland, New Zealand, harbor. The May 2008 
sinking of the Sri Lankan logistics ship M/V Invincible by Tamil Sea Tigers using 
limpets underscored the vulnerability of military vessels to suicide-diver attack 
in ports and waterways.16
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Some mines are mobile, capable of being launched from submarines thou-
sands of yards from intended minefields. Old mines can be refitted with modern, 
highly sophisticated components to improve effectiveness and confound EOD ef-
forts, and any mine can be equipped with counter-countermeasure features—for 
example, “ship counts” or antidiver sensors—to frustrate sweeping, hunting, and 
neutralization. They can be fabricated from fiberglass or plastic, making them 
extremely difficult to detect, identify, or counter once in the water. They can be 
designed to fire in several ways: by contact, by sensing the signatures or “influ-
ences” of a surface ship or submarine, and on command.
Contact mines are either moored or surface/drifting mines that are designed 
to actuate when their cases or attachments come into contact with targets. This 
is the oldest type of mine still in use. Most contact mines use a chemical “horn” 
that becomes a battery to actuate the detonator when the chemical vial in the 
horn is broken. Others are fitted with electric switches and internal batteries to 
fire the detonator.
Influence mines can be bottom or moored weapons and can have sophisticated 
sensors and firing mechanisms that do not require contact with targets. They are 
fitted with combinations of magnetic, acoustic, seismic, underwater-electrical-
potential, pressure, and video sensors. Modern sensors use microcomputers that 
can sense a target’s approach, determine whether the sensed sig nature is a ship 
or a sweep, and estimate the optimum time to detonate as the target passes.
Command-detonated mines are moored or bottom weapons that are fired on or-
der by the miner when the target ship enters the minefield. Command-detonated 
MINE THREAT SPECTRUM
Source: U.S. Navy.
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minefields are generally—but not always—limited to protective/defensive opera-
tions in harbors or restricted waterways.
Thus, mines are “tools” that can be used in peacetime as well as crisis or war. 
Indeed, the peacetime laying of naval mines is a legal option in a state’s own in-
ternal waters and territorial sea, even on the high seas areas (though not the high-
sea regions of international straits or archipelagic waters)—so long as an explicit 
and effective Notice to Mariners is issued and other rules are followed, as the U.S. 
multiservice Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations explains.17
Hunt If You Can—Sweep If You Must
The best MCM operations are those that prevent the minelayers from putting 
their weapons in place—once in the water, mines are exceedingly difficult to 
detect, identify, and neutralize. To keep them out of the water, aircraft, cruise 
missiles, naval “fires” (long-range, targeted strikes, especially by gunnery), and 
even special-operations forces can (assuming rules of engagement permit) attack 
mine depots, assembly areas, or potential minelayers.
Failing that, MCM operations can be conducted from the high-water mark 
on shore to water depths greater than two hundred feet. Countermeasures can 
be carried out in crowded ports, in narrow assault “breaching” lanes, and in fleet 
operating areas covering many thousands of square nautical miles. The variety of 
MCM operations areas and the number of mine types and characteristics, taken 
together, greatly complicate the mine-defense “problem.” Tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that apply to one water regime, area, or mine threat do not usually 
apply to others. No other naval warfare discipline presents such a diversity of 
environments and threats.
Accordingly, several critical questions must be answered if MCM is to be 
effective:
• What intelligence do we have about the weapons?
• Where might they be deployed? 
• What is the miner’s objective?
• What are the local oceanographic, bottom, and environmental 
characteristics?
• What is already on the bottom?
• How can we know if something new is there?
With these questions in mind, MCM operations can be broken into two broad 
categories of tasks: mine hunting and minesweeping.
Mine hunting is effective against virtually all mine types. It comprises five 
steps: detection, classification, localization, identification, and neutralization. 
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Sonars are the primary means to detect and classify contacts as mine-like or not. 
Each contact can also be identified as a mine or a non-mine by specially trained 
divers, marine mammals, or such equipment as video cameras and laser systems 
on mine-neutralization or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Advanced 
sonars and electro-optical sensors on UUVs offer good promise to enhance 
mine-hunting capabilities and remove the “man and the marine mammal” from 
the minefield. Still, detection and classification/identification are slow: surface 
mine-hunting tactics using hull-mounted or towed sonars are usually carried 
out at very low speeds, on the order of three knots; mine hunting by helicopters 
is faster—depending on the sensor system, upward of fifteen knots or so—but 
less certain.
Once a contact has been detected and classified as mine-like and identified as a 
mine, it must be rendered safe before the commander can declare a route or area 
cleared. Depending on the accuracy with which the contact has been located, the 
characteristics of the bottom (i.e., smooth or rough), sediment type, amount of 
clutter, the amount of burial, and the depth of the water, among other factors, the 
detection-to-neutralization process of a single mine-like contact can take several 
hours if conducted by MCM ships, longer if by other systems.
In contrast, minesweeping is a matter of trawling defined swaths of water, us-
ing either mechanical or influence systems to expose or destroy any mines that 
might be there (along with any mine-like but non-mine objects that are there, 
too). Mechanical sweeping consists of cutting the tethers of mines moored in the 
water volume or physically damaging the mines themselves in other ways, such as 
chain drags to cut control wires. Moored mines cut loose by mechanical sweeping 
must then be neutralized (as by gunfire or explosive charges) or rendered safe for 
subsequent analysis.
Influence minesweeping consists of simulating the magnetic, electric, acoustic, 
seismic, or pressure signatures of a ship so that a mine fires harmlessly. Intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of an adversary’s mining objectives, doc-
trine, tactics, and inventories are extremely important when influence sweeping, 
as is specific intelligence on the operation of the sensors, firing criteria, and any 
counter-countermeasures (e.g., ship counters or delay arming) of mines believed 
to be present. Minesweeping is more risky to the platform than mine hunting 
and, when completed, generally leaves behind a higher residual risk to ships that 
transit the area. To ensure as low a risk as possible, then, most mine countermea-
sures operational plans include both mine hunting and minesweeping.
Before sending naval and commercial traffic through a cleared channel, a low-
value guinea pig ship often transits first to demonstrate that the channel is indeed 
safe. These low-value ships can be configured to withstand multiple hits without 
sinking, in an operation called “check sweeping.” During the 1980s “tanker war” 
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in the Arabian Gulf, for example, M/V Bridgeton struck a contact mine but was 
able to remain under way and thereafter served (inadvertently) as a guinea pig/
minesweeper of sorts, leading the way for the U.S. Navy warships that had been 
assigned to escort it and other U.S.-flagged commercial ships.
PLAN MINES AND MINING 
Chinese mine inventories total perhaps as many as a hundred thousand weap-
ons, from relatively unsophisticated but still dangerous moored contact mines 
of World War I design to rocket-propelled weapons employing sophisticated 
signal-processing and target-detection systems. However, this figure of a hundred 
thousand mines is at best a guess; no one really knows for sure—at least from 
open sources.
U.S. Government–Published Assessments
Despite a burgeoning “cottage industry” scrutinizing virtually every aspect of the 
U.S./People’s Republic of China (PRC) relationship in recent years, official un-
classified assessments of the PLAN MIW forces are remarkably slim. For example, 
a U.S. Department of Defense 2010 report to Congress gives Chinese mine-
warfare capabilities virtually no mention. Its single reference, which appears in 
two places, is indirect, simply acknowledging that in January 2010 the Barack 
Obama administration announced its intent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion worth 
of defensive arms and equipment, which included ex–U.S. Navy mine-hunting 
ships of the Osprey (MHC 51) class, as an element of a broader commitment to 
defend it against the use of force or coercion by Beijing.18
In its latest published assessment of the Chinese navy, the U.S. Navy’s Office of 
Naval Intelligence provides some pertinent details about Chinese MIW:19
• The PLAN surface force in 2009 included forty mine warfare ships (in addi-
tion to twenty-six destroyers, forty-eight frigates, more than eighty missile- 
armed patrol craft, fifty-eight amphibious ships, fifty major auxiliaries, and 
more than 250 minor auxiliaries and service/support craft).
• The Song and Yuan advanced diesel-electric submarines and the Shang 
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are the PLAN’s newest indigenous 
submarines and the first to be designed to employ the YJ-82 antiship cruise 
missile in addition to traditional loadouts of torpedoes and mines.
• The Chinese-licensed copy of the French SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter, 
the Z-8, is a medium-lift helicopter performing troop transport, antisubma-
rine, antisurface, minesweeping, and minelaying tasks.
• In the last fifteen years the PLAN has moved from an obsolete mine in-
ventory comprising primarily pre–World War II mines to a robust and 
modern inventory including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket-propelled, 
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and intelligent mines. Advanced mines feature digital microprocessors for 
enhanced targeting and integrated sensors to resist sweeping. The mines can 
be laid by submarines (primarily for covert mining of enemy ports), surface 
ships, aircraft, and fishing and merchant vessels.
• Although the PLAN considers its MCM capabilities to be relatively 
advanced—including as it does operations in complex, multiservice en-
vironments, during emission-controlled conditions, and at night—China 
recognizes that adversary mines could be a major impediment to its naval 
operations. In 1988, the PLAN launched a new minesweeper, Wolei, and 
might have developed an indigenously produced version of the French 
Pluto Plus mine-neutralization vehicle. The PLAN looks to be maturing 
into a more capable MCM force by improving its capability to protect its 
waters from mines, in addition to clearing minefields Chinese forces might 
have sown during a conflict.
• The PLAN is expanding its domestic research and development for under-
water weapons, moving away from reliance on imported systems and tech-
nology. The PLAN has reportedly developed a maintenance and inspection 
program for the upkeep of existing mine stockpiles, necessary to ensure that 
the more advanced mines, using microprocessors and long-life batteries, are 
operational when needed.
The Congressional Research Service provides a bit more information:20
• China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon 
acquisition programs, including programs for antiship ballistic missiles, 
antiship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, 
mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, destroyers and 
frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine countermeasures 
ships, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.
• Although the aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old 
technology and are much less capable than its newer submarines, China 
may decide that they have value as minelayers or as “bait,” decoy submarines 
that can draw out enemy submarines (such as American SSNs), which can 
then be attacked by other Chinese naval forces. In related areas of activity, 
China reportedly is developing new unmanned underwater vehicles and has 
modernized its substantial inventory of mines.
• China’s navy exhibits limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including 
C4ISR systems, antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and MCM. Coun-
tering China’s naval modernization might thus involve, among other things, 
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actions to exploit these limitations and weaknesses, such as developing and 
procuring electronic-warfare systems, antiship cruise missiles, Virginia (SSN 
774)–class attack submarines, torpedoes, UUVs, and mines.
Current/Future PLAN Mines and Mining
Aside from these publications, interviews with U.S. Navy MIW operators, plan-
ners, and intelligence specialists at Navy headquarters and in field activities, aug-
mented by additional sources, yield, in summary form, the following.
In the PLAN’s mine inventory are more than thirty types of contact, mag-
netic, acoustic, water-pressure, and other multiple-influence (e.g., acoustic- or 
magnetic-sensor) mines, including remote-control, rocket-propelled rising, and 
mobile mines.21 The inventory is mostly based on older, former Soviet technol-
ogy, but it also boasts newer, more sophisticated, multiple-influence types. For 
example, Chinese copies of Soviet AMD (or MDM) -series multiple-influence 
bottom mines are common, and they can have air-, ship-, or submarine-launched 
variants. The PLAN is augmenting with more-capable weapons its inventory of 
1970s/1980s-era (and even earlier) mines. Most of these older mines, designed to 
defend littoral areas, can be deployed only in shallow seas; only a fraction of them 
can be deployed in medium depths. (Table 1 shows selected Chinese navy mines.)
The shallow-water Chen-1, -2, -3, and -6 influence mines can be placed for 
defense of ports and harbors; the T-5 mobile mine can be laid in deeper waters 
in channels and approaches to ports; and the Soviet PMK-1 and the Chinese- 
developed Mao-5 rocket rising mines are intended for deeper waters farther from 
ports and in open-ocean areas and choke points.
China’s remotely controlled mines, such as the EM-53 bottom influence mine, 
can be deployed and deactivated by acoustic codes to allow the safe passage of 
friendly vessels through a mined area and then reactivated to attack adversary 
ships and submarines.
China likely also possesses an inventory of submarine-launched mobile mines 
(SLMMs), called “self-navigating mines” in Chinese. These are similar to the U.S. 
Navy’s Mk (Mark) 67 SLMMs. Thought to be derived from Yu-type torpedoes, 
China’s SLMM can travel along a user-determined course for a set period of time; 
when it arrives at its programmed destination, the torpedo’s engine shuts off and 
the weapon sinks to the bottom.
China began to develop rocket-propelled and rising mines in 1981 and pro-
duced its first prototype in 1989. Rising-mine systems are moored, sometimes in 
very deep water, and release buoyant torpedoes or warhead-tipped rockets when 
they detect targets. The guided, rocket-propelled EM-52 reportedly can reach at-
tack speeds of eighty meters per second, is armed with a 140-kilogram warhead, 
and has an operating depth of at least two hundred meters, while the Russian 
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PMK-2 rising encapsulated torpedo mine can be laid in waters deeper than two 
thousand meters (anchor depth). (A speed of eighty meters per second means 
that an EM-52 in two hundred meters of water will take about three seconds 
from weapon launch to endgame attack—far too short a time for maneuver even 
if the target detects the approaching weapon.) China reportedly offers these two 
rising mines for export.
Minelaying platforms will likely not include dedicated MCM vessels, other than 
a single 3,100-ton combination minelayer/sweeper MIW command ship, Wolei, 
mentioned by the Office of Naval Intelligence. This vessel can carry as many as 
three hundred weapons. The MCM force is focused on near-shore defense, and 
the Chinese navy has several mining options among its other assets. That said, the 
aging T-43 minesweepers can carry from twelve to sixteen mines, and the newer 
Wosao Type 082 MCM ships are capable of carrying six mines each.
About 150 maritime patrol aircraft and naval bombers can carry mines, and 
the employment of aircraft-delivered mines is considered a critical element in 
“air blockade campaigns.”22 For example, China’s Harbin SH-5 seaplane can 
carry six Chinese copies of the Russian ADM-500 mine. The aging force of H-6 
bombers might still be employed in mining roles, each capable of carrying up 
Model TDD Type/Mission Laying Platform
Case Depth
(meters)
Warhead
(kg)
C-1 500
1000
Acoustic,
magnetic
Bottom
ASW, ASUW
Surface ships, aircraft
Surface ships, aircraft, 
submarines
6–30 300
700
EM-52 Acoustic,
magnetic,
pressure
Rocket-propelled 
straight-rising 
ASW, ASUW
Surface ships 200 140
EM-56 Acoustic,
magnetic,
pressure
Mobile (13 km)
ASUW
Submarines 45 380
M-3 Contact Moored
ASUW
Surface ships,
submarines
12–430 (large)
M-4 Acoustic Moored
ASW, ASUW
Surface ships,
submarines
200 600
PMK-2 Acoustic
(passive/
active)
Rocket-propelled 
encapsulated torpedo
ASW
Aircraft, surface 
ships, submarines
400 
(anchor  depth > 
1,000)
110
Note: ASW: antisubmarine warfare; ASUW: antisurface warfare.
Sources: Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare, pp. 12–17; Friedman, World Naval Weapon Systems; Wertheim, Combat Fleets.
TABLE 1
SELECTED PLAN MINES
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to eighteen mines, as the aircraft apparently continues to be used in minelaying 
exercises. The literature seems to indicate that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Air Force bombers might also be able to deploy mines, although their availability 
for mining missions is another question.
PLAN surface warships are equipped to lay mines. The four Sovremenny-class 
(Project 956E/956EM) destroyers have rails for up to forty mines, and the ten of 
the Luda class (Types 051/051D/051Z) can each carry thirty-eight mines. The 
twenty-five Jianghu I/V–class (Type 053H) and three Jianghu III– and IV–class 
(Type 053 H2) frigates each can carry up to sixty mines. The ten Hainan-class 
(Type 037) coastal patrol craft are fitted with mine rails, while the thirty-five 
gun-armed fast attack craft of the Shanghai II (Type 062) class can be fitted with 
rails for ten mines. Chinese planners are well aware that most sea mines laid 
worldwide since 1945 have been sown by merchant ships, fishing trawlers, or 
junks—“vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” China has 
thousands of such craft available to support a mining campaign.
Submarines have attracted particular attention as deployment platforms for 
deepwater rising mines and SLMMs. The Chinese navy regards submarines as 
ideal for long-range, clandestine operations that would sow weapons in an adver-
sary’s port or naval base. The need for high-volume mine delivery is understood 
as well, and submarine mine belts—external, conformal containers designed to 
carry and release large numbers of mines—are seen as a clandestine means to 
complement high-volume aircraft delivery. These belts can expand otherwise 
limited payloads, a method pioneered in the British E-class submarines in 1915. 
More recently, the Soviet navy developed a mine belt capable of deploying fifty 
sea mines on either side of a submarine.
Approximately fifty-five PLAN submarines can sow mines in clandestine 
operations: the Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-powered attack submarines each 
carry up to thirty-six mines; twelve Song-class (Type 039/039G) diesel/guided-
missile subs also carry mines; nineteen Ming (Type 035) diesel subs, thirty-two 
mines; the twelve Kilo (Project 877EKM/636) diesel-powered cruise-missile 
boats, twenty-four mines; and the residual Romeo (Project 033) diesel boats, 
twenty-eight mines. In all cases, however, mine loads are carried at the expense 
of torpedoes.
The mine warfare school is located at Dalian, adjacent to the major surface 
warfare officer school. Chinese minelaying training and exercises have extensively 
involved air, surface, and even civilian platforms. For example, Jane’s Underwa-
ter Warfare Systems notes, “airborne minelaying is also regularly practiced and 
would be a significant component of defence planning considerations.” Also, 
in particular, the PLAN views submarine delivery of mines as a critical element 
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of offensive and blockade operations, and it practices this “most basic require-
ment of submarine warfare.” By 2002, minelaying had become one of the most 
common PLAN submarine tactics—a significant difference from the U.S. Navy 
submarine warfare “culture” that during the Cold War came to view mining as a 
diversion from more critical tasks. Indeed, PLAN crews train to handle subma-
rines loaded with large quantities of mines and practice deploying them from 
shallow, in-port/near-port locations to choke points and deep water.
Chinese naval officers recognize the challenges inherent in “penetrating the 
enemy’s antisubmarine forces and laying mines behind enemy lines.” According 
to one PLAN assessment, “Secretly penetrating the combined mobile formation 
deployed by the enemy’s antisubmarine forces is a prerequisite to fulfilling the 
mine-laying task.” There is some evidence that China may rely on centralized 
control of its submarines when conducting offensive mining missions. In carry-
ing out offensive mine blockades, for example, “if there is a shore-based subma-
rine command post to handle command and guidance of the submarine for its 
entire course, it will not only ensure its concealment but also improve the strike 
effectiveness of the mines . . . that are laid.”
The Research, Development, Test, Evaluation, and Industrial Base
Mindful of the Russian support to the North Korean mining of coastal waters 
in the late summer and early fall of 1950, China has imported Russian mines, 
technology, and even engineers to bolster its indigenous MIW programs. As a 
leading reference explains:
China aggressively seeks foreign mine technology and is believed to have done con-
siderable business acquiring advanced Russian mine technologies. The mine stock is 
estimated to number tens of thousands of weapons, mostly derivatives of USSR/
Russian origin, including M-08, M-12, M-16 and M-26 moored contact mines; the 
MYaM shallow water and M-KB deep water contact mines; the PLT-3 contact mine 
(submarine laid); and KMD and air-launched AMD influence mines. Indigenously 
developed mines include the EM 52 rocket-propelled rising mine, which closely 
resembles the first Russian “Cluster” [NATO code name] rising mine and is believed 
to be powerful enough to break the keel of an aircraft carrier; the EM 55 (submarine 
laid); and the EM 56 rising mine. Ground mines include the EM 57 remote-control 
mine and the EM 11 multipurpose mine.23
Recent data suggest that the PLAN is expanding “in-house” research on en-
hancing its indigenous deepwater rising mines: on methods to predict rocket- 
propelled-mine attack probability; analysis of launch-platform stability, under-
water rocket propulsion, and launch trajectory; target detection, tracking, blast 
maximization, and damage to ships; and the ability of targets to react to and 
evade deepwater rising mines.
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There has been discussion of a theoretical nature in published Chinese naval 
analyses concerning arming sea mines with tactical nuclear weapons, although 
there is no direct evidence of the existence of such naval tactical nuclear weapons 
programs in China. (During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy tested a mine armed 
with a tactical nuclear warhead in Operation CROSSROADS, but the weapon never 
went into production.)
Several sources offer insight regarding the Chinese mine research and devel-
opment (R&D) and industry infrastructure, which, particularly compared to the 
U.S. mine industrial base, looks to be robust. Plant 884 in Taiyuan and a satellite 
facility near Houma in Shanxi Province began producing contact mines in 1958 
and single/multiple-influence weapons in 1965, all based on Soviet technology. 
Naval civilian research facilities for demagnetization and mines center in Institute 
710, in Yichang. PLAN mine warfare testing has been concentrated in Huludao; 
other test facilities are at Lüshun, Zhoushan Island, and Changshan Island. These 
mine facilities are in the North Fleet area, except for Yichang and Zhoushan.
PLAN Mining Strategies and Scenarios
In late March 2011, a U.S. Navy MIW analyst cautioned:
Do not “mirror-image” the PLAN. It is not the U.S. Navy. They will do things differ-
ently than we otherwise might expect. For example, Beijing might announce in the 
early, “pre-kinetic” phase of a crisis that the PLAN has laid mines in critical high sea 
areas for “defensive” purposes in accordance with the international legal regime—in 
essence daring the United States and others to attempt passage: are mines in place or 
not? They could even command-fire one or two weapons just to heighten the anxiety. 
Also, don’t discount their use of “dummy” mines in great numbers to slow down and 
frustrate our and our partner-navies’ naval maneuver and MCM operations. Their 
objective would be to convince regional navies and the U.S. Navy that the cost of 
engagement would be too high—in essence achieving “checkmate” on the first move.
Finally, although it’s also important not to conflate capabilities with intentions, in 
this case the PLAN looks to be capable of and intending to use mines during a crisis 
or conflict in both “Near” and “Far Seas” scenarios.24
Another senior U.S. Navy MIW official interviewed for this article was un-
equivocal in his assessment that the Chinese could “seriously hamper an adver-
sary’s ability to enter the First Island Chain. That’s a fairly significant advantage 
to them in a ‘Taiwan Strait’ scenario—particularly if they executed this before 
the ‘kinetic’ phase of a conflict. But that’s looking at the obvious.” He continued,
The open-source Chinese literature also indicates they are concerned about Guam 
and its strategic importance as a base for USAF [U.S. Air Force] strategic bombers 
and Navy attack submarines. Apra outer harbor is very narrow; outside the harbor 
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entrance it gets deep quickly. We need to be concerned about the Chinese Navy’s 
ability to place covertly small numbers of advanced mines in strategic locations, like 
the Apra channel, even if it does no more than slow down our ability to carry out 
time-phased operations.25
Much of the sea area and several of the choke points within the First and Sec-
ond Island Chains and the approaches to Taiwan are minable, in what have been 
described as a “strategic interior line of defense” and a “tactical exterior line of 
defense,” respectively. Chinese bottom mines can be deployed in water depths of 
approximately two hundred feet and still be effective against surface targets and 
shallow-running submarines, while the PLAN’s rising mines can be deployed in 
waters some two thousand meters deep to serve as area-denial barriers—much 
like the U.S. Navy’s Mk 60 CAPTOR (enCAPsulated TORpedo) mines in the 
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom “GIUK Gap” during the Cold War.
The United States must consider the possibility of feigned or actual deploy-
ment of Chinese sea mines in conflict arising out of a crisis over territorial claims 
in the South China Sea or on the Korean Peninsula. In those areas, MCM support 
from South Korean and Japanese naval forces will be critically important in keep-
ing sea-lanes open.
That said, the U.S. Navy’s concern seems to be focused on its ability to respond 
to a Taiwan crisis in which naval mines are one element of an overall, combined-
arms campaign. The bathymetry of the Taiwan Strait and sea areas to the im-
mediate north and south of the island’s largest ports is sufficiently shallow for all 
types of PLAN mines. Although Taiwan’s eastern coast has deeper waters, a mul-
tiaxis mining effort, involving primarily submarines and aircraft, could efficiently 
blockade Taiwan. American assessments of Chinese analyses conclude that the 
PLAN believes Taiwan’s MCM vessels cannot effectively counter Chinese mines 
and that attempts by Taiwan to deploy its own mines could be defeated by PLA air 
forces, surface warships, and submarines.
The concept of the “air blockade campaign” looks to be critical for PLAN op-
erations in the Taiwan scenario as well as for A2/AD efforts, particularly within 
the First Island Chain. According to a 2011 RAND analysis:
In conjunction with the naval and ground force elements, air forces may also imple-
ment the blockade of maritime and ground traffic. Typically, maritime blockades are 
conducted jointly by the air force and navy and involve blockading maritime routes 
and attacks on shipping. Bombers and fighter-bombers are employed in blockading 
maritime routes, operations that generally involve mining port entrances and critical 
sea-lanes to impede and eventually sever transport traffic with the outside.26
This example is perhaps of most relevance for a Taiwan scenario, and aerial 
minelaying is regarded as one of the primary means employed in aerial blockades. 
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Minelaying is, according to the 2000 version of Study of Campaigns, one of the 
four important operations conducted during air blockades.
Beyond Taiwan, Chinese assessments of antisubmarine warfare suggest that 
mines are best employed against submarines by laying them in egress/ingress 
routes nearby adversaries’ bases, potentially frustrating the ability of enemy 
submarines to reach the ocean or return for replenishment should the crisis or 
conflict go on for long. In view of the strategic importance to the U.S. Navy of 
Guam, for example, it should be expected that the PLAN would attempt to lay 
mines in the approaches to bases there. Guam is within the endurance limits of 
the more capable Chinese submarines armed with “self-navigating mines.” The 
waters around the southern Ryukyus, including Okinawa, are also susceptible to 
Chinese offensive mining operations, as could be the Tsushima Strait. Offensive 
mining apparently has been a major impetus for Chinese research on mobile 
mines, and the priority would be the laying of SLMMs in each choke point of the 
First Island Chain, forming a blockade line and preventing U.S. nuclear and other 
navies’ submarines—or surface forces—from entering China’s Near Seas areas.
In light of the Chinese navy’s intense study of historical mining campaigns 
and of its focus on U.S. submarine capabilities, PLAN commanders also may 
believe that a geographically broader “deep thrust” mining campaign—even if 
employing only a few weapons at each attack point—might be worth the risk. 
For example, sporadic mining of American West and even East Coast ports by 
Chinese armed forces or PRC-sponsored terrorists may join the list of options, if 
only as a means of diluting the U.S. Navy’s constrained MCM capabilities.
Here Chinese thinking on the use of commercial vessels might come into 
play. Much of the Chinese merchant fleet falls under the control of the state- 
owned China Ocean Shipping Company (known as the COSCO Group), and 
COSCO container lines maintain scheduled services to several key American 
ports, including Los Angeles/Long Beach, San Francisco, Seattle, and Tacoma, 
Washington, on the West Coast, and Norfolk, Virginia, on the East Coast (as well 
as Kao-hsiung and Keelung in Taiwan). In addition, other, nonscheduled bulk 
and break-bulk vessels in COSCO’s large fleet—modified into covert minelayers 
—might be conscripted into minelaying service in an emergency. The domestic 
terrorist-mining threat has become an increasing interest for the U.S. Northern 
Command.
Such a course of action might be difficult for the PLA should hostilities com-
mence and key forces on both sides concentrate in the Near Seas. Prehostilities 
mine deployment, using time-delay or remote-control activation, could help 
solve the problem of laying mines without U.S. or partner navies detecting or 
responding to the act.
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U.S. AND PARTNER NAVIES’ MCM CAPABILITIES
“Brittle”—that is how several U.S. Navy mine warfare specialists described the 
Navy’s MCM capabilities in the spring of 2011.27 This brittleness is largely due 
to the state of mine warfare generally in the Navy. Mines, mining, and mine 
countermeasures—from the laboratories and industry to Navy headquarters and 
systems commands, to deployed forces—historically have accounted for less than 
1 percent of the service’s annual total funding for programs and operations. The 
vast majority of that constrained funding supports MCM, not mining, programs, 
or operations.28
Brittleness also reflects the fact that American MCM is on the cusp of a broad 
transformation from an aging force of specialized surface vessels, helicopters, 
and diver and marine-mammal EOD systems to a highly integrated, “tailored,” 
modular mine-countermeasures “system of systems” embarked on the new lit-
toral combat ships of the Freedom (LCS 1) and Independence (LCS 2) classes. The 
new “tailored” MCM forces are intended to provide direct, highly automated 
MCM support to naval maneuver forces in forward areas. However, it is proving 
difficult to maintain the material and operational readiness of in-service “legacy” 
platforms during the transition, raising concern that the Navy might be hard-
pressed to respond to some crisis or conflict involving mines before the “tailored” 
future arrives.
U.S. MCM in Transition
The sea is a maneuver area. From the U.S. Navy’s perspective, the goal of MCM 
is to enable maneuver of naval forces, not to counter every mine. If a crisis in-
volving PLAN mining of critical regions in Taiwanese waters and inside the First 
and perhaps even Second Island Chains erupted today, the U.S. Navy’s mine-
countermeasures response would clearly be a “come as it is” force of uncertain 
effectiveness, due to its small numbers and increasing obsolescence. As of the 
spring of 2011, U.S. Navy’s dedicated MCM assets fall into three main categories.
The fourteen ships of the Avenger (MCM 1) class constitute the Navy’s dedi-
cated surface mine-countermeasures capabilities. They are relatively slow, with 
top speeds of around fourteen knots, making their response to “away games” 
somewhat problematic (although they could be transported to the scene by 
heavy-lift ships). To enhance responsiveness, four are forward deployed to the 
Arabian Gulf (Manama, Bahrain), and four are homeported in Sasebo, Japan; 
the remaining six ships are in San Diego. The Avengers are fitted with several 
hunting and sweeping systems. The Navy is upgrading these ships—which in 
2011 were well beyond the midpoints of their operational lives—but their back-
logged modernization and material readiness bill, just to keep them ready in 
the near term, amounted to some $500 million. The final MCM 1 will retire in 
53
Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 48  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
2024. But for the time being, in any PLAN mine-warfare scenario, the U.S. Navy’s 
initial surface MCM response would be limited to the eight ships in Japan and 
the Arabian Gulf.
The airborne “leg” of the Navy’s mine countermeasures “triad” comprises two 
squadrons of MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters, a total of twenty-eight airframes 
—a figure that includes seven in training, as well as “pipeline” (out of service for 
rework, etc.) aircraft. Both squadrons (HM-14 and HM-15) are located at the 
Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Center for Mine Warfare Excellence, 
at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia. Two helicopters are deployed to South 
Korea and four to Bahrain. The helicopters carry out rapid-response MCM 
tasks—they can be airlifted anywhere in the world within seventy-two hours of 
the decision to deploy, assuming the availability of strategic airlift—with mine-
hunting sonars and mechanical and influence sweeping systems. In service since 
1986, the MH-53Es are capable of night operations and have a six-hour mission 
capability. In 2009, the Navy began a fatigue-life-extension program of structural 
upgrades to ensure that the helicopters can perform their missions until all are 
retired, by 2025.
The third leg of the triad is explosive ordnance disposal. The Navy’s EOD de-
tachments directly support mine-hunting and -clearance operations. They have 
specialized training in equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures to locate, 
identify, neutralize, recover, or otherwise dispose of sea mines, torpedoes, and 
other undersea weapons, including underwater IEDs.
In addition, the Navy maintains several types of marine-mammal systems, 
bottlenose dolphins and sea lions specially trained for mine detection and neu-
tralization, swimmer defense, and recovery of exercise mines, torpedoes, and 
other objects. In some situations the marine mammals are much more effective 
than humans or hardware now in service, and presently only they can detect 
buried bottom mines. Each “system” has several dolphins or sea lions that can 
be deployed quickly throughout the world by strategic airlift and worked from 
ships in forward operating areas. For example, Navy MCM dolphins deployed 
to the Arabian Gulf in 1988 during Operation EARNEST WILL, in 1991–92 dur-
ing DESERT STORM/DESERT SWEEP, and in 2003 in support of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM.
It is apparent from this summary that the U.S. Navy’s dedicated mine coun-
termeasures force is aging while the worldwide mine threat is being modernized, 
particularly that of the PLAN. As a result, the Navy is making investments in a 
future mine-defense force. Its formal requirements call for a new capability that 
various Navy briefings and publications describe as “fast, light, agile, adaptable, 
precise, and modular, to remove the man and the marine mammals from the 
minefield.”
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The focal point of this next-generation MCM force is the modular littoral com-
bat ship (LCS), which is to be the principal host for the MH-60S multimission he-
licopter (which, however, unlike the MH-53E, cannot conduct MCM at night and 
has about half of the MH-53E’s mission endurance), unmanned aerial vehicles, 
and several advanced “mission module” systems. (Of the two classes, Freedom 
is a primarily all-steel monohull design, while Independence is a predominantly 
aluminum trimaran.) Modular mine-countermeasures, antisubmarine, and anti-
surface packages are being developed to counter A2/AD strategies and contribute 
to littoral sea superiority.
The MCM mission modules include the Remote Minehunting System 
(RMS), AQS-20A mine-hunting sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
(ALMDS), Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), Organic Airborne 
and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS), Unmanned Influence Sweep System 
(UISS), and Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) system. 
The ships will also possess inherent capabilities for intelligence support, surveil-
lance, reconnaissance, special operations, and maritime interception, regardless 
of the specific mission package installed. With top speeds in excess of forty-five 
knots, the LCS looks to be far more responsive than the Navy’s legacy dedicated 
forces. Indeed, necessary mission modules could be staged in critical regions to 
allow any LCS to be reconfigured as an MCM platform, although there are grow-
ing concerns about the maturity of the MCM mission packages.29
The first units of each class, LCS 1 and LCS 2, were in service in 2011, two 
more are under construction and will be delivered in 2012, and the Navy has 
awarded contracts for an additional twenty ships (ten of each design). A total of 
fifty-five LCSs are in the Navy’s plan, and the service intends to acquire twenty-
four MCM mission packages. Two packages have been delivered, and one was 
in production in mid-2011. However, several systems of the MCM mission 
modules are not yet in service—only three (AQS-20, AMNS, and ALMDS) are 
even in “low-rate initial production”—so it will be years before the LCS (in its 
MCM configuration) replaces the Avenger class. In the meantime, the Navy is 
investigating proposals to deploy MCM mission modules on other ships, such 
as dock transport ships (LPDs)—or to land facilities from which the MH-60S 
helicopters could operate.
The U.S. Navy’s future, LCS-focused MCM assets are also to be the core forces 
dedicated to any mine-cleanup mission after crisis or hostilities. In the aftermath 
of DESERT STORM, for example, it took a multilateral MCM force of vessels and 
helicopters from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States more than two years to make the pri-
mary channels in the northern Arabian Gulf as mine-free as possible. Since then, 
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periodic MCM operations have continued in this strategic waterway (as noted, 
four of the Navy’s Avengers are homeported there). It must be expected that 
MCM-tailorable LCSs will be included in any dedicated force, and concepts for 
how they are to perform such tasks need to be addressed before the first weapon 
fires in some future crisis or conflict.
Regional Partner Navies’ MCM
Several regional navies have made a commitment to mine countermeasures, 
but all are focused on near-shore littoral operations using traditional sweeping 
and hunting, albeit in some instances complemented by remotely operated and 
unmanned systems. These resources might be available to assist U.S. Navy MCM 
operations in response to PLAN mining of critical waterways.
Australia. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) operates six Huron-class mine 
hunters (MHCs) based on the Italian Gaeta class, acquired from 1999 to 2003.30 
These are modern ships, employing several types of mechanical and influence 
minesweeping systems and variable-depth mine-hunting sonars. In service since 
1982 are the RAN’s two 520-ton auxiliary minesweepers Bandicoot and Wallaroo, 
which also deploy reconfigurable permanent-magnet influence sweeps. The RAN 
has put in place a “Craft of Opportunity program” that employs fishing vessels 
taken up from trade and fits them with side-scan sonars and magnetic influence 
sweeps. The RAN also has two small (about 115 tons full-load displacement) 
auxiliary minesweepers—MS(S)/MSA Bermagui and Koraaga—con verted from 
tuna boats, capable of deploying side-scan sonars and magnetic influence sweeps. 
Finally, the RAN operates three MCM drones employed by craft-of-opportunity 
vessels.
Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia Navy operates eleven coastal mine-hunting 
and minesweeping ships, of which only about five are in active service.31 Two are 
modern, Tripartite-class MHCs taken from Royal Netherlands Navy production 
in 1988: Pulao Rengat (ex-Willemstad) and Pulao Rupat (ex-Vlardingen). They 
embark remotely operated mine-hunting vehicles that can neutralize confirmed 
contacts, mechanical sweep equipment, and magnetic and acoustic influence 
sweeps. The remaining nine ships, ex–German navy Kondor II–class coastal pa-
trol ships, have been employed primarily as patrol craft, although their original 
mechanical sweep gear has been retained and more modern magnetic-influence 
sweeps have been tested. The three (or fewer) active Kondor IIs are obsolescent, 
at best.
Japan. Like the RAN, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has mod-
ern and capable MCM forces.32 The need for robust MCM is seared in the Japa-
nese navy’s memory by the experience of Operation STARVATION, the many years 
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needed to clear ports, harbors, straits, and nearby seas after World War II, and 
the mine experiences of the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM. Pub-
lished sources show a JMSDF mine warfare order of battle comprising about 
thirty-five surface mine hunters and minesweepers, three drone-control ships, 
and six radio-controlled MCM drones. These include a mix of new acquisitions 
(e.g., the twelve Sugashima-class MHCs, which joined the fleet in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s) and ships that were in service in the mid-1980s—certainly not 
“old,” in comparison to those of other regional navies, including the PLAN. The 
two Uraga-class mine countermeasures support ships, which entered service in 
1997–98, also serve in minelaying roles. The ships are fitted with mechanical and 
influence sweeping equipment and can operate remote mine-hunting vehicles. 
Since 1989, the JMSDF has also operated MH-53E Sea Dragon AMCM helicop-
ters; a total of eleven were in service at this writing and employed minesweeping 
and -hunting equipment similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s MCM helicopters. 
These aircraft are being replaced by the MCH-10, which will operate the OASIS 
minesweeping system, now under development in the United States, as well as 
in-service systems.
Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Navy operates four coastal mine hunters based 
on the Italian Lerici design acquired in the middle and late 1980s.33 They are 
equipped with on-board and off-board mine-hunting systems and influence and 
mechanical sweep gear. EOD divers can be embarked.
Philippines. The Philippines Navy operates no MCM ships or craft. Several ex- 
U.S. minesweepers have been modified for patrol duties and are no longer ca-
pable of mine countermeasures.
Republic of China. Rather remarkably, given the potential for extensive PLAN 
mining during a “Taiwan scenario,” the Republic of China’s MCM capabilities 
are poor.34 The Taiwan navy has only twelve small coastal mine hunters and 
sweepers, eight of which are ex-U.S. or ex-Belgian vessels built during the 1950s. 
The eight older ships are capable of minesweeping only; they are fitted with 
acoustic and magnetic systems as well as wire sweeps to cut moored mines free 
for subsequent destruction. The four units of the MWW 50/Yung Feng class were 
delivered in 1991 but were not commissioned until 1995. They can conduct 
mine-hunting as well as sweeping operations. As noted earlier, in January 2010 
the Obama administration announced its intent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion 
in defensive arms and equipment, which included Osprey-class mine hunters—
Taiwan reportedly wants two MHCs—but the deal is still pending.
Republic of Korea. The South Korean navy understands well the value of mines 
and mine countermeasures, and in any contingency on the Korean Peninsula 
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or with China mine warfare would be pivotal for the coastal defense of both its 
coasts.35 Critical sea lines of communication, particularly through the Tsushima 
Strait, are indispensable to the ability of South Korean and American forces, and 
perhaps Japanese forces as well, to fight and win. Despite this requirement, South 
Korean MCM forces are modest: a single (appropriately named) Wonsan-class 
minelayer/MCM ship, a planned ten-ship Yangyang class of coastal mine hunters, 
six SK5000-class MHCs based on the Lerici design, five ex-U.S. MSC 289–class 
coastal minesweepers (transferred between 1963 and 1975), and three ex-U.S. 
MSC 268–class coastal minesweepers (transferred in 1959). These last two classes, 
if still in service, are obsolete; the others, however, are newer (in service from 1993 
on) and can operate modern minesweeping and mine-hunting systems. In July 
2009 the Republic of Korea requested a Foreign Military Sales purchase of eight 
Seahawk multimission AMCM helicopters. (This is the same “main battery” that 
will operate from the U.S. LCSs, and it would employ the AQS-20A towed sonar 
mine countermeasures system, AES-1 ALMDS, ASQ-235 AMNS, and ALQ-220 
OASIS.) Three months later, however, the deal was postponed.
Singapore. The Republic of Singapore Navy operates four Bedok-class MCM ves-
sels based on the Swedish Landsort design.36 All were placed in service in 1995. 
These are modern, capable MCM ships, carrying two remote-control mine- 
neutralization systems. A mine rail is fitted, allowing the ships to lay mines. Be-
ginning in 2009, they received service-life extensions, which included advanced 
integrated MCM combat systems, new hull-mounted and towed synthetic-
aperture sonars, and expendable mine-disposal systems.
Vietnam. Although its inclusion in this “partner navies” discussion might seem 
problematic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam operates a small number of obso-
lescent coastal and inshore MCM vessels and craft, perhaps as many as eight, all 
ex–Soviet navy minesweepers.37 They would be irrelevant in virtually any con-
tingency involving the PLAN.
{LINE-SPACE} 
In general, the MCM assets in Pacific Rim partner navies cannot substitute for 
a more robust American mine-warfare capability in the region. Their technical 
and operational limitations and the likelihood that they would be tasked in their 
home waters mean that most would probably be unavailable to support Near 
Seas mine countermeasures. The U.S. Navy’s own MCM capability—brittle or 
not—will undoubtedly determine the extent to which Chinese mines can frus-
trate American strategies and operational plans. But whether U.S. Navy mines 
and minelaying capabilities are sufficiently effective, in turn, to defeat PLAN 
strategies, operations, and forces is uncertain.
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U.S. MINES AND MINING
“I have always deemed it unworthy of a chivalrous nation,” wrote Admiral Far-
ragut in 1864 of what we now call mine warfare, after having “damned the torpe-
does” at Mobile Bay.38 In that he echoed the Royal Navy’s rejection half a century 
earlier of “a mode of war which they who commanded the sea did not want, and 
which, if successful, would deprive them of it.”39
The U.S. Navy has had a “love/hate” relationship with its own naval weapons 
that wait, from Bushnell’s screw-torpedo and floating powder kegs to advanced, 
autonomous, twenty-first-century, networked weapons. Since the end of World 
War II, Navy planners have focused on mine countermeasures to defeat adversar-
ies’ mines rather than on sustaining our own mine inventories—perhaps with 
good reason, given the Navy’s post–World War II encounters with mines. There 
were a few exceptions, such as the advanced, deepwater Mk 60 CAPTOR mines 
targeting Soviet ballistic-missile and attack submarines.
The result has been the gradual atrophy of the “pillars” of America’s naval 
mining capabilities: the technological/industrial base, modern and effective 
mines, adequate mine stockpiles, minefield planners, trained specialists to ready 
the weapons, and the means to put them in place. If U.S. Navy MCM capabilities 
are brittle, so, too, are the Navy’s mines and mining capabilities. Without our own 
mines, we essentially give adversaries a “free pass.” Instead, they should be made 
to solve MCM problems of their own, posed by the mines of the United States 
and its maritime partners.
This is particularly important in any strategy to use American mines to deny 
sea areas to PLAN surface ships and submarines. But in such an attempt, if un-
dertaken today, the U.S. Navy would—in an instance of asymmetric irony—be 
pitting its mining weakness against the PLAN’s mine-countermeasures weakness, 
with ultimately uncertain results.
Ramping Up Mining
That said, senior Navy leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
commanders of the Third and Fifth Fleets, are warming to “offensive” mining. 
In the fall of 2010, Captain John Hardison, then deputy program manager of 
the Navy’s Mine Warfare Programs Office (PMS-495) in the Naval Sea Systems 
Command, identified remote control and improved targeting for offensive min-
ing as among his command’s “top items of interest.”40 He echoed Admiral John 
C. Harvey, Jr., Commander, Fleet Forces Command, who said the Navy needs to 
avoid losing its naval mining capabilities—although, the admiral also admitted, 
funding mine R&D was not at the top of his list of priorities.41
One measure of relative priorities is the fact that U.S. Navy mine invento-
ries pale in comparison to those of other countries. The American stockpile is 
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significantly smaller than even North Korea’s estimated fifty thousand mines, 
while the PLAN might have, as noted, on the order of a hundred thousand mines, 
and Russia has been estimated to have about 250,000. Ominously, all three (and 
another twenty or so mine-producing countries) actively sell their weapons to 
other states and nonstate actors.
The Navy’s mine arsenal includes diminishing numbers of the increasingly 
obsolescent Mk 67 submarine-launched mobile mine, which will be out of ser-
vice by the end of fiscal year 2012. The Mk 67 is a modified Mk 37 torpedo with 
its wire guidance removed and a thin-wall mine warhead and multiple-influence 
(magnetic/seismic/pressure) target detection device (TDD) installed. A shallow- 
water bottom mine meant for use against submarines and surface ships, the Mk 
67 is launched from the torpedo tubes of a submarine and runs to a preselected 
location or distance, at which point the motor shuts down and the mine sinks to 
the bottom. Arming takes place at a preset time or distance, and the mine either 
“sterilizes” (i.e., shuts itself down) or self-destructs at a predetermined end of life. 
This is the Navy’s only submarine-delivered mine, and after FY 2012 the U.S. Na-
vy’s submarine force will have no minelaying capability. There are suggestions for 
a modification to the Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo into a dual-purpose weapon
—that is, torpedo or SLMM, at the turn of a switch. If pursued, that would be 
well into the future, as no funding has been programmed.
The Navy does have the dedicated, aircraft-laid, thin-walled, two-thousand- 
pound Mk 65 Quickstrike (QS) bottom mine, as well as low-drag bomb-conversion 
kits for the aircraft-laid five-hundred-pound Mk 62 and thousand-pound Mk 
63 QS bottom mines. The Mk 62/63 weapons use general-purpose Mk 82 (five 
hundred pound) and Mk 83 (thousand pound) low-drag bombs as explosive 
warheads. Arming takes place at a preset time after the mine enters the water and 
comes to rest on the bottom, and the mines either self-destruct or sterilize at the 
end of life.
The in-service multiple-influence Mk 57, Mk 58, and advanced Mk 71 TDDs 
are used with the converted general-purpose bomb QS weapons and the Mk 65 
dedicated mine. The TDD Mk 71 for the QS Mk 65 was fielded in the spring of 
2011, and the Navy has one approved software algorithm for its use, with three 
more ready for final testing. The Mk 71 is a programmable device capable of 
responding to a broad spectrum of target types, from small combatant craft and 
quiet, diesel-electric or air-independent submarines to major warships . The Mk 
71 development program dates to the early 1990s, and acquisition began in FY 
2005, but it has been chronically hamstrung by low-level funding and changing 
priorities, as well as by a “tech refresh” to make it more producible. The devel-
opment of a new Mk 75 safe and arming fuse for Mk 62 and Mk 63 QS bomb 
60
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
 T RU V E R  55
conversions has also taken longer than anticipated, but it should enter service by 
2017–18. As an example of the fragility of the American mine industrial base, 
only a single company produces the Mk 71/75 TDDs, and a sole subcontractor 
company that provided a critical component has ceased production, forcing the 
Navy to look for alternative sources.
There is no surface minelaying capability in the U.S. Navy, although the service 
might investigate rolling Mk 62 and Mk 63 Quickstrikes off virtually any avail-
able ships (e.g., the LCS) or craft—something Libya, using Soviet/East German 
“export” mines, did from a ferry (M/V Ghat) in the Red Sea during the summer 
of 1984.42
With the demise of the Mk 67 SLMM in 2012, the nation’s sole minelaying 
capabilities will reside in naval aviation and the U.S. Air Force. The Navy’s P-3C 
Orion maritime patrol aircraft and F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet can drop QS 
mines (P-3C mine loadouts are four Mk 63 or two Mk 65 mines, and Hornets 
can carry all three QS variants), but the P-3Cs will start leaving service in 2013. 
They will be replaced by the P-8 Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft; it 
too will also have a mining capability, but its ability to lay mines in meaningful 
numbers is years away.
Minelaying training for F/A-18 Hornet pilots ramped up in 2011, and the 
Navy’s minefield planners have seen a renaissance of sorts within the aviation 
strike warfare community. However, the last time the U.S. Navy aircraft laid 
mines “in anger” was during the DESERT STORM “air war” in February–March 
1991. A sortie of four A-6 Intruders from Attack Squadron 55 embarked on USS 
Ranger (CV 61) attempted to mine the Khwar 'Abd Allah waterway with Mk 36 
Destructor mines (DSTs, predecessors of the Quickstrike) in January 1991, but 
with uncertain results. One aircraft was shot down and the crew lost, a reminder 
of how dangerous airborne mining can be. The Navy did employ Mk 36 DSTs 
against Iraqi bridges and runways (a tactic perfected against traffic along jungle 
trails during the Vietnam War), with better effect and no losses.43
The U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit stra-
tegic bombers constitute the nation’s only high-volume mining capability. B-1s 
can carry more Quickstrike mines than the seemingly ageless B-52s (expected 
to remain active through 2040, the first B-52H having entered service in 1961), 
and the B-52s and B-1s—but not B-2s—regularly train for and practice this mis-
sion.44 Close collaboration between the Navy and Air Force has been on the rise 
in recent years, and in 2011 planning began for B-52s and B-1s to deliver mines 
for an in-water mine test. However, in wartime, high-volume mining will be only 
one of several missions demanded of Air Force strategic bombers and, if the 
minefields are at great distances, their supporting fleet of aerial tankers.
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Mining-specific training continues to be a concern for planners. The focus 
at the Mine Warfare Training Center in San Diego has been on MCM rather 
than mining, although the Naval Mine and Anti-submarine Warfare Command 
(NMAWC) is increasingly emphasizing training for aircrews in mining tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. But the Navy’s institutional knowledge base for min-
ing and minefield training largely amounts to “received wisdom” passed down by 
experts in the Mobile Mine Assembly Division of the Navy Munitions Command. 
In the late spring 2011 there were only two minefield planners in the U.S. Navy—
a retired Coast Guard captain and a Limited Duty/Surface Ordnance naval officer 
assigned to NMAWC—in addition to a handful of enlisted rated minemen (none 
of whom have formal training).
Looking to an ambiguous future, in the fall of 2010 Captain Mark Rios, Re-
source Sponsor for Mine Warfare (N852) in the Expeditionary Warfare Director-
ate (N85) of the Navy Staff, observed that while the Navy has a good ability to lay 
indiscriminate mines, it could create mines that would more effectively and dis-
criminately target enemy ships and could be turned on and off by remote control. 
“We want there to be a discussion about how we can use mines,” Captain Rios 
noted in October 2010.45 “Clearly some of our adversaries or potential adversar-
ies have submarines and patrol craft that are very nimble and fast. Early on in 
the conflict, mining their harbors or their approaches to come in and out of port 
would reduce the number of ships and submarines that could come out to attack 
us and this reduces the threat.” He also mentioned that N85 is assessing concepts 
for “glide mines” (fitted with global positioning system targeting, they could be 
launched from tactical aircraft well outside the range of adversary antiaircraft 
weapons) and mine-laying UUV “trucks” (that could be clandestinely deployed 
from the Navy’s special-forces/guided-missile attack submarines).46
That vision will likely prove optimistic. There have been only a few efforts—
halfhearted and short-lived—since the Cold War ended in 1991 to develop new 
mines. An improved submarine-launched mine based on the Mk 48 torpedo was 
initiated but died in 2002, and there was the “2010 Mine,” a modern air-dropped 
mine to complement the Quickstrike mines by 2010. That too was canceled.
Several years ago the Navy proposed a new family of mines, Sea Predator, that 
fell victim to the tyranny of the budget when available funds were shifted to solve 
the land-IED problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.47 That said, low-level testing and 
proof-of-concept work have continued, and the Navy has modeled a networked-
mine approach with some analytical success. The Sea Predator concept called for 
an advanced, remote-control, autonomous mobile mine (in some concepts more 
like an armed UUV than a traditional mine) that would nonetheless take advan-
tage of the basic mine characteristics—high lethality, long endurance, “man out 
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of the loop” tactics, strong psychological impact, and force-multiplying features 
that free manned platforms for other duties. Sea Predator was to have an excep-
tionally large damage width. It was also to be deployable by both submarines and 
surface ships (the littoral combat ship was a candidate platform). Thus the dis-
tinction among smart mobile mines, torpedoes, and UUVs is becoming blurred.
Some have suggested acquiring foreign mines for American service. For ex-
ample, in 2005 the Naval Research Advisory Committee concluded,
The U.S. Navy should consider employing mines in offensive operations, to create 
barriers to deny areas of interest/operations to hostile submarines, UUVs, and SDVs 
[swimmer delivery vehicles]. The current U.S. mine capability is limited and rapidly 
dying. It is unlikely that the planned 2020 Mine [Sea Predator] will be developed 
on time, at cost, and with the capabilities originally expected. Accordingly, the Panel 
recommends the use of existing and in-development foreign-built mines that could 
be fitted with advanced sensors to meet the use described above.48 
As this article was prepared, the Navy was considering a “drill down” study to get 
to the “ground truth” about acquiring and employing foreign mines.
Still, this nascent interest in advanced, sophisticated offensive mines has not 
yet translated to funding, and given increasing pressures on Defense and Navy 
budgets, “business as usual” will likely set in. Within the mine warfare communi-
ty itself, investment in advanced new mines looks to be held hostage by resource 
competition. The Navy’s mine-warfare resource sponsor (that is, the require-
ments and funding office) has a difficult problem: balancing MCM and mines/
mining while having to fund both legacy and future MCM systems as they are 
brought on line, with no growth in total budget. In short, while the technologies 
for improving mines are mature, the Navy’s will to develop, acquire, and deploy 
them remains uncertain.
This in turn brings into question emerging strategies to deal with the PLAN 
anti-access/area-denial challenges, generally, and the Chinese mine threat, 
specifically.
U.S. Mines in the AirSea Battle Concept
While still being refined and debated in mid-2011 (and at this writing still not 
formally released), an “AirSea Battle Concept” outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review—focused largely on defeating a Chinese A2/AD strategy in both 
Near and Far Seas scenarios but also addressing those of Iran and North Korea—
has implications for the nation’s future mines and mining capabilities:
Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are developing 
a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military 
operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area-
denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate 
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capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace
—to counter growing challenges to American freedom of action. As it matures, the 
concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effec-
tive power projection operations.49
Specifically regarding U.S. mines and mining, observers have outlined several 
candidate AirSea Battle “future capabilities” and concepts to defeat A2/AD sys-
tems of China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. These could include:50
• Enhanced capabilities are needed for undersea operations generally, includ-
ing submarines, submersible robotic systems, and mines.
• Offensive mining appears particularly attractive, given its comparatively low 
cost and the difficulty and time-consuming nature of countermine opera-
tions. Mining will generally be effective only in areas close to hostile terri-
tory, near the approaches to ports and naval bases, and in choke points.
• Significant numbers of smart mobile mines capable of autonomous move-
ment over extended distances to programmed locations are needed. Such 
mines should be deployable by submarines and stealthy Air Force bombers. 
Smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting PLAN sub-
marines and surface forces or blocking their access to and from their bases.
• Stealthy minelaying platforms capable of penetrating A2/AD systems are 
preferable. Assuming that submarine-launched weapons—armed UUVs 
and more traditional mines—are in the inventory, these capabilities will 
likely need to be deployed almost exclusively from submarines during the 
early stages of a conflict, as submarines represent the only highly survivable 
maritime asset of the United States and its maritime partners. However, 
they have limited payload capacity, must trade off mine loads for torpedoes, 
have lengthy transit times (whereas the theater is enormous), and, perhaps 
most important, are needed for other high-priority missions. Establishing 
effective minefields near all PLAN bases would require a prolonged effort if 
submarines alone were assigned the mission.
• The AirSea Battle Concept would also employ stealthy Navy and Air Force 
aircraft to lay mines, and they could prove particularly effective in that role, 
given their large payloads.
• The Air Force should equip its stealthy, large, long-range/long-endurance, 
manned and unmanned platforms with an offensive minelaying capability 
and then train and conduct exercises in conjunction with the Navy for of-
fensive minelaying missions within the PLAN’s A2/AD zone.
These AirSea Battle mining initiatives are years, if not longer, away from bear-
ing fruit, and whether they ever do depends on an American commitment to 
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design, engineer, and acquire modern mines—problematic at best. However, if 
advanced U.S. mine-development programs are pursued, they promise to chal-
lenge PLAN naval forces generally, but also Chinese MCM forces, which, like 
those of the United States, are “brittle,” particularly when compared to China’s 
mines and mining capabilities.
Moreover, from a broader countermining perspective, U.S. Air Force strategic 
aircraft, Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft, long-range land-attack cruise mis-
siles, and aircraft carrier–based armed unmanned aircraft systems would certain-
ly be used to attack mine depots and warehouses, assembly areas, and minelaying 
platforms should intelligence be sufficiently precise and accurate. While prehos-
tilities (“prekinetic”), preemptive destruction of PLAN mining capabilities is 
probably out of the question for a variety of reasons—diplomatic (it would be a 
significant escalation of a crisis), operational (PLAN submarines would probably 
be deployed and weapons laid well before bombers departed bases in Guam and 
Missouri), and practical (how would the United States determine whether mines 
were on board a given COSCO merchant ship or fishing boat—that is, solve the 
quintessential maritime-domain-awareness challenge?)—it is unlikely that the 
option to do so would not be included in operational plans.
CHINESE NAVY MCM CAPABILITIES
Compared to the PLAN’s extensive mine/mining capabilities, Chinese mine- 
countermeasures forces look much less impressive.51 Various sources indicate 
a total order of battle of about twenty-eight active MCM vessels (with another 
sixty-eight or so in reserve) and four “mine warfare drones” (with another forty-
two in reserve), plus another seventy small, port- and harbor-focused MCM 
craft. PLAN minesweeping forces are strictly coastal and port/harbor vessels, 
except for the T-43 minesweepers and the single MCM command ship.
The first Chinese minesweepers were nine coastal ships delivered after the end 
of World War II: four former Japanese 222-ton units delivered in 1947 and five 
350-ton former U.S. Navy yard minesweepers in 1948. The first postwar-design 
minesweepers, and the beginning of a credible Chinese mine warfare force, were 
the four T-43 minesweepers obtained from the Soviet Union in 1955. China be-
gan building copies at Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan and at Donglang Shipyard in 
Canton (Guangzhou). The first two were launched in 1956, and by 1976 a total of 
twenty-three had been built. Wuchang ceased production in 1960, but Donglang 
continued until a total of forty minesweepers had been built. As many as sixteen 
T-43s may remain active, with the rest in reserve or modified for patrol duties, if 
not scrapped. Chinese MCM equipment on the T-43s includes mechanical and 
magnetic sweep gear.
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In the late 1970s/early 1980s, the Chinese copied the German remote-control 
Troika minesweepers, producing more than fifty, designated the Futi class (Type 
312). These are capable of magnetic and acoustic sweeping under remote control 
up to five kilometers from a shore control station. Although several PRC mine-
sweepers have been marketed for export, the only sales were to Thailand and 
Pakistan.
Four steel-hulled, 320-ton Wosao (Type 082)–class coastal minesweepers are 
in service, the first of them commissioned in 1988. The second was not seen until 
1997. They are equipped with mechanical, magnetic, acoustic, and low-frequency/
infrasonic sweeps.
At least five Wochi-class mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs) are in ser-
vice and are capable of acoustic and magnetic minesweeping. The first of the 
class, Zhangjiagang, was commissioned in 2007; the second, Jingjiang, in Novem-
ber 2007; and the remaining vessels at regular intervals. Final numbers in the class 
are not known, but indications are that it might replace the remaining T-43s.
Only one Wozang-class MCMV is known to be in commission. Commissioned 
in July 2005, it was thought to be a successor to the T-43; however, no additional 
hulls have been seen. The hull seems to be built of glass-reinforced plastic to 
reduce its magnetic signature and to have acoustic-reduction features to reduce 
self-noise. It is believed to be capable of remotely operating mine-hunting/
sweeping vehicles.
Wolei can serve as a command ship during mine-clearing operations. Another 
one-of-a-kind unit is hull 4422 of the Wosao class; it was designed for export, but 
there were no customers. In 1976, about twenty Shanghai II patrol boats were 
built for minesweeping and named the Fushun class.
China’s approximately seventy smaller coastal and auxiliary minesweepers 
are attached to various maritime-district control roles. Examples include the 
four-hundred-ton Lienyun-class minesweepers, which are designated with dis-
trict letters—such as J-141 and J-143, under the Shanghai Maritime Military 
District—and the Fushun 250-ton coastal sweeper E-303. All of the coastal and 
harbor minesweepers are equipped solely with simple, mechanical sweeps that 
counter only moored contact mines.
The PLAN has apparently developed towed-array MCM sonars operated from 
helicopters. The Changhe Z-8, similar to the French Super Frelon design, is the 
largest helicopter yet built in China. The Z-8 carries out auxiliary roles in the 
PLAN, such as towing of mine-clearing systems, vertical in-flight refueling of 
ships, and support to the submarine fleet.
In short, the PLAN MCM force appears to be quite limited and devoted pri-
marily to minesweeping in near-shore regions, ports, and waterways. In direct 
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counterpoint to the U.S. Navy’s MIW posture, PLAN attention seems to be fo-
cused on mines and mining rather than the countermeasures needed to deal with 
its adversaries’ mines. 
AN EXCELLENT RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Mines, like the poor, will always be with us. Mines and their terrorist-counterpart 
underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build and are cheap, but their low cost 
belies their potential to do significant damage. With costs measured from a few 
hundred to several thousand dollars, they are asymmetric weapons of choice for 
a “poor man’s navy,” providing an excellent return on investment. To summarize 
the discussions of this article:
• Current and projected future Chinese naval mine technologies, inventories, 
delivery systems, doctrine, and training are robust. The PLAN seems to take 
mining seriously.
• China could rather easily employ sea mines in several Near Seas as well as 
Far Seas scenarios, in addition to the “Taiwan scenario.” Also, given develop-
ment of stealthy minelaying systems, particularly advanced submarines, the 
PLAN could extend mining operations to key targets beyond the First Island 
Chain. Indeed, mines could be employed in virtually any crisis or conflict. 
Mine Warfare Area PLA Navy U.S./Partner Navies
Mines and mining “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Mix 
of many older but still dangerous weap -
ons with new, sophisticated devices 
supported by strong RDT&E efforts. 
Doctrinal foundation for mining ap-
pears to be strong. Uneven capabilities 
with regard to submarine, surface, and 
airborne mine-delivery platforms.  
Limited mine capabilities and likely to 
worsen without significant investment 
in RDT&E and acquisition of modern 
weapons and delivery platforms. Doctri-
nal foundation for mining is weak. With 
the demise of the Mk 67 SLMM in 2012, 
the only U.S. minelaying capability 
resides in Navy tactical aircraft and Air 
Force strategic bombers.
Mine countermeasures “Brittle,” obsolescent platforms and sys-
tems, mixed with small numbers of 
more modern technologies, systems. 
MCM command, control, communica-
tions, intelligence, reconnaissance, and 
surveillance capabilities uncertain.
“Brittle” and worsening in near term 
until LCS and MCM mission modules 
in service in numbers post-2020. Need 
concept of operations for post-2020 “hy-
brid organic/dedicated” MCM forces. 
Other than Australia and Japan, re-
gional partner navies’ MCM capabili -
ties are limited and constrained to 
coastal operational environments.
TABLE 2
PLAN/U.S. NAVY MIW COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
Note: RDT&E: research, development, testing, and evaluation.
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U.S., allied, and partner navies in the region thus must be mindful of the 
potential that they will have to counter Chinese weapons that wait.
• The U.S. Navy and its allied and partner navies are ill prepared to cope with 
Chinese mine warfare strategies and operations. In addition to the eight 
American MCM ships in the region, only the Australian and Japanese MCM 
forces look up to the task of countering Chinese mines in approaches to 
ports and harbors, in choke points, and in the open sea. All others are likely 
to be held back for local or littoral operations. Assuming the eventual suc-
cess of the LCS and its organic tailored-mission MCM systems, however, the 
balance might become more even.
• The U.S. Navy is significantly hamstrung in types and numbers of mines and 
in its ability to deploy them in the Near Seas with precision and in high vol-
ume. The lack of sufficient numbers of modern, sophisticated, and effective 
mines casts doubt on emerging concepts like the AirSea Battle, exposing the 
reality behind the rhetoric, at least in the mine warfare arena.
Table 2 provides a thumbnail assessment of the PLAN, U.S. Navy, and regional- 
partner navy mine warfare balance as of the spring of 2011.
The conclusions reached in 2009 by analysts of the U.S. Naval War College’s 
China Maritime Studies Institute remain sound.52 First, China has a large inven-
tory of naval mines, many of which are obsolete but still deadly, and somewhat 
more limited numbers of sophisticated modern mines, some of which are op-
timized to destroy enemy submarines. Second, we think that China would rely 
heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario. Third, were China able to 
employ these mines—and all think that it could—they would greatly hinder 
operations, for an extended time, in waters where the mines were even thought 
to have been laid.
In short, the U.S. Navy and its regional maritime partners damn China’s “tor-
pedoes” at their peril.
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ivil-military relations describe the interactions among the people of a state, 
the institutions of that state, and the military of the state. At the institutional 
level, there are “two hands on the sword.”1 The civil hand determines when to 
draw it from the scabbard and thence guides it in its use. This is the dominant 
hand of policy, the purpose for which the sword exists in the first place. The mili-
tary’s hand sharpens the sword for use and wields it in combat.2
From the time of the Revolution to the present, U.S. civil-military relations 
essentially have constituted a bargain among the aforementioned parties—the 
people, the civil government, and the military establishment—concerning the 
allocation of prerogatives and responsibilities bet-
ween the government and the military, in answer to 
five questions:3 Who controls the military instrument? 
What is the appropriate level of military influence on 
society? What is the role of the military? What pattern 
of civil-military relations best ensures military success? 
Who serves?4
From time to time throughout American history, 
certain circumstances—political, strategic, social, tech-
nological, etc.—have changed to such a degree that 
the terms of the existing civil-military bargains have 
become obsolete. The resulting disequilibrium and 
tension have led the parties to renegotiate the bargains 
in order to restore equilibrium. 
C
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This is not to say that in the United States the parties to the bargain are equal. 
The American civil-military bargain is the outcome of an “unequal dialogue.” It 
is “a dialogue, in that both [the civilian and military] sides expressed their views 
bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly—and [an] 
unequal [one], in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous 
and unquestioned.”5 In the United States, the military, despite having a monopoly 
on coercive power, has generally accepted its position relative to the other parties. 
As the idea of a periodic renegotiation of the civil-military bargain would sug-
gest, there have been some fairly serious civil-military clashes over the past two 
decades. They primarily reflect changes in the security environment but also have 
been driven to some degree by changing social and political factors. 
For example, a substantial renegotiation of the civil-military bargain took 
place with the end of the Cold War. The change in the security environment oc-
casioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a lack of consensus regarding 
what the military was expected to do in the new security environment. The result 
was a period of drift that had an impact on civil-military relations. During this 
period, some observers worried that the military had become more alienated from 
its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, that it had become 
politicized and partisan, that it had become resistant to civilian oversight, that 
officers had come to believe that they had the right to confront and resist civilian 
policy makers—to insist that civilian authorities heed their recommendations
—and that the military was becoming too influential in inappropriate areas of 
American society.6 
Arguably another renegotiation of the civil-military bargain began to take 
shape after the attacks of 9/11, as the military found itself fighting protracted 
irregular wars instead of the conventional wars it prefers. Illustrative of civil-
military tensions were clashes between the uniformed services and President 
George W. Bush’s first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, over efforts to 
“transform” the military from a Cold War force to one better able to respond to 
likely future contingencies, and the planning and conduct of U.S. military opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq. These tensions peaked with the so-called revolt 
of the generals in the spring of 2006, which saw a number of retired Army and 
Marine Corps generals publicly and harshly criticize Secretary Rumsfeld.7 
With Rumsfeld’s departure and the apparent success of the “surge” in Iraq, 
some expressed hope that harmony might return to American civil-military 
relations. To be sure, Rumsfeld’s successor as secretary of defense, Robert Gates, 
did a great deal to improve the civil-military climate. But subsequent events—
including Gates’s decision to fire two service secretaries and a service chief, to 
recommend against renominating the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a 
second term, and to force the retirement of a combatant commander, as well as a 
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public disagreement on military strategy between President Barack Obama and 
the ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and the lat-
ter’s subsequent relief—make it clear that the state of U.S. civil-military relations 
remains contentious at best.8 
The new secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, as well as new service chiefs and combatant 
commanders, will be deeply involved in a likely renegotiation of the civil-military 
bargain as the country draws down from a decade of war just as it faces severe 
fiscal constraints. It is a given that the Defense Department will face substan-
tial budget reductions, placing a great deal of stress on civil-military relations. 
Whether they realize it or not, military officers of all grades, not only the most 
senior commanders, will be deeply involved in the constant negotiating that 
shapes the U.S. civil-military bargain. Here’s some of what they need to know.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INCLUDE MORE THAN CIVILIAN 
CONTROL
Most of the debate over American civil-military relations since the 1990s has 
been dominated by concerns about civilian control of the military establishment. 
Indeed, some observers believe that the focus on civilian control has obscured 
other equally important elements of civil-military relations.9 But as noted above, 
the domain of civil-military relations encompasses four questions in addition to 
control of the military.
The first additional question raises the issue of what degree of military influ-
ence is appropriate in a liberal society such as the United States. The extreme form 
of military influence in society is militarism, a state of affairs in which military 
values predominate and the military devours a disproportionate share of society’s 
resources. What is the proper scope of military affairs? In today’s environment, 
what constitutes military expertise? Does it go beyond what Samuel Huntington 
called in The Soldier and the State, his classic study of civil-military relations, the 
“management of violence”?10 Should it? 
For instance, to what extent should the military influence foreign policy? Has 
American foreign policy become “militarized”? Do combatant commanders ex-
ercise too much power? Have they become the new “viceroys” or “proconsuls”?11 
What is proper regarding the military and domestic politics? Should active-duty 
officers be writing op-eds in support of particular programs or policies? Should 
retired officers get involved in partisan politics? What is the military’s proper role 
in influencing the allocation of resources? 
Next, what is the appropriate role of the military? Is the military establishment’s 
purpose to fight and win the nation’s wars or to engage in constabulary actions? 
What kind of wars should the military prepare to fight? Should the focus of the 
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military be foreign or domestic? The United States has answered this question 
differently at different times and under different circumstances. For example, 
throughout most of its history the U.S. Army was a constabulary force. It perma-
nently oriented itself toward large-scale conflicts against foreign enemies only in 
the 1930s. The end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 have suggested new 
answers—for example, a focus on “irregular warfare” (counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism), as well as an openness to the use of the military in domestic 
affairs, such as disaster relief in response to emergencies like Katrina, domestic 
law enforcement during the Los Angeles riots, or border security. What impact 
do such issues have on civil-military relations? 
Next, what pattern of civil-military relations best ensures the effectiveness of the 
military instrument? All of the other questions mean little if the military instru-
ment is unable to ensure the survival of the state. If there is no constitution, the 
question of constitutional balance doesn’t matter. Does effectiveness require a 
military culture distinct in some ways from the society it serves? What impact 
does societal structure have on military effectiveness? What impact does political 
structure exert? What impact does the pattern of civil-military relations have on 
the effectiveness of strategic decision-making processes? 
And finally, who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship, or 
something else? How are enlisted members recruited and retained? How should 
the U.S. military address issues of “diversity” in the force? What about reserves, 
racial and ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals? 
Obviously, questions regarding military service have been answered by Ameri-
cans in various ways. Through most of its early history, the United States main-
tained a small regular peacetime establishment that mostly conducted limited 
constabulary operations. During wartime, the several states were responsible for 
raising soldiers for federal service, either as militia or volunteers. 
While the United States resorted to a draft during the Civil War and again dur-
ing World War I, conscription became the norm in the United States only from 
the eve of World War II until the 1970s. Today the U.S. military is a volunteer 
professional force. But even now the force continues to evolve, as debates over 
such issues as the role of the reserve components in the post-9/11 military force, 
women in combat, service by open homosexuals, and the recruitment of religious 
minorities, especially Muslims, make clear. 
The question of civilian control is important, but a myopic focus on this issue 
means that other important questions are often ignored. In addition, the fact that 
liberal societies like the United States often take civilian control for granted raises 
several further questions: Does civilian control refer simply to the dominance of 
civilians within the executive branch—the president or the secretary of defense? 
What is the role of the legislative branch in controlling the military instrument? 
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Is the military establishment “unified,” that is, does it speak with anything like a 
single voice vis-à-vis the civil government? 
What is the nature of military advice? Should military leaders “insist” that 
their advice be heeded? What courses of action are available to military leaders 
who believe the civilian authorities are making bad decisions? In other words, is 
there something that might be called a “calculus of dissent” that military leaders 
can invoke in cases where they believe civilian decisions are dangerous to the 
health of the country? These issues, addressed below, are part and parcel of what 
officers need to know about civil-military relations.12 
CIVILIAN CONTROL INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 
It involves Congress as well. As the constitutional scholar Edward Corwin once 
famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy” between Congress and the president.13 But 
there is a similar tension at work with regard to civil-military relations. Those 
who neglect the congressional role in American civil-military relations are miss-
ing an important element.14 
The military has two civilian masters, and this has implications for civil-
military relations that officers must understand. For instance, while the president 
and secretary of defense control the military when it comes to the use of force, in-
cluding strategy and rules of engagement, Congress controls the military directly 
with regard to force size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly regarding 
doctrine and personnel. Indeed, Congress is the “force planner” of last resort. 
The U.S. military accepts civilian control by both Congress and the president 
but offers advice intended to maintain its own institutional and professional 
autonomy. On use of force, the military is usually granted a good deal of leeway 
regarding the terms and conditions for such use. 
By not dissenting from executive-branch policy, American military officers 
implicitly agree to support presidential decisions on the budget and the use of 
force, but they also must recognize an obligation to provide their alternative 
personal views in response to Congress. However, officers must recognize that 
Congress exerts its control with less regard for military preferences than for 
the political considerations of its individual members and committees. Thus 
congressional control of the military is strongly influenced by political consider-
ations, by what Samuel Huntington called “structural,” or domestic, imperatives 
as opposed to strategic ones. 
When the president and Congress are in agreement, the military complies. 
When the two branches are in disagreement, the military tends to side with the 
branch that most favors its own views, but never to the point of direct disobedience 
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to orders of the commander in chief. Military officers are obligated to share their 
views with Congress. Doing so should not be treated as an “end run” undermin-
ing civilian control of the military.15 
THE ABSENCE OF A COUP 
The absence of a coup does not indicate that civil-military relations are healthy or 
that civilian control has not eroded. All too often, officers seem to believe that if 
the United States does not face the prospect of a Latin American– or African-style 
military coup d’état, all is well in the realm of civil-military relations. But this is a 
straw man. A number of scholars, including Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, the late 
Russell Weigley, Michael Desch, and Eliot Cohen, have argued that although there 
is no threat of a coup on the part of the military, American civil-military relations 
have nonetheless deteriorated over the past two decades.16 
Their concern is that the American military “has grown in influence to the 
point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and deci-
sions,” which manifests itself in “repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces 
to frustrate or evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to 
preclude outcomes the military dislikes.” The result is an unhealthy civil-military 
pattern that “could alter the character of American government and undermine 
national defense.”17 
In theory, Kohn argues, “civilians have the authority to issue virtually any or-
der and organize the military in any fashion they choose.” 
But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree 
among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority 
by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; 
by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect 
channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching 
friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions, or 
carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. . . . We are not talking about a 
coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the 
tune in military affairs in the United States today.18 
But this seems to support the contention that actual civil-military relations rep-
resent the outcome of constant bargaining. 
Kohn argues that balanced civil-military relations in the United States have 
traditionally rested on four foundations, which, he argues, have eroded: the rule 
of law and reverence for the Constitution; a small force in peacetime; reliance on 
the citizen-soldier; and the military’s own internalization of military subordina-
tion to civilian control. Kohn cites Major General John J. Pershing’s instructions 
to First Lieutenant George Patton in 1916: “You must remember that when we 
enter the army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the 
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government, entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances. 
We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or 
else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete 
understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.” Or in the words 
of Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Thirty-two years 
in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and keep my 
name out of the papers.”19
While Kohn acknowledges that civil-military tensions are not new, he argues 
that current conditions are such that the threat of military insubordination is 
much greater than in the past. First, thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, 
the military is united in an unprecedented way. Whereas in the past the armed 
services often were at odds over roles, missions, budgets, and weapons systems, 
today they can work together to shape, oppose, evade, or thwart the choices civil-
ians make. Of course in view of the upcoming budgetary battles that can be ex-
pected over the next few years as resources for defense are substantially reduced, 
this unity may well deteriorate. 
Second, many of the issues in play today reach far beyond the narrowly mili-
tary, not only to the wider realm of national security but often to foreign relations 
more broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the character and values 
of American society itself. Kohn argues that this expanded role represents a sig-
nificant encroachment on civilian control of the military. Third, military advice 
and advocacy are now much more public than they once were. Fourth, senior 
officers now lead a large, permanent peacetime military establishment that dif-
fers fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Kohn argues that this military is 
increasingly disconnected, even estranged, from civilian society, while at the same 
time it is becoming a recognizable interest group, “larger, more bureaucratically 
active, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than 
anything similar in American history.”20 
According to Kohn, the erosion of civilian control gives rise to “toxic” civil-
military relations, which, he argues, damage national security in at least three 
ways: by paralyzing national security policy; by obstructing or even sabotaging 
the ability of the United States to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise inter-
national leadership; and by undermining the confidence of the military as an 
institution in its own uniformed leadership.21 
The military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership on numerous occa-
sions during the last two decades. This pushback has manifested itself (to use Pe-
ter Feaver’s formulation) in various forms of “shirking”—“foot dragging,” “slow 
rolling,” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy or individual policy 
makers.22 Such actions were rampant during the William Clinton presidency and 
during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. Such pushback is 
79
Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 74  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
based on the claim that civilians are making decisions without paying sufficient 
attention to the military point of view. This leads to the next principle of civil-
military relations: officers have an obligation to make their case as strongly as 
possible but do not have the right to “insist” that their advice be accepted. How-
ever, there must be a “calculus of dissent.”
MILITARY ADVICE: PROFESSIONAL SUPREMACISTS VS. CIVILIAN 
SUPREMACISTS
During the 1990s, some military officers explicitly adopted the view that soldiers 
have the right to a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military instru-
ment, that indeed they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. This 
assumption has been encouraged by a serious misreading of a very important 
book by H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.23 
The subject of Dereliction of Duty is the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara adequately during the Vietnam War. Many 
serving officers believe the book effectively makes the case that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff should have more openly opposed the Lyndon Johnson administration’s 
strategy of gradualism and then resigned rather than carry out the policy. But 
the book says no such thing. While McMaster convincingly argues that the chiefs 
failed to present their views frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, 
including members of Congress, he neither says nor implies that they should 
have obstructed President Johnson’s orders and policies through leaks, public 
statements, or resignation. 
This misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the increas-
ingly widespread belief among officers that they should be advocates of particular 
policies rather than simply serving in their traditional advisory role. For instance, 
according to a survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions undertaken 
by Ole Holsti for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) in 1998–99, 
“many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian 
decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American 
forces abroad.” 
Peter Feaver has called this view “McMasterism,” in order to distinguish it 
from McMaster’s own, more nuanced argument. McMasterism essentially argues 
that, first, civilians actively try to suppress the military’s opinion; second, mili-
tary opinion is right, or at least more right than civilian opinion; and third, the 
military should ensure not only that its voice is heard but also that it is heeded. 
McMasterism essentially blames the U.S. failures in Iraq that predated the surge 
on the generals, because, it claims, they went along with civilian preferences 
rather than blocking them.24 
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Two recent and widely disseminated examples of McMasterism are Army lieu-
tenant colonel Paul Yingling’s “A Failure of Generalship” and Marine lieutenant 
colonel Andrew Milburn’s “Breaking Ranks.” The former exhorts the generals to 
“find their voices” and excoriates them for not making “their objections public.” 
The latter states that “there are circumstances under which a military officer is 
not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order.”25 
Feaver argues that McMasterism reflects the viewpoint of what he calls the 
“professional [military] supremacists,” who argue that the primary civil-military-
relations problem during wartime is ensuring that the military can prevent the 
civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging. But “civilian supremacists” 
contend that this view of the role of military leaders is questionable and at odds 
with the principles and practice of American civil-military relations.
McMasterism is reflected in the TISS study cited above. When “asked whether 
military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way 
in the decision” to use military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming 
active-duty officers who responded answered that leaders should “insist” regard-
ing the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political 
and military goals exist, developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and “deciding what kinds 
of military units will be used to accomplish all tasks.” In the context of the ques-
tionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance 
of the military’s recommendations.26 There is little to suggest that this view has 
changed. 
According to the civilian supremacists, the uniformed military in the Ameri-
can system does not possess a veto over policy. Indeed, civilians even have the 
authority to make decisions in what would seem to be the realm of purely mili-
tary affairs. This school of thought holds that “the primary problem of [wartime 
civil-military relations] is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance 
is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with 
that direction.”27 They add that the record illustrates that the judgment of the 
military is not necessarily superior to that of civilian decision makers. 
Consider some historical examples. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln 
constantly prodded George McClellan to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862. 
McClellan just as constantly whined about insufficient forces. During World War 
II, despite the image of civil-military comity, there were many differences be-
tween Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. George Marshall, the greatest 
soldier-statesman since Washington, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 
1940 and argued for a cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. 
History has vindicated Lincoln and Roosevelt. 
Similarly, many observers, especially those in the uniformed military, have 
been inclined to blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on the civilians. But the 
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American operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed 
military. The consensus today is that the operational strategy of General William 
Westmoreland was counterproductive; it did not make sense to emphasize attri-
tion of People’s Army of Vietnam forces in a “war of the big battalions”—that is, 
one involving sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy 
the enemy with superior firepower. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could 
adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late.28 
During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early 
1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), presented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions 
in southern Kuwait followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that 
this plan was unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the ground 
war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican Guard. The 
civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by CENTCOM and or-
dered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative 
and effective, a further indication that in wartime the military does not always 
know best.29
This pattern persisted in Iraq. For instance, while Secretary of Defense Rums-
feld did not foresee the insurgency or the shift from conventional to guerilla war, 
neither did his critics in the uniformed services. In December 2004, Tom Ricks 
reported in the Washington Post that while many in the Army blamed “Defense 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpect-
edly difficult occupation of Iraq,” one close observer—U.S. Army major Isaiah 
Wilson III, an official historian of the campaign and later a war planner in Iraq—
placed the blame squarely on the Army.30 In an unpublished report, he concluded 
that senior Army commanders had failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq 
and therefore did not plan properly for victory, that Army planners suffered 
from “stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt,” and that Army commanders 
in 2004 still misunderstood the strategic problem they faced and therefore were 
still pursuing a flawed approach. 
Critics also charged that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon shortchanged the troops in Iraq, 
in part by failing to provide them with armored “Humvees.” Yet a review of Army 
budget submissions makes it clear that the Army did not immediately ask for the 
vehicles; its priority, as is usually the case with the uniformed services, was to 
acquire “big ticket” items. It was only after the insurgency began and the threat 
posed by “improvised explosive devices” became apparent that the Army began 
to push for supplemental spending to “up-armor” the utility vehicles. 
While it is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for postconflict 
stability operations, it is also the case that in doing so he was merely ratifying the 
preferences of the uniformed military. Only recently has the uniformed military 
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begun to shed the “Weinberger Doctrine,” a set of principles long internalized 
by the U.S. military that emphasize the requirement for an “exit strategy.” But 
if generals are thinking about an exit strategy, they are not thinking about “war 
termination”—how to convert military success into political success, which is 
the purpose of postconflict planning and stability operations. This cultural aver-
sion to stability operations is reflected in the fact that operational planning for 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took eighteen months, while planning for postwar 
stabilization began (halfheartedly) only a couple of months before the invasion.31 
It should also be noted that the most frequently cited example of prescience 
on the part of the uniformed military—General Eric Shinseki’s February 2003 
statement before Congress suggesting that “several hundred thousand” troops 
might be necessary in postwar Iraq—was no such thing. As John Garofano has 
observed, “no extensive analysis has surfaced as supporting Shinseki’s figures, 
which were dragged out of him by Senator Carl Levin only after repeated ques-
tioning.” Garofano notes that in fact the figures were based on a “straight-line 
extrapolation from very different environments.”32 That is, the Army’s Center of 
Military History based a figure of 470,000 troops for Iraq on the service’s experi-
ences in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the primary mission had been peacekeeping. 
This effort to estimate necessary troop strength was inept—critics called it naive, 
unrealistic, and “like a war college exercise” rather than serious planning.33
Finally, to the extent that Shinseki was correct, he was correct for the wrong 
reasons. His focus was on humanitarian concerns rather than on the critical 
society-building work that the U.S. military had to implement in Iraq.34 Garofano 
concludes that the oft-made charge against Rumsfeld—that he punished Shinseki 
for “being right”—is not supported by the evidence. War planning “comes down, 
as it did in Vietnam, to analysis, getting it right, and providing clear alternatives 
that address or confront policy goals.”35 This the uniformed military in general 
and Shinseki in particular failed to do.
THE “CALCULUS OF DISSENT” 
This is not to suggest that the military has no option if military advice is not 
heeded. The minimalist position is articulated in The Armed Forces Officer, an 
official publication that lays out the moral-ethical aspects of officership and the 
question of military deference to civilian authority in very stark terms: “Hav-
ing rendered their candid expert judgment, professionals are bound by oath to 
execute legal civilian decisions as effectively as possible—even those with which 
they fundamentally disagree—or they must request relief from their duties, or 
leave the service entirely, either by resignation or retirement.”36
Many have argued that the choices provided by The Armed Forces Officer are 
too narrow. They contend that in terms of Albert Hirschman’s classic study of 
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responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states, the publication offers of-
ficers only the choices of “loyalty” and “exit.” But Hirschman argues that under 
certain circumstances, the institutionalization of greater “voice”—that is, dissent
—can help stem massive exit.37 
For instance, Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace write that there are alterna-
tives “beyond blind obedience, resignation or retirement.”38 They propose a range 
of actions available to senior military leaders to achieve Hirschman’s “voice” 
when confronted with decisions by civilian leaders that they believe are flawed. 
They identify two variables: the degree of civilian resistance to military advice 
and the seriousness of the threat to national security that the policy embodies. 
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is low and the mag-
nitude of the threat is low, the options for the military are acquiescence or com-
promise. When resistance to military advice is low but the threat is high, options 
involve frequent interaction between the uniformed military and the civilians, 
work to achieve consensus, and cooperative analysis. 
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is high and the mag-
nitude of the threat is low, the options for military officers include declining ad-
vancement or assignment, requesting relief, waiting the civilians out, or retiring. 
When both civilian resistance to military advice and the level of the threat are 
high, the authors suggest, options range from a public information campaign, 
writing articles, testifying before Congress, and joining efforts with others to 
resignation.39 
Don Snider accepts the idea of broadening the choices available to uniformed 
officers when faced with what they believe to be flawed policy decisions by civil-
ians but questions whether the two variables employed by Wong and Lovelace 
alone provide adequate guidance for a strategic leader of the American military 
profession who is considering dissent.40 For Snider, the imperatives of military 
professionalism and the “trust” relationship between the military profession and 
other entities within American society and government also must play roles. 
Snider suggests three trust relationships, to be rated along a continuum rang-
ing from “fully trusted”—the ideal—to “not trustworthy.” The three relationships 
are that between the military profession and the American people; that between 
the military profession and the people’s elected representatives, in both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches; and that between senior leaders of the military 
profession and their subordinate leaders.41
Following Huntington, Snider identifies three responsibilities of military lead-
ers. The first is the “representative function,” the professional requirement “to 
represent the claims of military security within the state machinery”—that is, to 
“express their expert point of view on any matter touching the creation, mainte-
nance, use, or contemplated use of the armed forces.” The second responsibility is 
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to exercise the “advisory function.” This is the professional imperative “to analyze 
and to report on the implications of alternative courses of action from the mili-
tary point of view,” and to provide “candid professional military advice to elected 
and appointed civilian leaders, regardless of whether the advice was solicited or 
regardless of whether the advice is likely to be welcomed.” Such advice does not 
include policy advocacy, which both Huntington and Snider consider beyond 
the legitimate role of military officers. The third responsibility is to exercise the 
“executive function.” This requires the military professional “to implement state 
decisions with respect to state security even if it is a decision which runs violently 
counter to his military judgment.”42 
Having laid out the three trust relationships and the three responsibilities of 
professional military leaders, Snider addresses how the “other” in each trust rela-
tionship involving the military profession—respectively, the American people, ci-
vilian leaders, and junior leaders within the military profession itself—perceives 
and understands acts of dissent on the part of the military profession’s senior 
leaders. Such a moral analysis, he argues, must address at least five considerations.
The first is the gravity of the issue to the nation and therefore to the clients of 
the military profession. The second is the relevance of the strategic leader’s exper-
tise with regard to the issue that might impel dissent. Does the issue at hand fall 
squarely within the scope of the dissenter’s expertise as a military professional? 
The third consideration is the degree of sacrifice on the part of the dissenter. Is 
the dissent motivated solely by a disinterested desire to serve the nation, even 
in the face of personal sacrifice, or does it involve a self-serving subtext, such as 
the advancement of the dissenter’s own professional or political ambitions? The 
fourth consideration is the timing of the act of dissent. Was it timed to undercut 
the actions or policy from which the officer wishes to dissent? Finally, is the act 
of dissent congruent with the prior, long-term character and beliefs of the dis-
senter? Does the dissent strike those who know the dissenter as uncharacteristic 
or atypical?43 Snider goes on to argue that a complete assessment on the part of 
the dissenter would analyze the five considerations in the light of the three trust 
relationships. 
Of course, in practice, argues Snider, some factors are more salient than others. 
Like Wong and Lovelace, he believes that the gravity of the issue with regard to 
national security is most important. “Logically, the higher the stakes, the greater 
the temptation and justification will be for dissenters to speak out.”44 This is the 
case because the only reason to have a military is to ensure national security. That 
is what the military profession is all about. Of course, to engage in dissent, no 
matter the stakes, seems to be in conflict with the inviolate principle of the subor-
dination of the military to civilian authority. The interpretation of acts of dissent 
is complicated, argues Snider, by the deeply polarized nature of American politics 
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today and the perception on the part of some that the military as an institution 
has become too identified with the Republican Party.45 
The moral calculus of dissent also requires that we consider the relevance of 
the expertise and knowledge of the dissenter. Why should we listen to the dis-
senter? “If the issue does not fit within the compass of the profession’s expertise, 
or only marginally so, one would expect observers to dismiss dissenters as free-
lancers operating without standing, much as an Oscar-winning Hollywood actor 
who sets up shop as an authority on national defense.”46
Part of the problem with this criterion is that the meaning of professional 
military expertise has changed since Huntington’s time. Following Harold Lass-
well, Huntington referred to the expertise of the professional military officer as 
the “management of violence.” But today that description seems far too narrow. 
The fact is that today’s military officer is really a “national security professional,” 
whose expertise extends to the interconnected intellectual space of everything 
from strategic theory, strategic thinking, and strategy formation to diplomacy, 
nation building, and homeland defense.47 Thus in practice it is sometimes dif-
ficult to differentiate between what military and civilian national security pro-
fessionals do.48 As historical examples cited earlier illustrate, even when it comes 
to purely military affairs the professional military officer is not necessarily more 
correct than the civilians.
The sacrifice incurred by the dissenter and the timing of the dissent must be 
judged according to the standard of common sense. “For the true professional, a 
right understanding of one’s loyalties always places loyalty to self dead last. Thus, 
absent personal sacrifice, such dissent quickly leads to the suspicion of and the 
search for ulterior motives.”49 The same applies to the timing of the dissent. “If 
something is worthy of an act of dissent, then it is worthy. Thus, as soon as that 
is discerned and decided by the strategic leader, the act should follow immedi-
ately.” If there is a substantial delay, the other partners in the trust relationship, 
especially the subordinate leaders within the profession, may suspect a lack of 
moral agency on the part of the dissenter as well as the impact of ulterior mo-
tives on the act.
Finally, it is critical that the strategic leader contemplating dissent be an au-
thentic leader of competence and moral integrity who has previously displayed a 
steadfastness of character. Subordinates who judge leaders to be cynical or lack-
ing in integrity are unlikely to construe an act of dissent by such individuals as 
disinterested. 
In principle, U.S. military officers accept civilian control and recognize the 
limits of dissent. But as the previous discussion illustrates, the actual practice of 
military subordination is complicated by a number of factors. The first of these 
is organizational and institutional—the separation of powers related to military 
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affairs between the executive and legislative branches. But even more important 
is the tension between the loyalty and obedience of military professionals, on 
the one hand, and their military judgment and moral beliefs, on the other. The 
civil-military tensions visible both before and since 9/11 are illustrative of these 
complications. 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND SERVICE DOCTRINES 
The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect 
military effectiveness. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pat-
tern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at 
the level of strategic assessment and strategy making.50 However, Richard Kohn 
has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in 
this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other 
than those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty years 
after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money 
than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat in-
surgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each 
with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’ 
governments in a matter of weeks.”51 
He attributes this lack of effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional 
competence with regard to strategic planning. “In effect, in the most important 
area of professional expertise—the connecting of war to policy, of operations to 
achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found 
wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, 
weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with 
strategy.”52 
This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a 
changing security environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less 
from massed armies than from terrorism; economic and particularly financial 
instability; failed states; resource scarcity (particularly oil and potable water); 
pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime in the form of piracy, 
smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness.” He 
observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in 
which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign 
and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often, 
there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.”53 Is there some-
thing inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure 
of strategy?
The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be 
attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued 
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dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the 
“normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of 
demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uni-
formed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W. 
Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge” 
in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since 
the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon 
Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was 
the cause of American defeat in Vietnam. 
The normal theory can be traced to Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the 
State, in which he sought a solution to the dilemma that lies at the heart of civil-
military relations—how to guarantee civilian control of the military while still en-
suring the ability of the uniformed military to provide security. His solution was a 
mechanism for creating and maintaining a professional, apolitical military estab-
lishment, which he called “objective control.” Such a professional military would 
focus on defending the United States but avoid threatening civilian control.54
But as Cohen has pointed out, the normal theory of civil-military relations 
often has not held in practice. Indeed, such storied democratic war leaders as 
Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln “trespassed” on the military’s turf as a 
matter of course, influencing not only strategy and operations but also tactics. 
The reason that civilian leaders cannot simply leave the military to its own de-
vices during war is that war is an iterative process involving the interplay of ac-
tive wills. What appears to be the case at the outset of the war may change as the 
war continues, modifying the relationship between political goals and military 
means. The fact remains that wars are not fought for their own purposes but to 
achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state. 
The second factor, strongly reinforced by the normal theory of civil-military 
relations, is the influence of the uniformed services’ organizational cultures. Each 
military service is built around a “strategic concept” that, according to Samuel 
Huntington, constitutes “the fundamental element of a military service,” the 
basic “statement of [its] role . . . or purpose in implementing national policy.”55 A 
clear strategic concept is critical to the ability of a service to organize and employ 
the resources that Congress allocates to it.
It also largely determines a service’s organizational culture. Some years ago, 
the late Carl Builder of the RAND Corporation wrote The Masks of War, in which 
he demonstrated the importance of the organizational cultures of the various 
military services in creating their differing “personalities,” identities, and behav-
iors. His point was that each service possesses a preferred way of fighting and 
that “the unique service identities . . . are likely to persist for a very long time.”56 
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The organizational culture of a service, in turn, exerts a strong influence on 
civil-military relations, frequently constraining what civilian leaders can do and 
often constituting an obstacle to change and innovation. The critical question 
here is this: Who decides whether the military instrument is effective, the civilian 
policy makers or the military itself? 
An illuminating illustration of this phenomenon at work has been the recent 
attempt to institutionalize counterinsurgency doctrine within the U.S. Army. 
This is a difficult task, given the service’s focus on the “operational level of war,” 
which manifests itself as a preference for fighting large-scale conventional war—
despite the fact that throughout most of its existence, the conflicts in which the 
U.S. Army engaged were actually irregular wars. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Army embraced the idea of the operational level of war as its central organizing 
concept. This made sense in light of that service’s major war-fighting concern of 
the time—defeating Warsaw Pact forces on the Central Front of Europe—but 
also, as Hew Strachan has observed, “the operational level of war appeals to 
armies: it functions in a politics-free zone and it puts primacy on professional 
skills.”57 
Herein lies the problem for civil-military relations: the disjunction between 
operational excellence in combat and policy, which determines the reasons for 
which a particular war is to be fought. The combination of the dominant posi-
tion of the normal theory of civil-military relations in the United States and the 
military’s focus on the nonpolitical operational level of war means that all too 
often the conduct of a war is disconnected from the goals of the war.
As an essay published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Insti-
tute puts it, the operational level of war has become an “alien” that has devoured 
strategy. 
Rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of 
campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of 
war”—assumed responsibility for campaign planning. This reduced political leader-
ship to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widening the gap between 
politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles 
that have not always contributed to strategic success, producing “a way of battle” 
rather than a way of war.
The political leadership of a country cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide 
the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its 
military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians should be involved in the minute-
to-minute conduct of war; as Clausewitz reminds us, political considerations are 
“influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.”58 
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The task of strategy is to bring doctrine—concerned with fighting battles in 
support of campaigns—into line with national policy. But instead of strategy, we 
have Gray’s “black hole.”
The third factor contributing to the perseverance of the American strategic 
black hole is one that was, ironically, intended to improve U.S. strategic planning
—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In 
passing Goldwater-Nichols, Congress sought to address two central concerns: the 
excessive power and influence of the separate services and the mismatch between 
the authority of the combatant commanders and their responsibilities. The act 
increased the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while reducing 
that of the Joint Chiefs themselves, and it increased the authority of the theater 
commanders. Congress expected that such reorganization would, among other 
things, improve the quality of military advice to policy makers. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for integrating theater strategy and 
national policy. But if they are marginalized, as they were during much of the 
Bush administration, such integration does not occur. This is an institutional 
problem illustrated by the case of General Tommy Franks, the commander of 
U.S. Central Command, who, in directing the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 and 
the first phase of the war in Iraq, was able to bypass the Joint Staff. His justifica-
tion is found in his memoirs, American Soldier: “Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan had been nitpicked by the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff, and I 
did not intend to see a recurrence of such divisiveness in Iraq.” He essentially sent 
a message to the chairman, the service chiefs, and the Joint Staff: “Keep Wash-
ington focused on policy and strategy. Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”59 
Of course, such an attitude is a dysfunctional consequence of the well-intentioned 
institutional arrangement created by Goldwater-Nichols, reinforcing as it does the 
idea that there is an autonomous realm of military action within which civilians 
have no role. The result of such a disjunction between the military and political 
realms is that war plans may not be integrated with national policy and that strat-
egy, despite lip service to its importance, in practice becomes an orphan. In the 
absence of strategy, other factors rush to fill the void, resulting in strategic drift. 
The current civil-military framework fails to provide strategic guidance for 
integrating the operational level of war and national policy. Rectifying this situ-
ation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they 
do business.
{LINE-SPACE}
U.S. civil-military relations since 9/11 raise a number of issues. How informed 
are civilian leaders when they choose to commit the military instrument? How 
well does the prevailing pattern of civil-military relations enable the integration 
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of divergent and even contradictory views? Does this pattern ensure a practical 
military strategy that properly serves the ends of national policy? 
The state of post-9/11 American civil-military relations also points to the issue 
of trust—the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military 
leaders and the exchange of candid views and perspectives between the two par-
ties as part of the decision-making process. 
Establishing trust requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain re-
examine their mutual relationship. On the one hand, the military must recover 
its voice in the making of strategy, while realizing that politics permeates the 
conduct of war and that civilians have the final say, not only concerning the goals 
of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, civilians must understand 
that implementing effective policy and strategy requires the proper military in-
strument and therefore must insist that soldiers present their views frankly and 
forcefully throughout the strategy-making and implementation process. This is 
the key to healthy civil-military relations. 
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AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
amuel P. Huntington died in December 2008, but this Harvard academic 
continues to have a significant impact on the conduct and state of American 
civil-military relations. Mackubin Owens’s recent US Civil-Military Relations 
after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain and Suzanne Nielsen and Don 
M. Snider’s 2009 edited work American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and 
the State in a New Era both challenge and contextualize Huntington’s work for 
contemporary theorists and practitioners of civil-military relations. This is in-
deed a worthwhile effort, as America’s civil-military relations have received much 
“airtime” over the past few years. General Stanley McChrystal’s seeming challenge 
to the political leadership over proposed Afghanistan troop levels, Lieutenant 
Colonel Andrew Milburn’s Joint Force Quarterly article challenging traditional 
conceptions of civilian control, and Bob Woodward’s revelations in Obama’s 
War regarding the 2009 tensions between the Pentagon and the administration 
over Afghanistan strategy highlight the relationship between the military and our 
civilian leaders while raising the issue of the military’s participation in political 
discourse.1 Do these instances point to “the troubled quality of American civil-
military relations,” or do they serve as continuing proofs of the vitality inherent 
in the American constitutional system as created by the 
founders?2 
In this article, I will discuss Huntington’s view 
that the American constitutional system inevitably 
draws our military leaders into the political process 
and therefore requires astute and well-developed po-
litical expertise on their part in order to maintain the 
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uniquely American civil-military relationship. In doing so, I will address Hun-
tington’s theory of civil-military relations, some historical examples of the mili-
tary’s involvement in the political process, the contemporary security missions 
and roles that require political insight on the part of military leaders, and barriers 
to acquiring and utilizing that insight. In pursuing this discussion I argue in no 
way that the unique system of civil-military relations in the United States should 
be overturned but rather that our leadership’s failure to recognize and train for 
the political roles and requirements inherent in today’s global security environ-
ment threatens the effectiveness of U.S. grand strategy and accomplishment of 
national security goals. 
THE CLASH OF THEORY WITH REALITY: HUNTINGTON’S 
OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE THEORY
In January 2011, Fareed Zakaria, a former student of Huntington’s, published 
a reflection on his mentor that offers particular insight regarding Huntington’s 
approach to political theory. “Sam would often say to me, ‘You have to find a big 
independent variable and a big dependent variable’[;] . . . you’ve got to start with 
something big to explain. . . . ‘Your job is to distill it, simplify it, and give them a 
sense of what is the single, or what are the couple, of powerful causes that explain 
this powerful phenomenon.’’’3 In Huntington’s own words, 
A good theory is precise, austere, elegant, and highlights the relations among a few 
conceptual variables. Inevitably, no theory can explain fully a single event or group of 
events. An explanation, in contrast, is inevitably complex, dense, messy, and intel-
lectually unsatisfying. It succeeds not by being austere but by being comprehensive. 
A good history describes chronologically and analyzes convincingly a sequence of 
events and shows why one event led to another.4 
The Soldier and the State follows the approach outlined above and is the 
Huntington treatment of civil-military relations that has become the standard 
in professional and academic discourse. Huntington suggests a theory of civil-
military relations caught between the variables of military professionalism and 
the military’s participation in the political process.5 The author outlines the his-
torical development of military professionalism in Europe and the United States, 
with some emphasis on the constitutional intentions of America’s Founding 
Fathers. The Soldier and the State also provides a somewhat limited, even “messy 
and intellectually unsatisfying,” explanation of the development of military pro-
fessionalism and civilian control of the military in the U.S. constitutional system. 
Huntington’s theory suggests two types of civil-military relations, subjective 
control and objective control of the military by political leaders. In the subjective-
control model, the military is closely integrated with and participates in the 
political and social system. Officers and enlisted personnel are drawn from civil 
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society to form a militia when danger threatens; once the danger is past, they 
return to society and serve in multiple capacities, including political ones. In this 
system, Huntington suggests, military professionalism is minimal. His objective-
control model describes a very different type of military and political system, 
one that is both differentiated and professional. Here military professionals and 
political leaders focus their efforts in distinct arenas of expertise. The military 
remains separate from the political system and focuses on developing expertise in 
the profession of arms, that body of knowledge embodying the “management of 
violence.”6 In this model, military professionalism is maximized.7 Huntington’s 
objective model adopts a purely Clausewitzian approach whereby “war is the 
continuation of policy by other means,” with senior military professionals pro-
viding security for the state while serving as military advisers to the politicians, 
who practice their own expertise in the realm of politics and national strategy.8 
Professionalism in one area precludes competence in the other.9 
Huntington clearly prefers the objective model;10 his preference has served as 
a source of discussion and controversy since The Soldier and the State was first 
published. In spite of his preference, however, Huntington clearly demonstrates 
that U.S. civil-military relations do not actually correspond to his objective 
model. Instead, our military and our civilian government operate somewhere on 
the continuum between his subjective and objective poles—to the detriment of 
military professionalism, at least in Huntington’s view.11 
Huntington’s “Civilian Control and the Constitution,” published a year before 
The Soldier and the State, examines the civil-military dilemma from the found-
ers’ perspective and provides us with additional insight into the professor’s 
thinking. It suggests that the subjective approach was the more familiar of the 
two in the political and cultural context of the early United States and that it 
influenced the founders’ treatment of the civil-military problem in writing the 
Constitution. Military professionalism, in Huntington’s view, did not exist in 
late-eighteenth-century America; instead, the military art was part and parcel of 
every gentleman’s knowledge base.12 The founders placed great confidence in the 
citizen-soldiers of the militia as guarantors of the country’s security and defense 
and had great distrust for standing armies. Yet they also recognized the potential 
for a crisis that would require a national military organization and so provided 
Congress the authority to raise and fund an army and a navy. Concerned as they 
were for the defense of the young nation from outside forces, the founders were 
also wary of concentrating too much power in any one arm of the government 
and thus divided control over the military between Congress and the executive.13 
The president serves as the commander in chief, while Congress declares war, 
raises the military establishment, and pays for its operations. 
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Thus developed that particularly American approach to civil-military rela-
tions, the division of authority over the military between Congress and the execu-
tive.14 Huntington suggests that as a result of this constitutional arrangement, his 
objective form of civil-military control is literally impossible in the United States. 
Military leaders, obligated to provide military advice to both the president and 
Congress, are constantly drawn into political controversy. In fact, Huntington 
states that the unintended consequence of the founders’ constitutional construc-
tion is that “the separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresist-
ible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.”15 
Since World War II, the military in the United States has developed significant 
political power, generally exercised by senior military leaders during budget and 
strategy debates in the rarefied atmosphere of the nation’s capital. The exercise of 
this political muscle has been most evident during budget battles on Capitol Hill; 
when political leaders have attempted to modify popular military institutions 
(as when President Harry Truman attempted to eliminate the U.S. Marine Corps 
and ran into a political buzz saw); and, especially, during attempts at defense 
reorganization (e.g., the political infighting that preceded passage of the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act).16 Most recently, Bob Woodward reported in Obama’s 
War that the Barack Obama administration perceived the military’s efforts to 
publicize its views on Afghanistan strategy as a deliberate campaign to influ-
ence and limit the president’s options regarding troop levels there.17 The politi-
cal tactics utilized by the military in such cases are familiar to those acquainted 
with interest-group politics: press releases, interviews by senior military officials, 
back-channel discussions with congressional leaders, public speeches discussing 
military and political strategies, publication of studies supporting military or 
service views, congressional testimony, and, most recently, expert opinion offered 
on national news programs by recently retired officers. 
The political power of the military has developed and matured since Hunting-
ton published The Soldier and the State in 1957. During the post–World War II 
and Korean War periods, interservice rivalry was so intense that military leaders 
often exhausted their political energy in turf and budget battles with each other, 
resulting in enhanced civilian control.18 Huntington sounded a cautionary note 
as he regarded this contentious environment, suggesting that should the services 
unite their efforts, “inter-service peace would probably have certain costs in de-
creased civil-military harmony.”19 In fact, an unintended consequence of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which strengthened the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and forced jointness on an unwilling military, has been a strengthening of 
the military’s political power. The military has become a political constituency 
that must be addressed in the Washington power equation.20 Richard Kohn, a 
well-known commentator on contemporary civil-military relations, observes, 
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“The professional military, with its allies and communities, has developed into 
a potent political force in American government. Knowledgeable people, par-
ticularly those who, in each administration, are charged with the direction of 
national security affairs, recognize this, even if they cannot, for political reasons, 
admit it openly.”21 
These considerations regarding the military’s participation in the political pro-
cess relate specifically to the development of military policy within our government
—an inherently political, competitive, and often contentious process. That pro-
cess pits the needs of foreign policy against those of domestic policy, and the 
military, commanding a significant portion of our national resources, is a key 
player in that process.22 In order to operate effectively in that arena, our military 
leaders must develop and practice sophisticated political acumen, a capability not 
traditionally associated with military professionalism. Yet it is one they ignore 
at their peril as they are inevitably drawn into the political process by America’s 
unique constitutional system. It is also a capability required in today’s interna-
tional security environment, one that draws our military leaders into missions 
that require a similar application of political expertise. 
THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT DRAWS 
THE MILITARY INTO POLITICAL ISSUES
The contemporary security environment requires a transformation of skill sets 
for our military. Even before the terror attacks on 9/11, the military was coming 
to grips with the fact that the post–Cold War world had changed. 
In the past twenty years . . . the quest for “security” has replaced war aims, and the 
result has been a more nuanced approach to international power. National security 
is now seen as a complex arrangement of political, economic, social, and military 
factors. American military power is hegemonic but it is recognized that even over-
whelming military power can accomplish only limited security objectives. . . . The 
frame of reference is less about “victory” and more about “prevailing” in a globalized 
competitive environment.23 
During the William Clinton administration, the military was used extensively 
for “military operations other than war,” in Haiti, Somalia, and other distant hot 
spots. These operations facilitated security for a global economic engine that 
demands a stable environment—the reality being that the “hidden hand of the 
market will never work without a hidden fist.”24 The U.S. military is universally 
understood to provide and facilitate that security. Many in the American military 
have resisted this role, arguing that our armed forces were not structured for 
“nation building” or stability operations. The issue even made it into the 2000 
election, when George W. Bush campaigned on a platform deriding the Clinton 
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administration’s nation-building missions, which, he contended, had overex-
tended the U.S. military. 
The issues became more focused after 9/11, with the realization that the 
United States was now engaged in a new kind of war, a “global war on terror,” 
in which the overriding concern became security against religiously inspired 
radicals who threatened the world with weapons of mass destruction. American 
citizens were reminded daily of their new insecurity, as airport scanners became 
ever more intrusive and suicide bombings dominated the nightly news. This 
new war included a number of “small war” missions familiar from our nation’s 
past, as well as some new ones, but all required the transformation of a military 
that had been created in the Cold War for battles in Europe against the massed 
armored divisions of the Soviet Union. In this new environment, our military’s 
firepower “would become an instrument of last rather than first resort.”25 “Asym-
metric warfare,” “counterterrorism,” “counterinsurgency,” “limited war,” “fourth-
generation war,” “stability operations,” and “complex irregular war” all began 
to compete for pride of terminological place and led to the creation of a new 
acronym, ROMO—the range of military operations. 
All of the missions within the ROMO share a common denominator: success 
requires the application of extensive and well developed political skill by our 
nation’s armed forces. This is true because of the characteristics of limited war 
in the contemporary world. Clausewitz’s dictum cited above certainly applies in 
major theater war, but it has special application in today’s conflict environments 
where unity of effort, legitimacy, and perseverance are essential to success and 
involve our operational forces and their leaders in extensive political interaction. 
Today’s security environment is a coalition environment. Every war the United 
States has fought in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been waged with 
allies. As Churchill so famously quipped, “The only thing worse than fighting 
a war with allies is fighting one without them.”26 The requirement to conduct 
operations with United Nations (UN) forces, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO), and “coalitions of the willing” indicates that this reality will not 
change in the near future. It forces our military to forge a unity of effort with 
coalition partners rather than the unity of command preferred by all military 
leaders. However, the maintenance of coalitions is difficult. Differing military 
and social cultures, languages, and home constituencies involve military leaders 
in often difficult interactions with their international counterparts to maintain 
strategic, operational, and tactical direction. These efforts are fundamentally 
political, and local misunderstandings can endanger mission accomplishment as 
well as the relationship between partner nations. These realities were highlighted 
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM at Basra, where the U.S. command dictated 
direct confrontation against local enemy forces, while the British preferred a 
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more “indirect” approach, that of negotiating with the opposition.27 A similar 
situation was reported in Afghanistan, where the Italian contingent was reported 
to have paid bribes to the local Taliban in exchange for a reduction in attacks on 
its forces.28 These differences of approach, as well as inherent cultural differences, 
doctrinal mismatches, and domestic political realities (e.g., European sensitivity 
to troop casualties and opposition to Iraq and Afghanistan deployments), make 
the sustainment of coalition unity of effort a delicate political matter. 
The requirement for legitimacy in today’s security operations involves our 
military forces in political issues on a number of levels—in the tactical (local) 
area, internationally, and back home. In the tactical area, our forces are required 
to pay attention to “hearts and minds.” This is not a new reality. Colonel C. E. 
Callwell, in his classic work on Britain’s small wars, held that the goodwill of 
the local population was never assumed.29 This is certainly true in today’s threat 
environments. Whether engaged in a humanitarian relief operation, a noncom-
batant evacuation operation, or counterinsurgency, America’s military must 
earn the goodwill of local populations and their leaders, as well as the support of 
political leaders and supporters at home. The concept of the “strategic corporal” 
is well known—that the acts of every member of the military have direct impact 
on hearts and minds on the local scene. Those actions can also have potentially 
strategic impact, either positive or negative, due to the ubiquitous media environ-
ment. A single misstep by any member of coalition forces can receive immediate 
exposure on 24/7 news programs, with the potential for significant impact on 
public opinion. 
As the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan passes the ten-year mark, the require-
ment for perseverance takes on new meaning for our nation and its military. 
The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that the United States 
must plan and prepare to fight the kinds of wars it is engaged in now, which is 
a significant shift from previous QDRs, which were more future oriented.30 The 
counterinsurgency, peace-building, and stability operations we face today require 
long-term perseverance and commitment. Yet perseverance in such operations 
inevitably draws the military into political discussion, for it is dependent on the 
will of Congress, the president, and the American people, as well as their counter-
parts in coalition and partner nations. The United States could be in Afghanistan 
another ten years, in spite of the scheduled drawdown of U.S. forces there. In-
deed, sensitive to the charge that the United States abandoned Afghanistan after 
the Soviet defeat there in the 1980s, one American leader is reported to have said, 
“We’re never leaving.”31 Our continued military presence is a necessary guarantor 
of security and stability for the region. In light of this requirement, the strategy 
of the Taliban has been to focus its efforts on the coalition center of gravity, the 
political will undergirding that presence.32 American military leaders understand 
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
 N I X  95
this essential point and wisely engage the media, Congress, the president, and 
the international community in order to sustain that will. It is no surprise that 
General David Petraeus (formerly commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and 
currently director of the Central Intelligence Agency) is known as one of the most 
politically astute of America’s military leaders since Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Eliot Cohen emphasizes the political realities that the U.S. military must suc-
cessfully negotiate in counterinsurgency, indeed, across the entire range of mili-
tary operations our nation faces today:
While all the elements of national power have a role in successful counterinsurgency, 
political objectives must retain primacy. All actions, kinetic or nonkinetic, must be 
planned and executed with consideration of their contribution toward strengthening 
the host government’s legitimacy and achieving the U.S. Government’s political goals. 
The political and military aspects of an insurgency are usually so bound together as 
to be inseparable, and most insurgents recognize this fact. In counterinsurgencies, 
military actions conducted without proper analysis of their political effects will at 
best be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy.33 
If American forces are to be successful in the diverse environments of the ROMO, 
they must consider the political implications of every action and mission, a real-
ity requiring significant political expertise and practice on the part of military 
commanders and the personnel they lead. However, the very characteristics of 
what Huntington termed “the military mind” may limit their effectiveness. 
ADAPTING THE MILITARY MIND TO THE CONTEMPORARY 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The evidence is clear: the U.S. military is inevitably drawn into political issues 
both at home and abroad. There is, however, a paradox regarding the political 
power that the military possesses. The effective use of political power requires 
nuance and skillful political calculation, traits not usually associated with the 
military personality. In exercising its power in political situations, the military 
often comes off as a “bull in a political china closet.” General McChrystal’s firing 
is a case in point. Viewpoints differ as to whether the general’s public comments 
during President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review were calculated or inno-
cent, but his interactions with the press and those of his staff do not attest to great 
political skill. This seeming lack was also evident during General Colin Powell’s 
tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He adapted the “Weinberger 
Doctrine” to then-current military strategy, advising that the military should 
be used only when victory was certain and pursuant to a clear political strategy. 
He often argued against committing the military to far-flung contingency op-
erations. “Powell seemed to ignore the need to bend operational capabilities to 
political imperatives, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright somewhat testily 
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acknowledged when she responded, ‘What’s the point of having this superb mili-
tary you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’”34
Huntington might comment that these events prove important points of his 
theory—that there exists a “military mind” and that true military professionals 
must necessarily be “incompetent” in political affairs.35 Yet the contemporary 
security environment requires that they operate competently both in the charged 
atmosphere of the U.S. capital and across the global commons. To do so, the mili-
tary must address a number of tendencies inherent in the “military personality.” 
The first of these tendencies involves the practical application of the principle 
that the military is and should remain apolitical. Military members are appropri-
ately taught, whether in “boot camp,” Officer Candidate School, or other entry-
level training, that military personnel should limit their participation in the po-
litical process to voting and are prohibited from participation in political events 
in uniform. As a result, military members generally view politics with distaste, 
if not downright hostility. Many view themselves as separate from and morally 
superior to politicians, whom they see engaged in political turf wars and nasty 
electoral campaigns. Indeed, Professor Huntington defines the military profes-
sional as separate from politics, giving as an example General George C. Marshall, 
who refrained from voting in order to preserve his political neutrality and pro-
fessionalism.36 Eisenhower also kept his political views private, to such an extent 
that President Truman offered him an opportunity to run on the Democratic 
presidential ticket—an offer that was refused due to what turned out to be “Ike’s” 
Republican leanings.37 However extreme and unrealistic these examples sound in 
a communications culture where retired admirals and generals serve as commen-
tators on the nightly news, Admiral Mullen’s 2011 guidance reminds the military 
of the necessity to remain “apolitical.”38 The danger is that political partisanship 
is mistaken for political competence by military leaders and personnel. The effort 
to remain apolitical may lead military members to avoid the necessary political 
education and awareness they require to operate in today’s complex environ-
ments. The unintended consequence is ignorance and downright incompetence 
when the mission requires awareness of political sensitivities and repercussions.39
A second dynamic that mitigates military effectiveness in the contemporary 
security environment is a failure to appreciate fully the application of the Clause-
witzian view of war as the continuation of politics. Clausewitz is taught in every 
military school, a key element in the Joint Professional Military Education cur-
riculum of service colleges and at the military academies. Yet the realities of the 
modern battlefield bring political requirements into conflict with the ingrained 
instincts of the military mind, a conflict of which the result is a tendency to 
ignore the political implications of Clausewitz in favor of victory—“to view 
military victory as an end in itself, ignoring war’s function as an instrument of 
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policy.”40 Military leaders who believe that their role is to “break things and kill 
people” are often insensitive to and frustrated by the political requirements of 
contemporary missions. 
Korea was perhaps the first war in which the U.S. military had to face the chal-
lenges of a limited war in which political requirements contradicted its intuitive 
drive for battlefield victory.41 General Douglas “No Substitute for Victory” Mac-
Arthur, especially, chafed under the political guidelines laid down by President 
Truman. In an aptly titled chapter—“Frustration in Korea”—of his memoirs, 
MacArthur reports feeling that President Truman’s will to win had been “chipped 
away by the constant pounding whispers of timidity and cynicism.”42 His even-
tual relief “confirmed civilian control over the military services and revealed the 
General as a heroic figure, single-mindedly committed to victory on the battle-
field, but seemingly without any real appreciation of the larger political impli-
cations of the war he was fighting.”43 MacArthur was not the only Korean War 
military leader uneasy with the political limitations set by politicians unwilling 
to engage in a larger war with China and, possibly, the Soviet Union. The major-
ity of Korean War generals, with the World War II experience of unconditional 
surrender just a few years behind them, were focused on battlefield success at the 
expense of political realities. These generals experienced, Huntington writes, “a 
feeling of unease because victory was denied, a sense of frustration and a convic-
tion that political considerations had overruled the military. . . . General [Mark] 
Clark reported that all the commanders in the Far East with whom he discussed 
the issue hoped that the government would remove the political restrictions 
which denied them victory.”44 
This frustration with the limitations imposed by political restrictions on 
military operations has not disappeared over time. As recently as the Kosovo 
campaign of 1999, General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 
concluded, “Using military force effectively requires departing from the political 
dynamic and following the so-called ‘principles of war.’”45 An even more recent 
example of this frustration is the storm of criticism, from both military and civil-
ian quarters, that arose in response to the restricted rules of engagement estab-
lished by General McChrystal (later confirmed by General Petraeus) in pursuit 
of the “hearts and minds” strategy in Afghanistan, an obviously political move by 
military leaders who “wrote the book” on counterinsurgency. 
Additional traits of the military mind that might limit the military’s effective-
ness in the ROMO are those that facilitate operational mission accomplishment 
but potentially violate political considerations. 
• The military is adept at independent worldwide operations and minimizes 
the need for outside assistance. Officers are taught that, should a leadership 
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vacuum arise, they must exercise initiative, exert leadership, and bring order 
out of chaos. Where military members consider this “gung ho” approach 
an operational necessity, other U.S. agencies and coalition partners often 
consider them pushy and overaggressive. 
• Huntington suggests that the military mind is realist in perspective, seeing 
the world in terms of competition for power. Numerous observers report 
(and my personal experience bears out) that military personnel generally 
see the world as a realm of conflictual, zero-sum competition for power. Of-
ten, if military people do not have an external enemy, they create one—even 
from within their own ranks or from “the interagency.” This tendency leads 
to competition within the ranks as well as conflict with partner organiza-
tions. Unity of effort is difficult to establish in this type of environment. 
• Senior commanders require regular, sometimes daily, briefings on the ac-
complishments of units in the field. Subordinate commanders are gener-
ally in the area of operations for limited tours, ranging from four to fifteen 
months, during which they are subject to, and must produce for their own 
subordinates, regular personnel evaluations. The result is an emphasis on 
“metrics” and on short-term gains easily transferrable to the next day’s 
briefing graphics (and perhaps upcoming fitness reports). This “results 
orientation” may create impatience with interagency or nongovernmental-
organization efforts that produce transparent or long-term effects, such as 
relationships with and influence on local leaders. It is difficult to quantify 
human relationships and interaction, and State Department civilians in the 
field frequently chafe at their military partners’ emphasis on “bricks and 
mortar” projects that look good on briefing slides.
• A final dynamic that undercuts the political expertise of U.S. military leaders 
is the “American way of war,” as characterized by a number of writers. This 
dynamic involves the complete Clausewitzian triad: our military leaders, 
our civilian political leaders, and the people of the United States. There is a 
historical preference on the part of these constituencies for wars of limited 
duration, with clearly defined “bad guys,” clear paths to victory through 
overwhelming “high tech” force, and a rapid return of forces to America’s 
shores after conflict termination. Fundamental to this approach is an 
idealism that seeks to spread democracy to those denied the benefits of the 
American political system. In short, “War [should be] clean, independent of 
politics, and fought with big battalions.”46 
This last characteristic deserves added attention, as it arises from within the 
military culture and self-image as well as from our national approach to war, 
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growing out of our shared history and cultural context. It is also a result of the 
pressures placed on the military by its loyal supporters, friends, families, and the 
media. Our nation’s “short attention span” does not contribute to the political 
will necessary to support complex and long-term contingencies across the world 
in pursuit of global security needs. One needs only remember the image of 
President Bush on board the USS Abraham Lincoln with the words “Mission Ac-
complished” emblazoned in the background. It is a fundamental strategic error 
to conceive that the defeat of the enemy’s military and the achievement of politi-
cal aims are synonymous. Unfortunately, this mistake is all too common, as the 
American experience in Iraq illustrates. 
The military traits discussed here often work effectively to accomplish military 
ends but conflict with successful political outcomes. The direct, confrontational 
manner of the American military may seem offensive and brash to many within 
the interagency realm, more used to diplomatic approaches. The competitive ori-
entation and need for an enemy may result in an inability to “play well with oth-
ers”; the zero-sum and realist perspective may neglect the possibility of compro-
mise or nuanced approaches to problems and relationships. The upshot of these 
traits—admittedly generalized here—is to make the military generally ineffective 
in the political realm. These aspects of the military mind and personality do not 
make the military incapable of political mission accomplishment. But they do 
reveal the limitations inherent in utilizing the military for stability, reconstruc-
tion, nation building, and other tasks requiring a nuanced, political approach. 
In the military’s defense, of course, there are senior officers who thrive in the 
political environment. Generally, they have served in geographic combatant com-
mands, where they are required to exhibit international political expertise and 
engage coalition partners effectively. They have also learned how best to combat 
their enemies on their home turf. As one commentator put it, “‘Political’ generals 
do better in counter-insurgency than ‘gung-ho’ warriors,” an insight that applies 
to many dimensions of the contemporary security environment.47 But military 
leaders with highly developed political acumen, such as an Eisenhower or a 
Petraeus, are the exception rather than the rule. American military culture values, 
and is more likely to produce, a George S. Patton, Jr. 
A REDEFINITION OF VICTORY? 
The contemporary military finds itself actively participating in the political pro-
cess, both at home and abroad. At home, this involvement is a result of the consti-
tutional process established by the founders, a process that requires the military 
to advise both the president and Congress and to participate in the crafting of the 
nation’s military policy. Overseas, the missions the military has been called on to 
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perform involve it in political issues at every level, from the general serving as a 
combatant commander to the corporal assigned to a provincial reconstruction 
team. The following recommendations are offered to assist both military and ci-
vilian leaders in accomplishing the goals of the nation’s national security strategy. 
First, the military needs to redefine its concept of professionalism to embrace 
all the missions that it has been assigned, including stability, peace-building, and 
reconstruction operations. The Defense Department has designated “stability 
operations” as a core mission;48 accordingly, the military must incorporate the 
requirements and capabilities (including appropriate political training) of sta-
bility operations and other, associated missions into its training regimens. This 
will require abandonment of debates as to whether we “do” nation building or 
whether a force designed for a major theater war can adapt to such missions. 
American military forces are amazingly flexible and will accomplish whatever 
mission is assigned to them. The reality of today’s security environment requires 
their leadership to come up with the means to address the thorny issues that will 
arise and to adapt training and deployment cycles accordingly.49 
Second, the military needs to recognize that the political and governance 
expertise required for many of the missions on the “lower end” of the ROMO 
resides within other agencies of government, especially the State Department and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Overcoming institu-
tional barriers and forging working relationships with interagency personnel is a 
requirement of the contemporary battlefield, and meeting it will greatly facilitate 
mission accomplishment. Karl Eikenberry, former U.S. ambassador to Afghani-
stan (as well as a retired lieutenant general and former commander of U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan), advised 2010 graduates of the Army Command and Staff Col-
lege “to see our civilian counterparts as empowered partners who complement 
your work. And welcome them as part of your engagement team. Take them with 
you and provide the security they need to do their jobs.”50 His comments also 
hint at the need for civilian members of the interagency to develop the skills and 
understanding necessary to work effectively with the military. After a decade of 
improvisation, “State” and USAID are themselves developing in-house expertise 
on stability operations, emphasizing training and lessons learned. One Senior 
Foreign Service officer with political-military experience in both Iraq and Af-
ghanistan notes, 
State is not the modern equivalent of the British Colonial Office, and the governance 
and development work Foreign Service Officers find themselves doing on Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams was not a core State competence a decade ago. But just as the 
Army and Marines have had to accept the centrality of Stability Ops, so State has 
recognized we’re in the grass-roots stability business for the long haul.51
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Third, civil affairs units and their expertise (where military political experi-
ence does exist) must be incorporated at every level of the military. Currently, 
the majority of Army civil affairs units reside in the reserves. Their numbers 
have been increased in recent years, and they are currently seeing extensive duty 
in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps and Navy have also expanded their civil af-
fairs capabilities, establishing responsibilities for that function within artillery 
battalions, on each coast, and in teams throughout the Department of the Navy. 
These capabilities must be expanded and given the additional role of training all 
members of the military in the political requirements of their missions. As we 
have seen in current conflicts, each military member, regardless of rank, can have 
a potentially strategic impact, if only through an unfortunate act that flies in the 
face of political sensibilities. 
A further need is for military leaders to adapt to the contemporary reality of 
“fourth generation warfare: . . . [a] political and not a military struggle.”52 In fact, 
everything about contemporary warfare has a political component, and military 
leaders must apply themselves to understand and plan for the political dimen-
sions of conflict and security. These dimensions require advanced specialized 
training and assignments to billets where military members can gain experience 
in political settings and the opportunity to practice political skills. This might 
include personnel exchanges with interagency partners. Such contact would 
make it easier for military officers to take orders from civilian executives, whose 
department may be the “lead government agent” in particular contingencies. In a 
similar vein, as Eliot Cohen points out, civilian leaders should take the initiative 
in “prodding” military leaders with probing questions to discern the advisability 
of their operations.53 Finally, the military must address its definition and its vi-
sion of victory. The political requirements of a conflict may dictate that success 
be a matter of negotiation, treaty, or UN resolution rather than the defeat of a 
military force or the surrender of opposing commanders. 
Finally, the political realities of the contemporary security environment re-
quire that civilian leaders establish political expectations and end states. “The 
military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civil-
ian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous pro-
fession to the ends of policy.”54 But in order for this appropriate subordination to 
take place, civilian leaders must clearly state what the “ends of policy” are. They 
do not always do so, for a number of reasons. Policies may shift over time as a 
result of victory on the battlefield or shifts in political will at home. Political lead-
ers may hesitate to communicate clear expectations, aware that they will be held 
accountable by their constituencies. Coalition considerations may hinder the 
development and communication of clear political guidance. Whatever the cause, 
lack of guidance from political leaders results in confusion on the battlefield and 
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the squandering of resources. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart reminds us of a pre-
cious truth: “The object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your 
own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to 
the peace you desire.”55 
In the end, General MacArthur’s words, written after he had been relieved 
of his Korean command, are instructive: “The supremacy of the civil over the 
military is fundamental to the American system of government, and is whole-
heartedly accepted by every officer and soldier in the military establishment.”56 
Whether our military is drawn into political engagement through the constitu-
tional form of government or as a result of the missions it must undertake in pur-
suit of global security, and whatever the decisions of the nation’s civilian leaders, 
the American military is committed to that constitutional form of government 
and the supremacy of the civilian over the military. As Huntington so forcefully 
stated, in the U.S. system the rightness or wrongness of civilian policy “does not 
concern the military man. He must assume that policy is ‘the representative of all 
the interests of the whole community’ and obey it as such.”57 
The opening paragraph of this article cited continuing questions regarding 
the nature of civil-military relations in the United States and the constitutional 
system created through the wisdom of the founders. This discussion and the on-
going dialogue between our civilian and military leaders regarding the nature of 
that relationship are indeed evidence of the vitality of our constitutional system 
and of the theory that Samuel P. Huntington so thoughtfully formulated.
N O T E S 
1. Andrew R. Milburn, “Commentary: Breaking 
Ranks—Dissent and the Military Profession-
al,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 59 (4th Quarter 
2010), pp. 101–107; Mackubin Thomas 
Owens, US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: 
Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (New 
York: Continuum, 2011). The other works 
mentioned are cited below.
2. Quote from Barry McCaffrey, foreword to 
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier 
and the State in a New Era, ed. Suzanne 
Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009), p. xiii.
3. Fareed Zakaria, “Remembering Samuel Hun-
tington,” Foreign Policy.com, 5 January 2011. 
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: De-
mocratization in the Late 20th Century (Nor-
man: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. xiii.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the 
State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (Boston: Belknap of 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1957) [hereafter SPH, 
Soldier and State], p. 2.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 58.
9. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control and 
the Constitution,” American Political Science 
Review, no. 3 (1956) [hereafter SPH, “Civilian 
Control”], pp. 676–99. 
10. SPH, Soldier and State. 
11. SPH, “Civilian Control,” p. 690.
12. Ibid., p. 679.
13. Ibid., p. 681.
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
 N I X  103
14. The militia clauses further divide control of 
the military between the national government 
and the state governments. 
15. SPH, Soldier and State, p. 177.
16. These battles are dutifully recorded in James 
R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon 
(College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press 
Consortium, 2004). 
17. Bob Woodward, Obama’s War (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2010). “McChrystal’s 
comments marked a seminal moment for the 
White House staff. What better proof that the 
military was on a search-and-destroy mission 
aimed at the president? . . . On top of that, 
the military was out campaigning, closing off 
his choices, and the White House was losing 
control of the public narrative” (pp. 194–95).
18. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense 
(New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1961) 
[hereafter SPH, Common Defense], p. 378.
19. Ibid., p. 417.
20. Woodward, Obama’s War, p. 338. Woodward’s 
book serves as a history of civil-military 
relations in the first two years of the Obama 
administration. 
21. Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust: Civil 
Military Behaviors for Effective National Se-
curity,” in American Civil-Military Relations, 
ed. Nielsen and Snider, p. 274.
22. SPH, Common Defense, p. 2.
23. Pauletta Otis, “Religion and War in the 
Twenty-First Century,” in Religion and 
Security: The New Nexus in International 
Relations, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. 
Hoover (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), p. 14.
24. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive 
Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), p. 464.
25. Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Pa-
rameters (Winter 2005), p. 29.
26. Mark Perry, Partners in Command (London: 
Penguin Books, 2007), p. 285.
27. John F. Burns, “U.K. Documents Show Fric-
tion with U.S. on Iraq,” New York Times, 24 
November 2009. 
28. John Ingham, “Italians Paid Taliban Not to 
Attack Them,” Express, 17 October 2009.
29. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles 
and Practice, 3rd ed. (London: Harrison and 
Sons, 1906), p. 49.
30. U.S. Defense Dept., Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 2010), pp. 42–43.
31. Woodward, Obama’s War, p. 354.
32. Thomas Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles 
of War,” in Rethinking the Principles of War, 
ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2005), pp. 273–77.
33. Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Impera-
tives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” 
Military Review (March–April 2006), p. 50. 
See also U.S. Joint Staff, Counterinsurgency 
Operations, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: 5 October 2009), p. III-13, available 
at www.dtic.mil/. 
34. Hew Strachen, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, 
McChrystal and the Operational Level of 
War,” Survival 52, no. 5 (29 September 2010), 
pp. 157–82. 
35. Quotes from, respectively, SPH, Soldier and 
State, p. 79, and “Civilian Control,” p. 678.
36. Forest Pogue, Education of a General (New 
York: Viking, 1963), p. 280. 
37. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier 
and President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1990), p. 208.
38. “Respect for [the American people]—and 
for our oath—demands that we continue to 
remain an apolitical instrument of the state. 
That means being apolitical in our acts and 
in our words, whether outside the wardroom, 
on the flightline, within the barracks, or in 
the halls of the Pentagon. Over nine years of 
close quarter combat has changed many as-
pects of what we do. It must not change who 
or what we are as a professional, disciplined 
force”; M. G. Mullen, CJCS Guidance for 2011 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff), p. 7, 
available at www.jcs.mil/. 
39. Strachen, “Strategy or Alibi?,” pp. 164–65.
40. Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” p. 24.
41. SPH, Soldier and State, pp. 387–90.
42. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 363.
43. Roy K. Flint, “The Truman-MacArthur Con-
flict: Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations 
109
Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 104  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
in the Nuclear Age,” in The United States 
Military under the Constitution of the United 
States, 1789–1989, ed. Richard Kohn (New 
York: New York Univ. Press, 1985), p. 225.
44. SPH, Soldier and State, pp. 387–90.
45. Strachen, “Strategy or Alibi?,” p. 165.
46. John T. Fishel, “Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, 
OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump 
in the Night,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law 
Enforcement Journal 46, nos. 3/4 (Winter 
1995), pp. 372–98. 
47. Strachen, “Strategy or Alibi?,” p. 167.
48. “Stability Operations,” Department of 
Defense Instruction 3000.05, 16 September 
2009, available at www.dtic.mil/.
49. Nadia Schadlow and Richard Lacquement, 
“Winning Wars, Not Just Battles: Expanding 
the Military Profession to Incorporate Stabil-
ity Operations,” in American Civil-Military 
Relations, ed. Nielsen and Snider, p. 131. 
50. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, speech (Com-
mand and General Staff College, Fort Leaven-
worth, Kans., 11 June 2010). 
51. Philip Kosnett, Political Military Counselor, 
U.S. Embassy, Kabul, 2009–10. Interviews by 
author, 2011. 
52. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” 
pp. 273–77.
53. Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2002), p. 8.
54. SPH, Soldier and State, p. 72.
55. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. 
(1967; repr. Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin Books, 
1991), p. 338.
56. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 393. 
57. SPH, Soldier and State, pp. 56–58.
110
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
A REMARKABLE MILITARY FEAT
Dr. Chisholm is professor in the Joint Military Opera-
tions Department at the Naval War College. He is the 
author of Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and 
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel 
System, 1793–1941 (2000), which received the 2001 
Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distin-
guished Contribution to Naval Literature, and Coor-
dination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in 
Multiorganizational Systems (1989), along with nu-
merous articles, chapters of collected works, reviews, 
monographs, and papers. His Spring 2000 article in 
this journal on command and control in Korean War 
amphibious operations received three awards. 
© 2011 by Donald Chisholm
Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2
The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950
Donald Chisholm
The difficulty . . . to be got over is to know how not only to invade with 
success; but likewise to retreat with safety.
THOMAS MORE MOLYNEUX
I kept the sea always on my flank; the transports attended the movements 
of the army as a magazine; and I had at all times, and every day, a short 
and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never 
be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land 
transport; and in case of necessity it might have embarked at any point 
of the coast.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY
mphibious operations exploit the great facility and inherent flexibility of 
movement and maneuver that the sea affords in order to concentrate mili-
tary power at the decisive time and place ashore.1 Such operations are founded 
on sea control, regularly capitalize on surprise and enemy weakness, and are 
usually carried out in support of broader operational and campaign objectives 
ashore—severing enemy land lines of communication, establishing lodgments 
for follow-on forces, establishing control of choke points or denying the enemy 
use of decisive physical points, outflanking less mobile 
enemy land forces, and the like. 
We are wont to identify amphibious operations with 
amphibious assaults, especially those executed during 
World War II, when the assault was refined to a high 
art. In truth, however, militaries have for many centu-
ries found it useful to conduct an olio of amphibious 
operations during peace as well as war. Appropriately, 
therefore, in addition to the assault, U.S. joint doctrine 
identifies four other categories of amphibious opera-
tion: raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and those in 
support of other kinds of operations with objectives 
A
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of conflict prevention or crisis mitigation (e.g., disaster relief and noncomba-
tant evacuations).2 The last type has constituted the majority of amphibious 
operations conducted since World War II. Still, the amphibious assault, as such, 
remains most vivid in the mind’s eye. Notwithstanding Omar Bradley’s 1949 
declaration that atomic weapons had rendered the large-scale amphibious assault 
anachronistic, events of the ensuing decades—famously, Inchon, less than a year 
later—suggest that the practical utility of the amphibious operation neither has 
dimmed nor is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.3 Its successful execution 
still poses the greatest risk to potential and actual enemies, as Argentina learned 
through hard experience in 1982, Saddam Hussein recognized during Operation 
DESERT STORM, and Task Force (TF) 58 demonstrated to the Taliban in Afghani-
stan in November 2001. And now the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are returning 
their attention to the amphibious assault, after ten years in the desert.4 
The present discussion, however, contemplates the amphibious withdrawal, 
those “operations conducted to extract forces by sea in ships or craft from a hos-
tile or potentially hostile shore.”5 The capability to plan and execute amphibious 
withdrawals, no less than their more glamorous and practiced assault siblings, 
remains a practical essential in the military repertoire. Forces successfully with-
drawn and redeployed will live to fight again another day, and the enemy must 
honor and plan against such a capability. If the amphibious assault against a 
hostile shore is among the most complex, technologically and organizationally, of 
all military undertakings, the amphibious withdrawal does the assault one better
—its execution comes as a “branch,” a contingency, against reversal of fortune, 
thus as reaction rather than proaction. 
History records a great many military situations in which the success or failure 
of amphibious withdrawals of land forces profoundly altered operational and 
strategic outcomes. Arguably, the inability of Cornwallis in 1781 to extract his 
troops at Yorktown led to his surrender and success for the American revolution-
aries. Certainly Lord Wellington thoroughly understood the power this capability 
afforded him during his Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon’s forces. The 
Royal Navy permitted him not only to reinforce by sea at the places and times 
required by the ground situation but also to withdraw troops under pressure. 
He did so on several occasions, most importantly in January 1809 at Vigo and 
Corunna, where nearly thirty thousand British troops were evacuated, thereby 
saving Britain’s only field army, as well as perhaps the government and the war.6
A surprising number of major military extractions from the beach, shown in 
table 1, were executed in the twentieth century.7 In every event, ground forces 
facing destruction by superior enemy strength and position were withdrawn by 
naval forces. All these withdrawals were executed without any doctrinal founda-
tion; some without air or sea superiority; most absent purpose-built amphibious 
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shipping; some over very short distances, some over long; some by command-
ers and staffs inexperienced in amphibious techniques; and others were poorly 
planned, if at all. In some, the withdrawing force suffered significant casualties in 
the process; in most, the bulk of heavy equipment was left behind. In every one, 
however, the amphibious withdrawal permitted the commander to retrieve forces 
a. U.S. Marine and Air Force transport aircraft lifted an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo from Yongpo Airfield adjacent to 
Hungnam.
Month/Year Location Actor(s) Scale
Dec. 1915–Jan. 1916 Gallipoli, Turkey Britain 140,000 British, Australian, and New 
Zealand troops
Dec. 1915–Feb. 1916 Durazzo/San Giovanni, Albania Serbia, 
Italy
136,000 troops, 36,350 horses
May 1940 Dunkirk, France Britain, 
France
338,000 troops
April 1941 Attica and Peloponnesus, Greece Britain 43,000 troops
Oct. 1941 Odessa USSR 86,000 troops, 150,000 civilians
Dec. 1941 Hangö, Finland USSR 20,000+ troops
Feb. 1943 Guadalcanal Japan 12,000+ troops
Aug. 1943 Sicily, Italy Germany, 
Italy
39,660 German and 62,000 Italian 
troops
Aug. 1943 Sardinia, Italy Germany 25,000 troops, 2,300 vehicles, 5,000 tons
Aug. 1943 Kolombangara, Solomon Islands Japan 9,000 troops
Sept.–Oct. 1943 Sea of Azov, USSR Germany, 
Romania
200,000 troops, 16,000 wounded, 
27,000 civilians, equipment
Sept.–Oct. 1943 Corsica, France Germany 6,250 troops, 1,200 POWs, 3,000+ 
vehicles, 5,000 tons
March 1944 Odessa, USSR Germany 24,300 troops and civilians, 54,000 tons
May 1944 Crimea, USSR Germany 130,000 German and Romanian troops
March 1945 Courland, Latvia Germany 2.2 million troops and civilians
Dec. 1950 Wonsan, Korea United 
States
3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, 10,000 
tons, 4,800 civilians
Dec. 1950 Chinnampo, Korea United
States
1,800 U.S. troops, 5,900 ROK troops, 
3,000 refugees 
Dec. 1950 Hungnam, Korea United
States
105,000 U.S. and ROK troops, 91,000 
civilians, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tonsa
Dec. 1950–Jan. 1951 Inchon, Korea United
States
4,963 UN troops, 63,220 ROK troops, 
64,200 civilians, 1,404 vehicles, 62,144 
tons
TABLE 1
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otherwise doomed to destruction or captivity and subsequently to reinsert them 
into combat. For this alone, the amphibious withdrawal demands our attention.
Dunkirk and Hungnam represent the antipodes of the twentieth-century 
amphibious withdrawal. Dunkirk in May 1940 amounted to a hurried evacua-
tion, executed under great pressure from the Luftwaffe, by a hasty assemblage of 
British and French naval vessels, augmented by myriad civilian ships and small 
craft. The British Expeditionary Force left behind most of its heavy equipment 
and arms, as well as about forty thousand British soldiers (along with many more 
French). However, the nearly 350,000 troops successfully returned to England, 
when recovered, rearmed, and reequipped, once again confronted the Germans 
in North Africa and Europe.
Conversely, Hungnam constituted a planned, carefully staged massive rede-
ployment of forces against enemy pressure. Most of General Douglas MacArthur’s 
X Corps ground troops—the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and the battered 
7th Infantry Division—arrived at and staged off the beach at Hungnam as or-
ganized fighting units. In addition, X Corps’s 3rd Infantry Division moved by 
road and amphibious lift from Wonsan to Hungnam before being redeployed 
south. All these units brought out their fighting equipment and supplies. The 
Marines brought their wounded (many others had already been evacuated by 
air) and virtually all of their dead down the gauntlet from the Chosen Reservoir. 
The Navy immediately treated the wounded and provided the troops with show-
ers and warm food on board ship.8 The Navy also lifted the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam, where it was reembarked and lifted 
to Bokuko Ko. When the U.S. Navy closed out Hungnam on 24 December 1950, 
it destroyed all facilities, leaving behind nothing for advancing enemy forces. 
The Navy also redeployed United Nations (UN) forces from Chinnampo and 
Inchon on the west coast. Thus, during December 1950, the U.S. Navy conducted 
five nearly simultaneous amphibious redeployments from both coasts of Korea. 
The total evolution was remarkably well organized and executed; not a single life 
was lost to enemy action, and material losses were light.9 
Oddly, Hungnam and its associated efforts never worked their way into the 
American mythological consciousness—although, justifiably, the 1st Marine Di-
vision’s epic fighting withdrawal from Chosen to Hamhung did.10 It was, rather, 
the brilliantly conceived and executed landing at Inchon in September 1950—a 
masterstroke that reversed the tide of the Korean War—that immediately cap-
tured the popular imagination and continues to receive the lion’s share of atten-
tion from military historians and the military itself.11
More important, the amphibious withdrawal, generally speaking, has never 
worked its way into U.S. doctrine in a meaningful way. Recognizing the require-
ment for seizing advanced bases in support of War Plan ORANGE, the U.S. Marine 
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Corps in its 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations laid the intellectual 
foundation for the great amphibious assaults of Campaign GRANITE in the Cen-
tral Pacific, General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign, and the Mediter-
ranean and European campaigns. By war’s conclusion, the amphibious assault, 
even of the magnitude and complexity of that planned for the September 1945 
invasion of Kyushu, largely had been rendered a well-structured problem.12 
Conversely, the Tentative Manual did not contemplate amphibious withdraw-
als. The Navy’s 1938 Manual for Landing Operations, known as FTP-167, provid-
ed doctrinally only for planning and organizing the amphibious assault—ditto 
for the Army’s 1941 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5); both were 
derived from the Tentative Manual. As it happened, World War II brought no 
such reversals of fortune for U.S. forces. Although it was believed at certain junc-
tures that, the situation being in doubt—notably, in the 1943 operations at Buna 
(New Guinea) and Anzio (Italy)—amphibious extraction might be required, in 
the event it was not, and no practical experience was gained. The extent to which 
narratives of the various World War II withdrawals conducted by other militaries 
then penetrated American military consciousness remains unclear, but it cannot 
have been very great.
We are only slightly better off today. Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, Joint Doc-
trine for Amphibious Operations (its current edition was issued in August 2009), 
recognizes and defines amphibious withdrawal but devotes only two pages, out 
of more than two hundred, to it.13 The subsidiary 1989 JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine 
for Landing Force Operations, last updated in 2004, granted the withdrawal 
several more pages, but surprisingly the current (2010) JP 3-02.1, now entitled 
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation, fails even to mention withdrawal—
presumably “embarkation” (an aspect of movement) and “withdrawal” (a form 
of maneuver) are to be treated as synonymous. 
Perhaps a certain misplaced optimism now makes it difficult to imagine a 
future situation in which an amphibious withdrawal might be appropriate. This 
would be thin gruel for the commander who confronts the real-world necessity 
for such an operation. Consequently, even though now sixty years in the past, the 
Hungnam redeployment still warrants our careful consideration. It offers endur-
ing lessons with regard to the problem of amphibious withdrawal; to the process 
by which it was conceptualized, planned, and organized; to the practical value 
of sea control to the conduct of land operations; and to effective approaches to 
solving ill-structured military problems.
KOREA IN 1950
The Korean War was a land war, and yet, because of the theater’s geography and 
the state of its communications infrastructure, friendly naval forces played an 
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essential role throughout. The Korean Peninsula, which runs roughly six hundred 
miles north to south, has an east-to-west span of mostly less than two hundred 
miles, leaving few locations more than a hundred miles from the coast. Its area 
totals about eighty-three thousand square miles. The northern part is defended 
by high mountains—a long mountain string isolates a major portion of the east 
coast—and the west is marked by hills and river drainage basins. In 1950, not-
withstanding forty years of Japanese occupation, land communications remained 
difficult at best, with few sealed roads or railroads available to negotiate the dif-
ficult terrain. These few road and rail lines described more or less an X, with its 
intersection at Seoul. Movement north and south, though problematic, was easier 
than east and west.
Militarily usable ports, shown on map 1, then comprised, on the west coast, 
Chinnampo, Inchon, and Kunsan, dominated by the great tidal range of the shal-
low Yellow Sea; on the east were Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Pusan, with 
deep water just offshore. Sailing distances from major American naval installa-
tions in Japan to Korean ports were short enough to allow quick turnaround; 
even Yokosuka, for example, on Japan’s east coast, lay only 655 sea miles from 
Pusan. Terrain and hydrography afforded additional opportunity and flexibility 
to forces capable of amphibious operations over the beach, as UN forces were. 
In short, the factor of space greatly favored the force able to assert and main-
tain sea and air control, granting it thereby greater freedom of movement and 
maneuver than a land-restricted opponent enjoyed. This essential fact had not 
escaped General MacArthur, who had learned the lesson during World War II 
and subsequently noted, in reference to the Inchon landing, that “deep envelop-
ment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines is, and always 
has been, the decisive maneuver of warfare.”14 The general also properly under-
stood that naval support secured his own lines of supply and provided the ability 
to hold necessary beachheads more or less indefinitely.
United Nations forces had promptly established sea and air control in the first 
days of the war and effectively exploited it for naval gunfire support, air strikes, 
air-to-ground support, and amphibious lifts and assaults. During the first year 
of the war North Korea and its Russian and Chinese sponsors made few attempts 
at sea denial, but among these, notably, were the extensive sea mining at Wonsan, 
the mining of Hungnam harbor, and the sowing of free-floating mines along the 
east coast.15 The affected ports would play pivotal roles in the war.
THE ROAD TO HUNGNAM
Against this physical backdrop unfolded the events of the first six months of 
the Korean War. North Korean forces attacked across the thirty-eighth parallel 
in the small hours of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Four days later, General Douglas 
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MAP 1
Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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MacArthur, Commander, Far East Command, personally visited the active front 
just south of Seoul and concluded that U.S. naval and air support would be insuf-
ficient by themselves to stop the invaders, who were already sweeping aside the 
South Korean defenders. Absent immediate employment of U.S. ground troops, 
the North Koreans would surely overrun the entire peninsula. Piecemeal inser-
tion of small U.S. units by airlift was succeeded by disparate small sealifts from 
Japan as MacArthur sought to buy time in order to mount an amphibious opera-
tion that would lay bare the North Koreans’ lines of communications and enable 
their forces’ envelopment and destruction. Events moved rapidly, however: the 
forces initially designated for a July assault at Inchon landed instead, on 17 July, 
at Pohang Dong, in order to reinforce the fragile Pusan perimeter—enabled by 
friendly sea and air control.
That perimeter held, and with the heroic deployment of the 1st Marine Divi-
sion, speedy assembly of the requisite amphibious shipping over the next two 
months, and organization of X Corps, the general realized his operational vision 
with the 15 September Inchon landing. Although follow-on land operations 
failed to envelop and destroy the North Koreans as intended, the latter’s offensive 
largely culminated, and, mostly no longer fighting in large, organized units, they 
fled north, pursued by Eighth Army units from the Pusan perimeter. 
A second X Corps amphibious landing, this time on the east coast at Wonsan, 
aimed to cut off and complete the destruction of the invaders. Unfortunately, the 
Soviets had anticipated such an assault and had covertly commenced extensive 
mining in late July, the clearance of which delayed landing X Corps, reembarked 
after Inchon. The 1st Marine Division did not land until 26 October, while the 
7th Infantry Division landed instead farther north, at Iwon. By that time the 
ground war had already largely passed north of Wonsan, although guerrilla activ-
ity plagued the mountainous areas just inland.
Meanwhile, an early October United Nations resolution had expanded the 
strategic objective from simply destroying the North Korean army and restoring 
South Korea’s integrity to pacifying North Korea, which for the moment seemed 
entirely possible. The X Corps commander, Major General “Ned” Almond, re-
peatedly urged his subordinate ground commanders to move faster toward the 
northern reaches of Korea in the mountains adjacent to the Yalu River, which 
they did, as did their Eighth Army counterparts in Korea’s west. Almond estab-
lished his headquarters at Hamhung; the Navy cleared and opened the port at 
Hungnam for its support.
The Chinese had other ideas, however. Feeling threatened by the looming pres-
ence of United Nations forces near their border, beginning in late October they 
had secretly started moving vast numbers of ground troops into the mountains 
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of northern Korea. American forces took Chinese prisoners almost immediately. 
However, ambiguity initially obtained as to whether these were individual vol-
unteers or from organized units. All doubt disappeared on 7 November, when 
the 1st Marine Division was hit hard by sizable Chinese units. Nonetheless, each 
succeeding estimate of Chinese strength was obsolete by the time it was pub-
lished: 16,500 on 2 November; 100,000 a week later; 145,000 on the 15th; a range 
of 142,000 to 167,000 on the 23rd.16 In fact, the Chinese had moved across the 
border in even greater numbers than those, and it was now an entirely new war.
On 15 November, in concert with an all-out air effort against the Yalu River 
bridges, MacArthur ordered X Corps to redirect its efforts to the west to assist 
Eighth Army; the Marines were to attack west against the enemy’s line of supply
—apparently on the assumption that they would meet little resistance—while 
other X Corps units moved north along the east coast. On 24 November, having 
opened Chinnampo for naval logistic support, and supported by Fifth Air Force, 
Eighth Army units attacked north from the Chongchon River—II Corps on the 
left, IX Corps in the middle, and the ROK II Corps on the right—with orders to 
link up with X Corps. Shortly, however, Chinese forces counterattacked heavily 
against the ROK II Corps, which broke, exposing the IX Corps right flank. The 
5th and 7th Marine Regiments, by this time nearing the Chosen Reservoir, met 
heavy opposition and on the 27th were struck by two Chinese divisions.
“NO, GENERAL, WE DON’T KNOW HOW TO DO THAT”
The stage was now set for Eighth Army to commence its hasty retrograde move-
ment in the west, while the Marines and fellow X Corps units were to begin their 
fighting withdrawal back to Hungnam.17 Meanwhile, what of the Navy, which 
was cast in a supporting role to the land forces and might very well have to pull 
them all off the beach?
Within a week of the 7 November Chinese attack against the Marines, Vice 
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, had published his 
Operation Plan 116-50, outlining general procedures for emergency evacuation 
of UN forces from Korea to Japan. It included hydrographic data on Korean 
ports, along with capabilities of available shipping, and it established command 
relations for the redeployment. On 15 November, the commanding general of 1st 
Marine Division, General Oliver P. Smith, conveyed his serious concern about the 
ground situation to the chiefs of staff of Vice Admiral Joy and of Rear Admiral 
James H. Doyle, commander of Amphibious Force, Far East, reinforcing the need 
for contingency plans. Joy, at the prescient recommendation of his deputy chief 
of staff, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke (who had arrived in Japan in late August), 
began accumulating time-charter shipping in Japan rather than releasing it for 
return to the United States.
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As was well known, and had just been proved once again in Korea, the U.S. 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army were well prepared to make amphibious assaults. 
But they were not so well prepared for extractions. Although veteran amphibious 
professionals all, the commanders and their staffs on the scene in Korea had nei-
ther previous directly comparable practical experience nor specifically applicable 
doctrine to guide their thinking and decision making for Hungnam. Where the 
assault had been rendered a well-structured one by World War II experience, the 
withdrawal remained ill structured.
“Ill structured” problems are distinguished from “well structured” ones by 
the degree to which their boundaries, constituent parts, and the relationships 
among those parts are understood. That is, “ill” and “well structured” refer to the 
fidelity of the decision maker’s representation of the problem to the existential 
problem itself. Well-structured problems are readily recognizable and assign-
able to discrete categories and are therefore directly susceptible of solution by 
computational means—that is, by selection and application of courses of action 
from existing solution sets. The pre–World War II Tentative Manual for Land-
ing Operations had begun the practical structuring of the amphibious assault, 
which was understood to be necessary for acquiring the forward operating bases 
required for the anticipated Pacific campaign against Japan; forces required, 
phases, timing, sequencing, and synchronization were all roughed out. Careful 
assessments of initial wartime amphibious experience refined that structuring: 
shipping requirements, command relations, prelanding bombardment, coordi-
nation of close air support, and hydrographic intelligence were all adjusted. The 
organization of boats for ship-to-shore movement was carefully reworked. By the 
time of the June 1944 Marianas operations, the problems had been so thoroughly 
structured that the plans were confidently executed against more or less alerted 
opposition. 
Conversely, ill-structured problems require decision makers to impose struc-
tures on them and to generate solutions for them—often at the same time. Typi-
cally, ill-structured problems are those that have not been encountered previously 
in quite the same forms and for which no predetermined, explicit sets of ordered 
responses (i.e., doctrines) exist.18 In war, it may be said, each opponent attempts 
to present the other with enough surprise that the problem posed cannot be struc-
tured and made solvable in the time and with the forces available.
Thus, Japan’s systematic employment of thousands of kamikazes and hun-
dreds of Shinyo and Renrakutai surface suicide boats against U.S. naval forces at 
Okinawa for a time rendered ill structured the problem of force protection. The 
practical challenge was simultaneously to figure out the structure of these threats 
and to devise effective methods for dealing with them.19 Out of 1,300 ships in-
volved at Okinawa, assaulted in the teeth of that dual challenge, the “Fleet That 
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Came to Stay” sustained thirty-six ships sunk and another 368 damaged, with 
more than 4,900 sailors killed.20
Neither do ill-structured problems remain constant while decision makers 
seek to impose structure on them. Their components and their interrelationships 
often change in a very short time frame, rendering initial efforts to understand 
them obsolete—especially in war, which we understand as a complex interac-
tive system. This was the case in November–December 1950 in Korea. Both the 
operational situation and understanding of that situation changed rapidly. The 
Navy’s practical challenge was to ascertain what rapidly changing conditions on 
the ground and successive decisions by MacArthur and his principal ground 
commanders would demand of it for support.21
The learning curve for ill-structured problems is generally very steep, and trial 
and error constitute the main mechanism for generating information and reduc-
ing uncertainty about the problem—that is, converting it into a well-structured 
one. Notably, the centralized, hierarchical organization structures effective for 
well-structured problems do not fit ill-structured ones, which are more readily 
addressed by decentralized, self-organizing systems, within which discretion re-
sides at many points. Such systems allow experts to exercise their best judgment, 
adjusting as required, while achieving unity of effort principally through lateral 
communications.22 Even then, the most that can be attained in real time is to ren-
der such problems well structured in the small, while the larger problem remains 
ill structured.23 The structure of the overall problem will likely only be known in 
retrospect, after its attempted solution. 
Although no name for the concept had yet been coined, Rear Admiral Doyle 
implicitly grasped the challenges posed by an ill-structured problem and the rela-
tionship between type of problem and the command-and-control (C2, in today’s 
shorthand) relations that would be appropriate. He proceeded accordingly.
Doyle realized that the unprecedented character of the potential problem 
of extracting large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment from widely 
separated hostile beaches on two coasts dictated against a programmed, standard 
C2 structure below. As Commander, Task Force (CTF) 90, he had at his disposal 
Amphibious Groups 1 and 3. Facing the prospect of simultaneous retrograde 
movements by Eighth Army on the west coast and by X Corps on the east, Doyle 
retained overall command of the redeployments but directed Amphibious Group 
3, under Rear Admiral Lyman Thackrey, to attend to Eighth Army at Chinnampo 
and Inchon, leaving Amphibious Group 1, under his direct command, to support 
X Corps at Songjin, Wonsan, and Hungnam.
At MacArthur’s request, Amphibious Group 1, under Doyle, had arrived in 
Japan in early June 1950 to train Eighth Army in battalion-level amphibious op-
erations. The day North Korea attacked, it was conducting a landing exercise at 
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Sagami Wan. Initially little more than a token training unit, during the months 
preceding Hungnam the group grew many times over to become a full-fledged 
amphibious force.
Doyle was a distinguished veteran amphibious officer, arguably the most 
amphibiously experienced serving senior officer. He had been Admiral R. Kelly 
Turner’s operations officer at Guadalcanal, 1942–43, and had then served in 
Admiral Ernest King’s Commander in Chief Amphibious Section, 1943–45, 
including work on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee. In early 1948 he 
had assumed command of the Amphibious Training Command at Coronado, 
California; in January 1950 he reported as Commander, Amphibious Group 1.
Officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience populated 
Doyle’s staff. They were overqualified and technically too senior for their billets—
the fortuitous result of a difficult civilian economy and a greatly drawn-down 
Navy. They knew in detail the intricacies of amphibious planning. They were 
used to working together, having experienced little turnover in the preceding 
two years, and had planned and executed three major amphibious exercises in 
the spring of 1950, followed by the three major Korean amphibious operations. 
The admiral knew his staff, its members knew each other, and all had developed 
effective working relationships.
Doyle, in his capacity as CTF 90, had a second capable amphibious force in 
Thackrey’s Amphibious Group 3. It had arrived in Korea shortly following In-
chon. Thackrey had run that port’s operations after its capture and in October 
landed the Army’s 7th Division at Iwon.
Mobile Training Team Able of the Amphibious Training Command’s Troop 
Training Unit had embarked with Amphibious Group 1 when it went to Japan. 
Commanded by Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Team Able’s officers and 
men had worked together for some time and were personally known to Doyle. 
Team Able had been integral to all three previous amphibious operations. Doyle 
had seconded the unit to the 1st Cavalry Division (which lacked amphibious-
experienced personnel) to plan that division’s part in the Pohang Dong landing. 
Doyle then placed the unit on a similar temporary assignment with X Corps for 
the Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon operations; Forney served as the corps’s deputy 
chief of staff. He and his men did the bulk of that command’s amphibious plan-
ning for those operations.24 Thus, Team Able and Amphibious Group 1’s staffs 
were no strangers to each other; neither were Team Able and X Corps staffs 
strangers. Doyle later commented that Forney “could get along with anyone—
and without compromising himself. This facility proved invaluable, for the corps 
commander [Almond] was at best prickly, at worst arrogant and overbearing.”25 
Conversely, Doyle and Major General Smith had quickly developed a close and 
mutually respectful relationship in planning and executing the Inchon and 
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Wonsan-Iwon operations, which was mirrored in the effective working relation-
ships between their staffs (Smith and most of his staff had sailed on board Doyle’s 
flagship for both operations).
Secure in the knowledge that they were seasoned professionals who had 
learned their craft not in peacetime training but in the hard schools of the South-
west and Central Pacific, Mediterranean, and European campaigns of World War 
II, Doyle, as we shall see shortly, would grant his subordinates considerable in-
dependence to make such arrangements for the Hungnam redeployment as their 
professional experience suggested were appropriate. The several elements were 
then to coordinate as required to achieve unity of effort through direct lateral 
communication.
Doyle understood that effectively addressing the problem of amphibious 
withdrawal also required that he be afforded by his own superiors considerable 
leeway in the exercise of command. Shortly after October 1950’s Wonsan-Iwon 
operation, Doyle plainly told his “old and very close friend” Vice Admiral Joy 
that he could not and would not come under the Seventh Fleet commander, Vice 
Admiral Arthur D. Struble, in any future operation. (Figure 1 shows the Naval 
Forces Far East command organization obtaining in November 1950.) Doyle’s 
conflict with Struble, eight years his senior, no doubt had roots in personalities, 
and perhaps in competition for credit, but it extended well beyond into profound 
differences in professional philosophy and practice.26 
For Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon, Doyle had reported directly to Struble. Dur-
ing these operations, Doyle felt, Struble had regularly interfered in his exercise 
of command. Consequently, judging that he needed Doyle’s expertise more than 
Struble’s, Joy issued on 13 November a preliminary plan for evacuation of UN 
forces from Korea that established a naval task organization as shown in figure 
2. It had Doyle reporting directly to him, while granting Doyle considerable dis-
cretion and unusually wide-ranging responsibilities, not only for the redeploy-
ment itself but for shipping protection, control of air support and naval gunfire 
support in the embarkation areas, and maintenance of the blockade along the 
Korean east coast. Joy directed Struble to provide support to Doyle.27 At the same 
time, this unusual arrangement allowed Struble freedom of maneuver and the 
ability to address whatever threats the Soviets and Chinese might pose from the 
sea, either to Doyle’s operations or, in the worst case, to Formosa or Japan. 
Subsequently, however, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral For-
rest Sherman—who believed Hungnam carried potential for great disaster—
intervened. He did not want an amphibious commander to control the fast car-
riers. He was also well aware of continuing friction between Struble (who was his 
protégé) and Doyle. Sherman had previously weighed in with Joy after July 1950’s 
Pohang Dong landing, and as a result the command relations that had obtained 
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for both Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon had been those acceptable to Struble (but 
not to Doyle). For his part, Doyle believed that “Sherman knew little, if anything, 
about amphibious operations”; of his own relationship with the CNO, he later 
commented, “We never were mutual admirers.”28
Sherman directed Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, to give 
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Pa-
cific, verbal orders (of which Joy was ultimately made aware) to go to Korea (his 
fifth trip there) and assume command at Hungnam if, in his judgment, Doyle was 
not executing effectively. Doyle learned of Shepherd’s orders only years later.29 
Major General Smith knew only that Shepherd was the CNO’s representative at 
Hungnam.30
In the end, however, Joy’s C2 structure stood, with its great leeway granted 
Doyle to organize and execute the redeployment operations, as well as the forces 
requisite to the job—amphibious shipping, naval gunfire ships, escort-carrier-
based aircraft, and Marine ground-based air. Doyle coordinated additional air 
and naval gunfire support with Struble as needed. Although the Air Force did 
not contribute air-to-ground support to X Corps, it provided night “heckler” 
coverage, and its transports proved essential for evacuating the wounded from 
Chosen Reservoir.31
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ACCELERATING EVENTS ON THE GROUND
On 28 November Joy alerted Doyle to the high probability of major evacuation 
operations. Doyle immediately commenced planning for “redeployment by water 
of own and friendly troops in Korea either as an administrative ‘outloading’ or 
a general emergency based on Joy’s OpPlan 116-50.” Joy advised Doyle to put 
his ships, then still in Japan, on six-hour notice for movement to Korea. Doyle 
in turn directed his ships to assemble in Sasebo (a short 165 miles from Pusan) 
and issued Operation Order 19-50 for planning purposes. His basic plan was for 
Amphibious Group 3 to conduct west-coast operations and Amphibious Group 1 
east-coast operations, while overall responsibility remained with Doyle as Com-
mander, Task Force 90.
On 30 November, MacArthur directed X Corps to concentrate in the Hamhung–
Hungnam area, while Eighth Army retired southward to Pyongyang and Seoul. 
Doyle now placed all ships in port on two-hour notice, and Amphibious Group 3 
departed Japan for Inchon. However, Eighth Army’s rapid southward movement 
had already uncovered Chinnampo, necessitating redirection of the group to that 
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port. Late on 3 December the transport group steamed up the eighty-four-mile 
swept channel to Chinnampo, on the assumption that an evacuation was immi-
nent but without specifics on troops and equipment to be extracted, the tactical 
situation, or even who was to command the operation.
Fortunately, Thackrey discovered that shipping already in place at Chin-
nampo was adequate to requirements. He had extracted 1,800 Army and Navy 
port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops, along with civilian refugees who showed 
up unannounced, by late 4 December.32 At Inchon, from 7 December to 5 Janu-
ary, when the port was closed and destroyed even as Chinese troops entered the 
city, Thackrey outloaded 4,693 UN and 63,220 Korean military personnel, 1,404 
vehicles, and 62,144 tons of cargo, along with 64,200 Korean civilians, all subse-
quently landed at Pusan.33
For the moment, it remained unclear whether United Nations forces would 
have to withdraw entirely from Korea to Japan or could and would maintain 
lodgments at Pusan and Hungnam throughout the winter. However, on 1 De-
cember the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur to withdraw X Corps and 
“coordinate” that movement with Eighth Army, which was to hold its position 
across the waist of Korea. On 7 December high-level discussions in Tokyo modi-
fied that plan to have Eighth Army hold Seoul until it became necessary to retire 
upon Pusan.34 The following day, when the senior Navy and Marine commanders 
conferred on board Doyle’s flagship, they still had to consider two possibilities: 
that of establishing and maintaining a lodgment at Hungnam and the more likely 
one of withdrawal. Fortunately, the next day the Joint Chiefs approved the revised 
plan, and the decision was made to redeploy south.
Such fluidity does not conduce to easy operational planning, but Doyle and 
his staff met the challenge, having preliminary plans already in hand both for de-
fending a perimeter at Hungnam and for withdrawing from that port, as well as 
from other east- and west-coast ports. Now they knew they would be executing a 
withdrawal: “Troops and supplies that had reached the theater through three ports 
and troops that had arrived overland now had to be funneled out through a single 
harbor; personnel and gear that had come in over a period of two months were to 
be removed in the space of two weeks.”35 At the same time, the amphibious forces 
had to continue unloading supplies required by the withdrawing troops and those 
supplies necessary to the defense of the perimeter around Hungnam.
Doyle and his staff initially made the analogy between the operant conditions 
of the redeployment problem and an “amphibious landing in reverse.” Suppose 
one filmed an amphibious assault and then ran it backward—what would the 
operation look like? It proved an apt connection and provided the starting point 
(but only that) for imposing a structure on the problem and devising a course of 
126
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
 C H I S H O L M  121
action for its solution. Doyle decided that excess supplies and supporting troops 
would embark first; thereafter, as the beachhead shrank with the embarkation of 
combat forces, naval gunfire and air support would ensure that there was no dim-
inution of combat power ashore. At the conclusion, naval bombardment would 
be the only force “ashore.”36 Doyle had previously commenced mine clearance at 
Hungnam to expand the safe anchorage area, provide an expanded safe channel 
from the anchorage to seaward, and establish channels for gunfire-support ships.
On 1 December X Corps reported that 3rd Infantry Division at Wonsan was 
under heavy enemy pressure and that road and rail lines between there and 
Hungnam had been cut, and it requested an amphibious redeployment of the 
division. Doyle decided to conduct this initial evacuation as a small-scale test 
of his tentative plans and procedures for Hungnam. It would illuminate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed staged reduction of the defense pe-
rimeter around the Hungnam harbor—in effect, telling him whether or not he 
had gotten about right the structure of the problem. In the event, at Wonsan the 
evacuation plan was simple and direct. The troops ashore described around the city 
an arc whose radius they progressively reduced as supplies and personnel within the 
beachhead loaded and left. The fire support ships isolated Wonsan by shellfire, fired 
any observed missions [i.e., spotted by controllers, in observation aircraft] requested, 
and at night provided random harassing and interdiction fires on pre-selected targets 
and fired star shells for battlefield illumination.37
Fortunately, it was already clear when Doyle arrived at Wonsan on 4 December 
that there was no significant enemy pressure and that all but the rear elements of 
3rd Division had already moved by road to Hungnam. Consequently, he revised 
lift requirements downward. Ultimately, 3,800 3rd Division troops, seven thou-
sand refugees, 1,146 vehicles, and ten thousand tons of cargo outloaded by ship 
from Wonsan from 3 to 5 December.
The experiment validated Doyle’s initial hypothesis, and his staff began pre-
paring detailed plans for Hungnam based on lessons learned there. Subordinate 
units proceeded simultaneously in their own planning, communicating continu-
ally with Doyle and his staff, who remained on board his flagship, USS Mount 
McKinley (AGC 7), anchored in Hungnam harbor. On 6 December, Doyle sent a 
small force from Wonsan to lift ROK I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam. Opera-
tions at Songjin closed out on 10 December.
ORGANIZATION AT HUNGNAM
As map 2 indicates, Hungnam was well suited to serve as the principal port for 
the redeployment. As one historian describes it, the
127
Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 122  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
city of Hungnam, manufacturing center as well as seaport, lies in the northwestern 
corner of the Korean Gulf near the delta of the Songchon River. Although Hamhung, 
its inland satellite, is an important road and railway center, Hungnam is the larger of 
the two, with a population in 1950 a third again that of Wonsan. The bay on which 
the city lies is open to the south, but the inner harbor is protected by a 2,200-foot 
wharf with four fathoms of water and by a breakwater. Other smaller wharves ex-
isted, as did heavy loading equipment, developed to handle the products of the city’s 
chemical industry. As at Wonsan, a 100-fathom curve runs 30 miles offshore and the 
approaches are easily mined.38
In addition to the inner port facilities, shown in map 3, which would allow ef-
fective employment of standard cargo and transport shipping, Hungnam possess-
es beaches immediately adjacent to the port, shown in map 4, that were entirely 
suitable in their hydrography for beaching amphibious shipping and were readily 
defensible within the planned perimeter. Nearby Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 
4) served as the primary base for the 1st Marine Air Wing, which was to provide a 
major portion of the close air support and combat air patrol. Equally important, 
X Corps headquarters had been established and remained at Hamhung, facilitat-
ing easy communication between the ground commander and the amphibious 
commander and their staffs.39 Moreover, in order to facilitate the logistic support 
MAP 2
Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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of X Corps, beginning on 7 November the Navy had addressed the Soviet-laid 
mines at Hungnam, declaring the port open four days later. Thus, the port was 
well located, suitable to the endeavor, and for Doyle a known quantity. 
The amphibious group staff held an operations planning conference on board 
Mount McKinley on loading and ship control on the afternoon of 9 December, 
followed by another planning conference ashore with representatives of X Corps 
and the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. Firm plans for loading were made 
during a final staff conference that night and were approved by Doyle. The Con-
trol and Loading Plan, based on a staff study of the harbor’s physical capabilities, 
established a series of control posts, for which a special task organization was 
formed. Doyle assigned to each control station the most able and experienced 
officer and enlisted personnel available from the staffs of CTF 90; the Military Sea 
Transportation Service (MSTS), Hungnam; Fleet Activities, Hungnam; and other 
naval units. “The general experience and ‘know how’ of all hands was utilized to 
the utmost as no one present [had] previous actual experience with an operation 
of this type.”40
The CTF 90 operations section (on board Mount McKinley) constituted one 
of the control stations; it coordinated all ship movements, assigned anchorages, 
issued docking instructions, and prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy 
and SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority, Japan) shipping.41 It also supervised 
operations of all other control stations. MSTS activities at Hungnam were in-
tegrated with the operations section on the flagship, with responsibility for all 
MSTS shipping engaged in the operation. Physical colocation facilitated easy, 
close, and clear communication between the two entities.
A radio-equipped harbor-control vessel stationed in the port managed ship-
ping, twenty-four hours a day. An officer boarded each MSTS-operated ship im-
mediately on its arrival to assess its load status, capacity, amount and condition 
of loading equipment, and any peculiarities relevant to loading. This information 
went to CTF 90 Operations by radio. All such ships were directed to be ready for 
movement on immediate, two-hour, or later notice as required. 
On 9 December a X Corps embarkation control group was established to 
provide overall Army supervision of corps loading, with a control officer, an 
executive officer, representatives from each of the corps’s technical services, and 
the CTF 90 staff combat cargo officer as liaison officer. Transient members, as 
required, included embarkation control groups from 1st Marine Division, 7th 
Division, 3rd Division, and ROK I Corps. As during the Inchon and Wonsan-
Iwon landings, Colonel Forney’s Marines did the actual planning for X Corps.
Forney himself served as the shore-based control and loading officer, perform-
ing with “consummate skill.” Set up in a shed on the docks, Forney assigned his 
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officers and enlisted personnel to key positions in this control station, “where 
their four months on the X Corps staff resulted in excellent relationships.” Doyle 
found that General Almond “cooperated fully and ensured that his subordinates 
followed his example. He established X Corps embarkation priority as personnel, 
[then] vehicles, [then] equipment, supplies, and refugees. But he never objected to 
departures from that order, knowing that we had good reason when we did so.”42
Forney and his staff “selected the X Corps units to be loaded on the basis 
of available tactical and administrative information and assigned shipping in 
consultation with the operations section of TF 90. Port operating units were 
then advised of dockside requirements, the loading section ground out its plans, 
the movement section got the traffic down to the water, and the rations people 
laid down these useful items alongside.”43 This control group maintained nearly 
constant direct telephone communication with all relevant units and CTF 90 
Operations.
Each corps unit provided its embarkation control group with a “readiness for 
loading” report (covering personnel, vehicles, and bulk cargo, etc.) prior to its 
MAP 3
U.S. Navy
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time to commence loading as promulgated in the master schedule, which hinged 
on the tactical situation. X Corps broke the report data into shipping require-
ments, as advised by the combat cargo officer. CTF 90 Operations assigned suit-
able shipping, on the basis of these requirements and available berths. The em-
barkation control group was provided the identities of the ships assigned, along 
with data on their capacity, booms, etc., and planned a “paper load.” Shortages 
and overages of shipping space were immediately reported to CTF 90 Operations, 
and the embarkation control group adjusted plans as necessary.
The port director maintained operational control of actual docking and un-
docking of all ships and of the movement of all shipping in the inner harbor. 
Three qualified CTF 90 staff officers were assigned to Port Director Control. A 
radio-equipped landing craft assigned to the port director (and shared with the 
beachmaster, described below) served as a dispatch boat. Ships moored at one of 
seven berthing spaces alongside four docks. Experimentation quickly led to pro-
cedures for the most efficient use of these limited spaces (including, importantly, 
double-banking ships at the docks). Two radio-equipped Army yard tugs made 
it possible to dock and undock ships rapidly.44 
CTF 90 Operations advised the port director that a given ship was to be 
docked at a given berth as a replacement for the ship there, then directed it to 
proceed from its anchorage and wait in the vicinity of the breakwater for a pilot, 
who docked the ship. Doyle and his staff contrived so to “time the process that 
the new ship reached her berth at the same time the first troops and supplies to 
be loaded came alongside,” and they usually met that goal.45 The embarkation 
control liaison officer advised CTF 90 Operations of the time a given ship would 
finish loading, and the latter assigned it a “chop time” that was given to the port 
director. At that time the ship was undocked and got under way.
The Beachmaster Control Unit controlled beaching and retracting all tank 
landing ships (LSTs) in the LST beaching area (Green Beaches 1 and 2; see map 
4), a function analogous to that of the port director. An MSTS officer with a 
great deal of previous LST experience, assigned as beachmaster, piloted most of 
the SCAJAP LSTs onto the beach (where they would open their bow doors, drop 
a ramp, and “onload” vehicles and cargo directly, backing off the beach, with the 
help of an anchor dropped astern, when ready). The beaching area could handle 
eleven LSTs simultaneously; additionally, three LSTs could be berthed at Dock 
No. 4 when the Green Beaches were full, or immediately adjacent to that dock 
at Blue Beach. CTF 90 Operations delivered sailing orders to each LST before it 
was loaded. Once the Shore Party (below) notified the beachmaster that an LST 
was loaded, the latter forwarded that information to the CTF 90 liaison officer 
at X Corps headquarters by radio. The liaison officer then obtained final clear-
ance for sailing and in turn informed the beachmaster, who directed the LST to 
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execute its sailing orders (and assisted, with boats, in its retraction from the beach 
if required). Additional assistance was provided by a SCAJAP headquarters staff 
officer temporarily assigned to CTF 90 Operations. 
A control officer and small staff (on board the Control Ship) directed move-
ment of all utility landing ships (LSUs) and smaller craft in the inner harbor. The 
control officer also assisted in directing movements of the LSTs, in coordination 
with the beachmaster and the port director. This was a busy station, twenty-four 
hours a day. 
Doyle assigned his staff civil engineer to the Army 2nd Engineer Special Bri-
gade, which served as the Shore Party—responsible for physical aspects of the 
loading. The civil engineer liaison officer advised the brigade in order to expedite 
loading and kept CTF 90 Operations informed of loading progress in real time. 
Doyle later commented that this “Liaison Officer solved any problems which 
arose and was extremely valuable as an ‘expediter’ who had direct contact with all 
Army and Navy Control Stations connected with the operation.”46 
Hundreds of aviation gasoline drums await evacuation on the Hungnam docks, 14 December 1950. USS LST-898 is in the center, with a LCU at right and the 
harbor entrance control frigate (PF) in the background. View looking northeast from Blue Beach across the inner harbor.
U.S. Navy
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Each control element worked independently on those matters that it could 
handle without reference to the other elements and coordinated with the others 
when required. However, given the extremely compressed time frame, the discre-
tion Doyle granted his subordinates would have been for naught absent a simple, 
effective, real-time communications system: the admiral believed that “the most 
important factor in the operation of the control organization was the establish-
ment of special primary and secondary very-high-frequency voice radio circuits 
directly connecting Control Stations.” All stations used the primary circuit except 
the station manned by the CTF 90 liaison officer at the X Corps embarkation 
control group, who had near-exclusive use of the secondary circuit. Ultimately, 
however, both circuits were used whenever necessary due to difficulties in com-
munication. A simple numerical code was employed to identify ships easily and 
still maintain security.
Qualified operators served on each station on both circuits, but in order to 
eliminate delay or misunderstanding in operational traffic, “all except routine 
messages of minor importance were transmitted by the officers concerned speaking 
directly to each other.”47 Officers spoke directly to other officers and therefore 
A truck convoy moves along a beach road to the evacuation beach, 18 December 1950. Two Japanese-manned LSTs and USS LSM-419 are loading.
U.S. Navy
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solved problems, kept everyone concerned informed, made or obtained deci-
sions rapidly, and issued orders in the most efficient manner possible under the 
circumstances.
In the harbor, CTF 90 Operations primarily used visual signals (flag hoist and 
flashing light) to handle administrative traffic and to communicate with MSTS 
ships present. During 7–24 December, Mount McKinley’s signal bridge handled 
1,124 outgoing and 1,104 incoming dispatches. Overall, 44,750 dispatches were 
handled on the flagship during the period, including 24,630 on the tactical cir-
cuits and 17,982 in Radio One (the ship’s “radio shack”). Such communications 
arrangements permitted ready adjustment and adaptation as circumstances 
changed and as new, unanticipated problems arose. At the same time, individual 
control posts were not overburdened with information they did not require to 
conduct their activities.
“WALK, DON’T RUN TO THE NEAREST EXIT”
Because the outloading could function smoothly without Doyle’s direct supervi-
sion, he was able to focus on “preventing the enemy from establishing itself close 
Amphibious shipping beached at Hungnam during the evacuation, December 1950. LCUs present include LCU-520, LCU-638, LCU-742, & LCU-783.
U.S. Navy
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enough to our troops to cause casualties. To that end [he] used air attacks and 
naval gunfire to maintain the necessary separation. Basically, [he] put in front of 
the U.N. units a zone of fire through which the enemy could not pass.”48 
Doyle directly controlled the naval gunfire support element. From 7 to 15 De-
cember he stationed ships of this element where, as shown on map 2, they could 
simultaneously deliver emergency “call fire” (that is, requested by troops without 
notice) for X Corps and defend local shipping against enemy air attack. On 15 
December, stationed in the assigned mineswept channels (extending ten miles 
north and south of Hungnam), the ships of the element began deep-support 
fires (while X Corps artillery provided close support)—principally eight-inch 
interdiction and harassing fires and five-inch illumination rounds (enemy 
forces tended to press on friendly lines at night). As the perimeter contracted, 
the gunfire support ships moved to closer stations as required for direct troop 
support. Both observation and fighter aircraft located targets of opportunity and 
supplemented ground observation. Missouri (BB 63) arrived at Hungnam on 24 
December to provide additional fire.49
The 1st Marine Air Wing at Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 4) provided air 
support during the initial phase of the operation. It controlled all air support 
(including carrier-based) and served as the tactical air control center until 15 
December, when Yongpo was uncovered by the contracting perimeter and it was 
flown out. The center moved to Mount McKinley, and CTF 90 assumed control 
of all air support within a thirty-five-mile radius of Hungnam, including TF 77 
aircraft and Task Group (TG) 96.8 escort carrier aircraft, night hecklers from the 
Air Force and TF 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft (see figure 2).
Throughout, Marine pilots in observation aircraft provided forward air control
—they “understood the requirements of the troops and the capabilities of the 
covering aircraft and their armament loads.”50 Detachments from the Marine Air 
and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) served with X Corps Army 
units to maintain radio contact with the forward air controllers, supporting air-
craft, and naval gunfire ships—the “ANGLICO’s had the expertise necessary to 
call for and control the available support.”51 At sea, under TF 77, there were never 
fewer than four Essex-class carriers to provide air support, coordinated by CTF 
90 Operations with CTF 77, as for the July 1950 Pohang Dong landing. Doyle 
handled air and naval gunfire communications in the manner prescribed for as-
sault amphibious operations.
Doyle also shifted from shore-based to seaborne logistics, using floating petro-
leum and ammunition dumps, along with an evacuation center and a prisoner-
of-war camp afloat. He ordered life jackets and debarkation ladders. He directed 
Thackrey to send all available attack transports and attack cargo ships (along with 
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one dock landing ship, or LSD) from Inchon to Hungnam and requested that Joy 
provide ten empty cargo ships daily at Hungnam until further notice.52
Doyle published his loading and control plan for Hungnam on 11 December. 
He issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December, incorporating his Operation 
Order 19-50 and consolidating previous dispatches. Plans for gunfire support 
and air support were finalized in coordination with the TF 77 operations offi-
cer, X Corps, and Commander, Cruiser Division 1.53 Operations would proceed 
twenty-four hours per day.
That same day, Doyle assumed direct command of Hungnam port functions 
and commenced loading X Corps personnel, vehicles, and supplies. General Al-
mond had proposed that the 1st Marine Division provide security for the opera-
tion. However, because the Marines had already borne the hardest fighting, Doyle 
insisted that they load first, while the 3rd Division supplied security, with the 7th 
Division taking over portions of the perimeter until the ROK I Corps cleared the 
port; then the last U.S. division would embark.54
The operation continued to present surprises. Doyle’s staff had initially esti-
mated, for example, based on Wonsan, that lift would be required for twenty-five 
thousand refugees. The number evacuated grew to almost four times that num-
ber. Aside from the shipping they required, the refugees had to be fed and kept 
warm while awaiting embarkation. Similarly, when the redeployment order was 
received 9 December, ships were still unloading supplies; some of the supplies 
were required to maintain the defensive perimeter, and the necessity for unload-
ing them tied up some port facilities for several days. Doyle halted unloading 
when possible, but then his loading officer had to devise loading plans for ships 
that were not empty at the outset. 
The 12th showed a marked acceleration of the loading operations. By the next 
day, 55 percent of the personnel, 40 percent of the vehicles, and 70 percent of the 
bulk cargo of the Marines had been loaded. Doyle finalized plans for lifting the 
ROK I Corps from Hungnam to Samchok, as requested by X Corps. The corps 
had estimated a requirement for twelve thousand personnel and “a few vehicles,” 
and accordingly three ships had been committed. However, X Corps continued 
to revise the lift requirements upward—now twenty-five thousand personnel, 
seven hundred vehicles (including four hundred two-and-a-half-ton trucks), fifty 
tractors, and other heavy equipment. Consequently, additional shipping was al-
located. Intelligence studies and aerial reconnaissance on 13 December led to the 
selection of Bokuko Ko as the landing site for the Korean units. Doyle formed TG 
90.8 for that purpose on 16 December. It departed for Bokuko Ko on 17 Decem-
ber and commenced disembarking the following day. Meanwhile, by the 14th, 90 
percent of the Marines’ personnel, 95 percent of their vehicles, and 97 percent of 
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their bulk cargo had been loaded. The division sailed for Pusan the following day, 
and the 7th Division commenced loading. 
Loading continued on the 17th, amid forty-knot winds, heavy seas, and freez-
ing temperatures. Ships dragged anchor, and small boats drifted loose in and out 
of the harbor. Winds reached sixty knots in the open sea, and all carrier flight op-
erations were suspended.55 At 1600 (four o’clock in the afternoon) on 19 Decem-
ber, General Almond embarked on Mount McKinley, and command of all shore 
operations, including defense of the perimeter, passed to Doyle. The admiral 
pointedly told the general, so that there could be no mistake, “You understand . . . 
that these troops are now under my command.”56 It was precisely the reciprocal 
of the procedure by which during an amphibious assault command passes to the 
ground commander once he has established his command post ashore and so 
notified the amphibious commander. At the same time, 3rd Division took over 
the ground defenses.
By 20 December Doyle was confident enough of the operation’s trajectory to 
set the 24th as the tentative “reverse” D-day—or “Dog Day,” as it was then known. 
On the 20th, 7th Division completed loading and 3rd Division commenced 
loading. By the 22nd it emerged that sufficient shipping was available to outload 
another four thousand tons of ammunition and thirteen railroad boxcars (South 
Korea desperately needed rolling stock). Instructions for the Dog Day embarka-
tion were completed and distributed. On the 23rd, additional refugees went on 
board U.S. ships, and Missouri reported to its assigned fire support station. Doyle 
informed the beachmaster of prospective movements and the beaching sequence 
of LSTs and LSUs on Dog Day. For the final withdrawal, Doyle maintained a na-
val gunfire barrage in a zone 2,500 yards wide about three thousand yards from 
the beaches and harbor. Call fires in addition to this barrage prevented enemy 
movement through the zone during the day. Doyle ordered the port director to 
commence undocking all ships at the quays at 2000 (8 PM) and increased harass-
ing fire from naval gunfire support ships. When the last friendly troops were off 
the beaches, destructive fires rained down on the port area. Particular attention 
was given the destruction of the remaining railroad cars.57 Hungnam port closed 
at 2300. The beaches remained to be cleared the next day.
Early on the day of Christmas Eve, Doyle confirmed H-hour as 1100 (11 AM). 
Simultaneously, aircraft napalmed a hundred to three hundred enemy troops 
who had begun to press on the perimeter. As shown on map 4, the perimeter 
was progressively and rapidly reduced until at 1100 initial combat elements, less 
the covering forces, commenced loading into the LSTs and LSUs. At 1217, Army 
personnel prematurely detonated two Pink Beach ammunition dumps, causing 
loss of personnel and boats. By 1405, friendly forces had cleared all beaches. Five 
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minutes later, demolition charges were detonated around the waterfront of the 
inner harbor. At 1457, the hospital ship Consolation (AH 15) got under way, and 
the general sortie from the harbor commenced. Mount McKinley departed at 
1632, and the operation concluded. Not a single friendly had been left behind.58 
{LINE-SPACE} 
In the end, the Chinese and North Koreans elected not to attempt any serious 
interference with operations at Hungnam—in part, because the 1st Marine Di-
vision and Navy and Marine air had combined with Old Man Winter to render 
their forces substantially ineffective, and also, no doubt, because they understood 
that “their losses would certainly have been greater than they could have hoped 
to inflict. Fire power from the sea would have dwarfed what they had already 
absorbed during their attack on the Marines at Chosen.”59 More ammunition 
was ultimately expended at Hungnam than at the Inchon landing—but then, the 
operation lasted much longer, plenty of ammunition was available, and as Doyle 
later pointed out, powder and metal were much less valuable than human life.60
USS LSMR-404 and USS Begor (APD-127) stand by as U.N. troops demolish the Hungnam port facilities at the end of the evacuation, on 24 December 1950.
U.S. Navy
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During fourteen days at Hungnam, the U.S. Navy embarked and redeployed 
105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of supplies (in-
cluding fuel and ammunition stores). It also lifted 91,000 civilian refugees to safety
—a number limited only by time and available shipping. Marine and Air Force 
air transports flew out an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of 
cargo. The number and types of ships employed reveal the operation’s magnitude 
and complexity: one amphibious command ship (AGC), three attack transports, 
three attack cargo ships, eight MSTS-operated transports and one MSTS cargo 
ship, five heavy-lift time-charter vessels, fifty-one regular time-charter vessels 
(Victory ships), two SCAJAP time-charter vessels, eleven U.S. Navy LSTs, twenty-
six SCAJAP LSTs, and three LSDs. Most vessels made multiple trips in and out of 
Hungnam; for example, thirty-seven LSTs made a total of eighty-one trips. 
A DECENTRALIZED, SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM 
Doyle later commented that the command relationships and operational proce-
dures for Hungnam were unique to that special situation and probably ought not 
Koreans prepare to board an LST during the Hungnam evacuation, 19 December 1950. Other Koreans are transferring their belongings from an ox cart to a 
fishing boat, at left. Taken on Green Beach.
U.S. Navy
140
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
 C H I S H O L M  135
to be used as a template for future amphibious operations. Insofar as the prin-
cipal factors (and their interrelationships) of future operations were not largely 
identical to those that obtained at Hungnam, the admiral was absolutely correct. 
At another level, however, the admiral was quite wrong and altogether too 
modest. The key to the remarkable military feat at Hungnam resided in Doyle’s 
implicit recognition that, however experienced they were in amphibious opera-
tions, he and his staff had never before encountered a problem even remotely 
resembling that presented by Hungnam, nor did amphibious doctrine provide 
any foundation. That is, he and his staff correctly assessed that they faced an ill-
structured problem—although they did not have that name for it.
Doyle’s decision to devise an ad hoc plan and C2 organization predicated on 
the analogy of an amphibious operation executed in reverse therefore proved 
pivotal. That approach allowed experts to exercise their professional judgment 
freely in their areas of responsibility, to impose structure on the problems each 
confronted and generate solutions for them, and to communicate informally, 
directly, and quickly with others whose advice, cooperation, and coordination 
were necessary. Doyle essentially established and maintained a decentralized, 
self-organizing system that proved highly adaptive and flexible, well suited to the 
primary constraint on the operation—time. Experimentation and rapid learning, 
inevitably essential to the solution of ill-structured problems, were the rule, not 
conformity to preconceived notions of doctrine and to military formalities. Even 
the plan and organization themselves resulted from unusually consultative staff 
planning conferences that facilitated input from those with the requisite exper-
tise. The profound lesson of Hungnam is to be found in the manner in which the 
operation was approached and organized.
UN control of adjacent sea and air enabled Doyle the complete freedom of 
action sought by every commander but rarely attained by any. The responsible 
naval commanders correctly understood that they could hold a perimeter at 
Hungnam as long as they wished to do so, given established and sustainable con-
trol of the sea and air, and the ready availability of naval air and gunfire support. 
This allowed United Nations forces to control the timing and completion of a 
well organized and well executed extraction. Conversely, the enemy was limited 
to ground action only, and that by an already attrited force without the heavy 
weapons to threaten seriously the redeploying forces.61
That historians and the popular imagination have heretofore focused on the 
Inchon landing is understandable (after all, it was an audacious assault, while 
Hungnam was a withdrawal) but unfortunate. Although the decision to land at 
Inchon was a difficult and daring one and succeeded operationally and tactically, 
it presented no particular novelties to Doyle and his amphibious experts. Mac-
Arthur’s insistence on Inchon may have violated their professional sensibilities, 
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but they possessed both doctrine and experience by which to act effectively.62 By 
contrast, Hungnam presented novelty at almost every turn, and yet the amphibi-
ous group rose to the occasion.
Doyle’s ability to emplace a self-organizing system at Hungnam was predicat-
ed on the granting by Vice Admiral Joy of his demand that unlike in the Inchon 
and Wonsan operations, he be permitted to exercise command independently of 
the Seventh Fleet commander. Joy acceded because of his long-standing profes-
sional and personal relationship with Doyle and his practical understanding that 
amphibious expertise was the factor critical to success at Hungnam. Notwith-
standing his own misgivings about Joy’s decision, the CNO was unwilling or 
unable to overturn it directly, and his subterfuge of sending a “representative” to 
Hungnam had, in the event, no effect. For his part, Admiral Struble of Seventh 
Fleet, for whom Joy’s decision must have been a bitter pill, responded fully to 
Doyle’s requests for air and naval gunfire support and at the same time was able 
to focus on his broader Seventh Fleet responsibilities. Similarly, the presence of a 
second fully capable amphibious group in Korea under Doyle meant that Doyle 
could allocate responsibility for west-coast redeployment operations to that 
group, freeing himself from their detailed supervision and allowing him and his 
staff to focus on Hungnam.
Several other factors also contributed both to Doyle’s willingness to employ 
a self-organizing system and to its success. His initial amphibious operational 
experience was as operations officer at Guadalcanal. Because such an operation 
had never before been attempted, it constituted an ill-structured problem, un-
like later operations in the Central Pacific, which were much better structured.63 
Subsequently, Doyle served for two years in Admiral King’s amphibious planning 
section. He thereby had firsthand experience with the practical matters of dealing 
with ill-structured problems and the need for an adaptable and self-organizing 
C2 organization.
Doyle’s staff comprised entirely officers with extensive World War II amphibi-
ous experience, men who were virtually all overqualified for their billets. The 
same obtained for the officers and men of Forney’s Mobile Training Team Able. 
Doyle’s staff was no ordinary collection of skilled individual officers. Rather, it 
had seen little turnover and had worked together on landing exercises both state-
side and in Japan prior to planning and conducting the Pohang Dong, Inchon, 
and Wonsan landings, along with myriad lesser amphibious lifts. In consequence, 
Doyle knew his staff members (and those of Team Able) personally and profes-
sionally in detail; the staff members knew each other in like manner, and they had 
evolved effective working relationships. Experience at Inchon and Wonsan had 
also established effective working relationships also with the principal ground 
commanders and their staffs. These factors all conduced to the development and 
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maintenance of trust among the key participants. These men could be depended 
on to do their jobs without central direction and to improvise when required. 
Underlying all of this was an effective communications system at Hungnam that 
permitted ready lateral coordination among the control posts.
In the end, the worst fears of the military commanders in Korea and of the 
American popular press were not realized in December 1950. Hungnam was no 
Dunkirk, nor from the Navy and the Marine Corps perspective had it at any time 
been likely to become one. Many factors contributed to success in Hungnam, 
including the availability of specialized amphibious shipping and complete 
control of air and sea, but the defining factors were the presence of experienced 
professionals, organized effectively, and the willingness of their commander to 
let them do their jobs.
{LINE-SPACE} 
After rest and recuperation at the “Bean Patch,” near Ulsan, 1st Marine Division, 
still part of X Corps but the latter now integrated with Eighth Army, was ordered 
out of Army reserve on 9 January 1951 to reenter the fight. The Army’s 3rd and 
7th Divisions followed close behind.
In spring 1951, Rear Admiral Doyle returned to the United States for a well 
deserved rest and new duties. In September that year he became president of 
the Board of Inspection and Survey, serving until the following May, when he 
assumed the chairmanship of the Joint Amphibious Board. Doyle retired in No-
vember 1953, in the grade of vice admiral on the retired list, on the basis of his 
combat awards. He practiced law for many years in Austin, Texas, and died in 1982.
His work on the Joint Amphibious Board, rewriting existing doctrine for am-
phibious operations (then embodied in Naval Warfare Publication 22), proved, 
in the aftermath of the defense unification battles, highly contentious. The board 
completed its work at the end of Doyle’s tenure, publishing its report in January 
1954. The report set forth divergent service views on “doctrines and procedures 
governing joint amphibious operations” that were delaying finalization of a 
jointly acceptable solution—each page was divided into thirds, with the views of 
the Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force for each issue given separately. 
Curiously, given its chairman’s immediate past experience at Hungnam, the re-
port addressed only the problems of the assault, primarily matters of phasing and 
of command and control.64 
Today, joint doctrine, although entirely consistent with the lessons of Hungnam, 
provides only minimal guidance for structuring the problem of the amphibious 
withdrawal. Naval commanders and staffs not already well practiced in the am-
phibious assault will find only a very rough outline for approaching the problem 
of the amphibious withdrawal. They are better advised to study Hungnam and its 
many relatives systematically, to consult the superseded Joint Publication 3-02.1, 
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The author thanks Capt. James Cook, USN 
(Ret.), and his colleagues in the Joint Military 
Operations Department of the Naval War 
College for their thoughtful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
1. The title refers to a 21 December 1950 mes-
sage (date-time group 210836Z) from Vice 
Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval 
Forces Far East, to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Com-
mander, Pacific Fleet, Adm. Arthur Radford, 
in reference to the Hungnam operation: 
“Doyle with Struble’s excellent air cover and 
complete support is performing remarkable 
military feat in withdrawal plan [sic] army 
with all of their equipment and without 
heavy losses” [emphasis supplied]; U.S. 
Navy Operational Archives, Naval History 
and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C. 
[hereafter Navy Operational Archives]. The 
epigraphs are as quoted from the original 
sources in Michael Duffy, “Festering the 
Spanish Ulcer: The Royal Navy and the Pen-
insular War, 1808–1814,” in Naval Power and 
Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns 
and New Theaters of Naval Warfare, ed. Bruce 
A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 15–28. The epigraphs: 
from Molyneux’s Conjunct Expeditions: or, 
expeditions that have been carried on jointly by 
the fleet and army, with a commentary on a lit-
toral war (1759); an observation by Wellesley 
(later Lord Wellington) on his 1808–1809 
Peninsular Campaign.
2. U.S. Defense Dept., Amphibious Operations, 
Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, D.C.: 
Joint Staff, 10 August 2009) [hereafter JP 
3-02], p. xi, available at Defense Technical 
Information Center, Joint Electronic Library, 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/.
3. The National Defense Program: Unification 
and Strategy: Hearings before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on the Armed 
Services, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (October 1949) 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office [hereafter GPO], 1949), p. 521. 
Strictly speaking, as has been pointed out, the 
general was correct: massive over-the-beach 
assaults against strong enemy defenses, such 
as those at Sicily and Normandy, have not 
been, and are not likely to be, practiced by 
the U.S. military—although one suspects that 
they just might be by other nations perhaps 
less chary of high casualty rates. The United 
States has found other ways to skin that cat, 
given developments in improved intelligence, 
vertical-lift capabilities, long-range precision 
fires, and the concept of ship-to-objective 
maneuver; see Keith F. Kopets, “Omar Bradley 
Was Right . . . ,” Marine Corps Gazette (August 
2003), available at www.mca-marines
.org/. One need observe only casually the 
trend of investment by rising powers, such as 
India and China, in amphibious capabilities 
to grasp the continued importance of such 
operations in both peace and war.
4. Recognizing that an entire generation of Navy 
and Marine officers has, after the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, virtually no practical 
experience of amphibious operations, U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command in 2011 conducted 
an amphibious training exercise, BOLD AL-
LIGATOR. Its follow-on, “BA12, tentatively 
scheduled for early in 2012, will be the largest 
amphibious exercise conducted by the Navy 
and Marine Corps in the last ten years. While 
planning is ongoing, it currently includes: An 
Amphibious Task Force (ESG-2) consisting of 
two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs—7–8 
ships) and a Naval Beach Group (NBG); a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade–sized Land-
ing Force (2d MEB) consisting of a com-
plete Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a 
Regimental Landing Team (RLT), a Marine 
Air Group (MAG) and a Combat Logistics 
Regiment (CLR); a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG—aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 3–4 
surface combatants); Military Sealift Com-
mand (MSC) ships; Mine Counter-Measures 
Joint Doctrine for Landing Operations, of 2004, and regularly to plan and exercise 
the amphibious withdrawal. The requirement for such does not come along of-
ten, but when it does, fortune will favor the prepared. 
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(MCM) forces; Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC) forces; Joint supporting 
forces; and Coalition amphibious, landing, 
and MCM forces.” See “Bold Alligator 2012 
Update,” U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog (9 
June 2011), usfleetforces.blogspot.com/.
5. JP 3-02, p. xii.
6. See Duffy, “Festering the Spanish Ulcer.” 
7. The data presented in table 1 are drawn 
primarily from Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy 
and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: 
Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 274–82.
8. Oliver P. Smith to Esther Smith, 14 December 
1950, Oliver P. Smith Papers, U.S. Marine 
Corps Archives, Marine Corps Historical 
Center, Quantico, Va. [hereafter O. P. Smith 
Papers].
9. On 20–22 December, eight soldiers died and 
twelve became severely ill from ingesting 
methyl alcohol. On 24 December, an Army 
captain prematurely detonated an ammu-
nition dump while boats and amphibian 
tractors were still on the beach, killing two 
men and injuring thirty-four; Commander, 
Amphibious Group One (CTF [Commander, 
Task Force] 90), “Report of Operations for 
Period 25 June 1950 to 1 January 1951,” pp. 
39–40, Navy Operational Archives; Oliver P. 
Smith, personal log, entry for 26 December 
1950, p. 123, O. P. Smith Papers. The freighter 
Senzan Maru, carrying fifty thousand 
hundred-pound bags of flour, was mined 
outside Hungnam harbor on 10 December 
but was repaired and sailed to Japan. Enid 
Victory grounded at Hungnam but was 
refloated and sailed to Pusan. A ROK tank 
landing ship (LST) fouled its propellers in 
Manila line and wire. Loaded with more than 
seven thousand civilian refugees, this LST was 
extracted from the beach but remained in the 
harbor overnight while the propellers were 
cleared. A gale came up, during which an 
uncounted number of the refugees on board 
died of exposure; see Walter Karig, Malcolm 
Cagle, and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report, 
vol. 6, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 
1952), pp. 432–33.
10. Of the many published accounts of the 
Chosen withdrawal, see Edwin H. Sim-
mons, Frozen Chosin: The U.S. Marines at 
the Changjin Reservoir (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002); 
Gail B. Shisler, For Country and Corps: The 
Life of General Oliver P. Smith (Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009); and Lynn 
Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. 
Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, 
vol. 3, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, 
Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1956). The 
most complete, balanced account of naval 
operations during the Korean War is to be 
found in James A. Field, Jr., History of United 
States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1962). See also Malcolm W. Cagle 
and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1957). 
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he onset of pirate attacks on merchant vessels off the Horn of Africa in re-
cent years has put Africa’s maritime security increasingly in the international 
spotlight. Recent times have also seen the advent of the African Union and with 
it a commitment to “African solutions to African problems.” Despite this, African 
states have made little active contribution to securing Africa’s maritime domains. 
Yet, as the scholar and analyst Augustus Vogel, of the Africa Center for Strategic 
Studies in Washington, D.C., points out, doing so 
is vitally impor tant to Africa: illegal fishing undercuts 
Africa’s eco nomic development and exacerbates its food 
secu rity challenges; piracy makes badly needed trade and 
investment in Africa more risky and expensive; the con-
tinent is becoming an increasingly active drug traf ficking 
hub; the growing drug trade, in turn, is giving inter-
national criminal syndicates a foothold within certain 
African governments, weakening their ability to address 
other national priorities; and illegal com merce (such as 
oil bunkering, transport of counterfeit materials, and 
theft) impacts legitimate businesses and world markets. 
In short, many of Africa’s emerging threats arrive by sea.1 
Most glaring has been the lack of a significant con-
tribution by the South African Navy (SAN), arguably 
sub-Saharan Africa’s most capable naval force. This ar-
ticle begins with a brief outline of the history of South 
Africa’s navy—a history that accounts for some of the 
T
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contemporary navy’s shortcomings. The article then outlines the SAN’s current 
capabilities and addresses the current constraints it faces. The article closes by 
looking to the future and advocating steps and measures that will need to be 
taken if the South African Navy is to make a significant contribution to African, 
or indeed even South African, maritime security.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY
To grasp fully what we might call the “philosophical” factors that limit the effec-
tiveness of today’s South African Navy, it is helpful to have a sense of the history 
of this force. The first officially recognized naval unit formed in South Africa was 
raised in 1885 in what was then the Natal Colony, as a consequence of a perceived 
threat emerging from tensions between Britain and Russia over Afghanistan. 
Technically a coastal artillery force, this unit, the Natal Naval Volunteers, never 
took part in a maritime engagement. It did, however, serve with some distinction 
as part of the British forces engaged in the second Anglo-Boer War, and again 
during the Zulu rebellion of 1906.2
In 1905 the Cape Colonial government followed the lead of the Natal Colony 
by establishing a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), com-
monly known as the Cape Naval Volunteers.3 With the 1910 formation of the 
Union of South Africa in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Boer War, this sys-
tem of naval volunteers was extended to include the whole of the Union, through 
the formation in 1912 of the South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve (RNVR[SA]), under the command of the Royal Navy.4 Mobilized for ser-
vice in World War I, the RNVR(SA) contributed twelve officers and 267 sailors, 
who between them served in every theater of the war.5
The experience of the First World War convinced the Union government of 
the need for a full-time naval capability, and in 1922 the South African Naval 
Service (SANS) was established to complement the capability provided by the 
volunteers of the RNVR(SA). The advent of the SANS brought with it South 
Africa’s first naval vessels—a survey vessel and two minesweeping trawlers on 
loan from the Royal Navy. The recommissioning of these vessels under the prefix 
HMSAS (His [or Her] Majesty’s South African Ship) on 1 April 1922 is marked 
as the South African Navy’s birthday.6
Despite this promising start, things quickly went badly for the fledgling SANS. 
The global effects of the Great Depression led to severe budget cuts. By 1934 
all three of the SANS’s vessels had been returned to the Royal Navy, and by the 
time of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 it “had virtually ceased 
to exist.”7 The pressing demands of the war stimulated the Union government to 
relaunch its full-time naval capability under a new name, the South African Sea-
ward Defence Force (SDF).8 The service experienced rapid growth, and by 1945 
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the authorized personnel establishment “had grown to more than 10,000 officers 
and ratings, with some 89 assorted vessels [all converted commercial vessels] 
in commission.”9 SDF vessels did duty in the South African and Mediterranean 
theaters. In addition, as in the First World War, the volunteers of the RNVR(SA) 
provided manpower to the Royal Navy, with members eventually serving in ev-
ery maritime theater of the war. South Africa’s navy was once again renamed in 
1942, this time as the South African Naval Forces, and in 1944 it received its first 
genuine warships, in the form of three Loch-class antisubmarine frigates. (One of 
these vessels, HMSAS Natal, performed a remarkable, probably unique feat: only 
hours after leaving the builder’s yard and en route to workup training, it located 
and sank a German submarine, U-714.)10
In the aftermath of the Second World War the navy underwent its final name 
change, becoming known in 1951 as simply the South African Navy.11 What fol-
lowed was a period of expansion that is generally considered to have been the 
navy’s heyday. Between 1957 and 1962 the SAN received six blue-water-capable 
vessels—a Type 15 frigate, two W-class destroyers, and three Type 12 frigates—all 
purchased from Britain under the terms of the Simon’s Town Agreement.12 The 
addition of a squadron of Avro Shackleton long-range maritime patrol aircraft 
and a squadron of Blackburn (later Hawker Siddeley) Buccaneer maritime strike 
aircraft to the inventory of the South African Air Force (SAAF), as well as West-
land Wasp shipboard antisubmarine helicopters, added significantly to South 
Africa’s ability to patrol and secure its maritime environment. The purchase of 
the Danish tanker Annam in 1967 and its subsequent conversion into the under-
way replenishment vessel SAS Tafelberg gave the SAN the ability to conduct long-
duration and long-range missions. The additional acquisition of three Daphné-
class submarines from France during the late 1960s and early 1970s rounded out 
the SAN as a small but capable and well-balanced navy, optimized for operations 
against other naval forces.13
The Afrikaner nationalist government that ruled South Africa from 1948 until 
the end of the apartheid era in 1994 harbored a deep hostility toward Britain, as 
a consequence of that nation’s colonial history in South Africa. Despite this, and 
because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, from the end of the 
Second World War until the mid-1970s it seemed virtually axiomatic that South 
Africa would side with Britain and the West in any future war against the Soviet 
bloc, serving as “the vigilant ‘Guardian of the Cape Sea Route.’”14 For this reason, 
in light of the close historical ties between the South African Navy and the Royal 
Navy, “the SA Navy was perceived by many of the senior officers in both navies as 
simply an extension of, and in all but name and administrative function, an op-
erational section of the Royal Navy.”15 However, the South African government’s 
policy of apartheid led to British withdrawal from the Simon’s Town Agreement 
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in 1975, thereby ending the historical close ties between the South African and 
Royal Navies.16 
By the latter part of the 1970s South Africa was facing increasing international 
isolation as well as the heavy budgetary demands imposed by its counterinsur-
gency campaign in South West Africa (now Namibia) and its involvement in civil 
war in Angola and warfare in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). This isolation and the 
imposition of a mandatory United Nations (UN) arms embargo made it increas-
ingly unlikely that the SAN would be called on by the West to play a role in coun-
tering the Soviet navy. As a result, in February 1977 the leadership of the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) effectively reduced the role of the SAN to that 
of a coastal force.17 The planned acquisition of two Type A69 corvettes and two 
Agosta-class submarines from France was canceled. A project to acquire Reshef-
class missile strike craft from Israel did, however, go ahead, with a final tally of 
nine entering into service, three built in Israel and six in Durban.18 The strike 
craft, armed with between six and eight Scorpion surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs) and two OTO Melara 76/60 mm compact dual-purpose guns, entered 
service between July 1977 and July 1986.19 By the latter date the last remaining 
frigates that had entered service with the SAN in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
had been withdrawn from service;20 the strike craft were left as the backbone of 
South Africa’s coastal navy of the 1980s and 1990s.
Struggling under a much-reduced budget, by the end of the 1970s the SAN 
had nonetheless found a niche that enabled it to maintain its relevance. The 
strike craft were used on a regular basis to insert and recover special forces teams 
behind enemy lines, and “for some of the more distant and covert operations the 
Navy demonstrated how rapidly and how effectively it had mastered the complex 
and difficult task of operating submarines by using them to insert small numbers 
of men and then recover them on completion of their task.”21 More traditional 
naval tasks were also carried out. It was proclaimed by one observer in 1985 that 
“Soviet naval movements in the region are shadowed routinely . . . [mainly by] 
the submarines. Apparently they [South African submarines] have grown quite 
adept at [these operations], not least vis-à-vis other submarines.”22
Apart from the purchase of four small, locally built minehunters in the early 
1980s, the only major naval acquisition of that period was the domestically de-
signed and constructed six-thousand-ton (12,500 tons full load) support vessel 
SAS Drakensburg, which was commissioned in 1987. Three years prior to that, 
the navy’s other support vessel, the ageing SAS Tafelberg, had completed a refit 
“that allowed her to carry a company-strength landing force, two medium heli-
copters and six small landing craft as well as the addition of a small hospital. This 
provided the SA Navy with a limited amphibious support capability.”23 This was, 
in all likelihood, an attempt to afford additional maneuver capability to SADF 
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commanders conducting cross-border operations against the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the supporting People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Cuban forces in Angola. This amphibious 
capability was, however, never used operationally, and SAS Tafelberg was decom-
missioned in 1993.24
The period of South Africa’s transition to democracy (from 1990 to 1994) was 
a particularly painful one for the South African Navy. Massive cuts to the defense 
budget forced the SAN to cut its personnel complement by 23 percent, with effect 
from the SAN’s sixty-eighth birthday, 1 April 1990. Another consequence of the 
cut was the cancellation of a long-running and fairly advanced program to build 
submarines in South Africa. The one positive development of this period was 
the purchase in February 1993 of Juvent, originally built as an icebreaking Arctic 
supply vessel for the Soviet navy. Renamed SAS Outeniqua, this vessel replaced 
the decommissioned Tafelberg and proved particularly useful in supporting the 
South African research base in Antarctica. The capability represented by this ves-
sel was, however, lost to the SAN in 2005, when Outeniqua was sold back into the 
private sector as a cost-cutting measure.25
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CAPABILITIES 
With the fall of the apartheid regime, the African National Congress (ANC), 
under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, came to power in South Africa’s first 
democratic elections in 1994 and has remained in power since. The South Afri-
can Navy inherited by the new government was in a poor state. The personnel 
cuts instigated in 1990 had affected both morale and capability, and operational 
capability amounted primarily to two support vessels (reduced to one in 2005), 
a handful of small ageing strike craft optimized for the more peaceful waters of 
the Mediterranean, and three diesel-electric submarines rapidly reaching the 
ends of their useful service lives (all three Daphnés would be decommissioned by 
2003).26 There was considerable concern that the SAN might not survive at all in 
any useful form. Given the very pressing socioeconomic needs that had to be ad-
dressed by the new government and the fact that South Africa was now at peace 
with its neighbors and facing no discernible military threat, many believed that 
the South African military would be significantly reduced in size and capability, 
possibly even disbanded altogether. 
Thankfully for the SAN, this did not happen. Rather than “disarm, demobi-
lize, and reintegrate” the apartheid-era South African Defence Force, its proxies, 
and the armed wings of the liberation movements, the new government instead 
integrated them into a new national military force, the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF).27 The ANC government also launched an ambitious 
and controversial Strategic Defence Procurement (SDP) package, announced in 
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September 1999, which focused on purchasing new ships for the navy and new 
aircraft for the air force.28 Under the terms of the SDP the navy has since received 
four MEKO A200SAN frigates, three Type 209/1400 submarines (SSKs), and four 
Westland Super Lynx maritime helicopters.29 
The frigates, designated as the Valour class in SAN service and displacing 3,590 
tons, combine a modular architecture with an X-form superstructure that very 
effectively reduces radar signature. Propelled by two MTU sixteen-cylinder, V-
configuration 1163 TB 93 diesel engines and a fully independent “combined die-
sel and gas turbine–waterjet and refined propellers” (CODAG-WARP) propul-
sion system, these vessels have a sustained speed of twenty knots, with a cruising 
range of eight thousand nautical miles, and they are capable of over twenty-eight 
knots. Primary armament consists of eight MM40 Block 2 Exocet SSMs and one 
OTO Melara 76/62 mm compact dual-purpose gun. Air defense is secured by 
sixteen vertically launched, locally developed Umkhonto surface-to-air missiles 
(plus sixteen reloads), missiles that can engage multiple targets at ranges in excess 
of twelve kilometers. Secondary weapons include one twin 35 mm gun, two 20 
mm guns, and two 12.7 mm machine guns. Antisubmarine warfare capability is 
provided by hull-mounted sonar and an embarked Super Lynx Mk 64 helicopter. 
(Each ship can accommodate two medium helicopters, though normally only 
one will be deployed.)30
The Type 209/1400 submarines displace 1,454 tons dived and are capable of 
a dived speed of 21.5 knots (ten knots surfaced). They can dive 250 meters and 
can cruise up to fifty days without replenishment. Primary armament comprises 
eight twenty-one-inch torpedo tubes that can be reloaded under way (and, if nec-
essary, submerged) from a store of an additional six torpedoes. Four of the tubes 
are also capable of minelaying, and the South African Type 209s have been modi-
fied from the standard design to give them the ability to support special forces.
In addition to the new frigates and submarines, the SAN of today is rounded 
out by a number of legacy vessels. Chief among these is the support vessel Dra-
kensburg. Two of the original nine Warrior-class strike craft remain operational, 
now with their SSMs removed and redesignated as offshore patrol vessels.31 
Three small T-Craft inshore patrol boats of glass-reinforced-plastic sandwich 
construction, ordered in 1991, were commissioned in 2003. The unarmed SAS 
Protea, commissioned in 1971, undertakes hydrographic survey duties, and the 
SAN also operates two small minehunters, a number of locally built Namacurra 
harbor patrol boats, and three tugs. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CONSTRAINTS
On paper, at least, the South African Navy is the most capable naval force in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this, barring a handful of fishery protection and 
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antismuggling operations conducted in home waters and the occasional sea 
rescue operation, the SAN has made little apparent contribution to African 
maritime security.32 Yet securing the maritime domain must be considered to be 
among Africa’s more significant challenges. 
The SAN’s relative inactivity in this regard is somewhat surprising, given the 
leading role South Africa has taken on itself in addressing security challenges 
across the continent over the past fifteen years. Since being welcomed back into 
the international fold and shedding its pariah status, South Africa has played a 
leading role in addressing conflict and defusing tensions in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and São Tome and Principe, and it 
has contributed additional forces to African Union (AU) and UN missions in the 
Comoros, Darfur, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia. Under the leadership of former 
president Thabo Mbeki (Mandela’s successor), South Africa was also one of the 
driving forces behind the creation of the AU out of the ashes of the largely ir-
relevant Organization of African Unity. In recent times the AU has increasingly 
acknowledged the importance of maritime security. Despite all this, until recently 
the only direct use of South Africa’s naval capability in support of African se-
curity was the deployment of a flotilla of three Namacurra harbor patrol boats 
(increasing to five in 2005) to the Burundian section of Lake Tanganyika between 
2003 and 2007, as part of the AU and subsequent UN peacekeeping forces in 
Burundi.33
One notable operational contribution by South Africa to maritime security in 
recent times, however, involved the Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols.34 
For one month, March 2009, officials from Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, 
and Tanzania conducted joint patrols on board the South African offshore patrol 
vessel Sarah Baartman. During the operation forty-one vessels were inspected, 
ten of which were fined; a further six were arrested for violations of national 
maritime laws. One of the seized vessels, detained in Tanzanian waters, had on 
board over three hundred tons of illegal tuna. While this cooperative venture was 
an important step in the right direction, it must be noted that it did not involve 
South African Navy assets but rather an environmental-protection ship from the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. 
An important recent exception to the SAN’s disengaged status quo has been 
the commencement of antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel. Accord-
ing to comments by Lindiwe Sisulu, South Africa’s Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans, the first informal steps in launching these patrols were taken 
in response to an attack by Somali pirates on a Mozambican vessel in “the waters 
of SADC [Southern African Development Community] around the 28th of De-
cember,” in 2010.35 Although information is somewhat scarce, calls for assistance 
by the Mozambican government and that of Tanzania seem to have led to the 
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formalization of these patrols. The patrols involve a single frigate on station at 
any one time, apparently “carrying a contingent of Special Forces and Maritime 
Reaction Squadron (MRS) commandos to conduct boarding operations.”36 An 
unconfirmed report suggests that additional support is being provided by land-
based aircraft launched from a strip at the popular diving resort of Pemba, in 
northern Mozambique.37
Though antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel by the SAN must be 
seen as encouraging, this seems to be largely a symbolic and ad hoc arrangement, 
and there are questions as to whether it can be sustained. It must, therefore, be 
conceded that thus far the SAN’s contribution to African maritime security has 
been very limited indeed. What, exactly, explains the lack of impact of this seem-
ingly capable naval force? The answer is a combination of a mismatch between 
the assets the navy has available and the security challenges it needs to combat, 
budget constraints, and a lack of political will.
The Capability/Challenge Mismatch
As its brief history as given above illustrates, the South African Navy has tradi-
tionally played the role of “Guardian of the Cape Sea Route,” first in service of 
Great Britain in the First and Second World Wars and later as a perceived part 
of the “West,” in response to the threat posed by the naval forces of the Soviet 
Union. This history is relevant today because of the impact it has had on the 
SAN’s perception of its own role and function. First and foremost, the SAN of 
today is conceived of and equipped as a “counternavy” force. That is to say, it is 
structured and equipped to give South Africa the ability to engage in battle with 
an as-yet-undefined enemy naval force. 
This is clearly evident when one considers its primary assets—stealth frig-
ates, armed primarily with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and 
torpedo-armed diesel-electric submarines. One can easily see in these acquisi-
tions a harking back to the service’s “golden era” of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Yet it is plain that the likelihood of the SAN engaging enemy surface combatants, 
maritime strike aircraft, or submarines in the Cape sea-lanes is extremely remote 
indeed. While the frigates do have a certain general-purpose utility beyond their 
conventional war-fighting capabilities, that same utility could most certainly 
have been achieved with cheaper vessels. Also, one has to wonder at the usefulness 
of the SAN’s submarine force: only three ships have been sunk by submarine-
fired torpedoes in the sixty-six years since the end of the Second World War.38 The 
submarines do obviously have some value in their ability to conduct surveillance 
operations and support special forces, but this hardly seems to justify the expense 
of these demanding and sophisticated vessels.
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As Vogel points out, this misalignment of operational philosophy, structure, 
and equipment with the actual threats being faced is a common one in the Afri-
can context:
Of the 33 independent mari time nations in sub-Saharan Africa, only five—Cape 
Verde, Liberia (when legislation is finalized), São Tome and Principe, the Republic 
of Mauritius, and the Republic of Seychelles—have maritime forces that identify 
themselves as coast guards rather than navies. Yet Africa’s maritime security challeng-
es are most often comprised of threats such as illegal fishing, narcotrafficking, and 
maritime disaster response—threats requiring the technical skills and collaborative 
relationships with civilian organizations typical of a coast guard.39
Given that the most pressing maritime threats facing South Africa and the con-
tinent as a whole are in fact illegal fishing, piracy, drug traf ficking, and illegal 
com merce, the most glaring gap in the SAN’s current capabilities is the lack of a 
genuine inshore/offshore patrol capability.40 The frigates can be used for offshore 
patrol, but as Minister Sisulu recently commented, “some of our frigates are too 
big to move around the coast.”41 The two remaining operational Warrior-class 
strike craft, though redesignated as offshore patrol vessels, are of limited utility, 
having reached the end of their effective service lives. The three T-Craft inshore 
patrol vessels have inadequate range and often struggle in the rough seas off 
South Africa’s coast. The SAN shares responsibility for patrolling its waters with 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (which operates Sarah 
Baartman and three Lilian Ngoyi–class inshore patrol vessels) and the South 
African Police Service (or SAPS, operating a handful of small boats), but even 
this collective capability falls well short of what is necessary to patrol effectively 
South Africa’s territorial waters and its vast (1,553,000 square kilometers) exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ).42 
Exacerbating the situation is a much-eroded South African Air Force maritime 
patrol capability. Since the retirement in 1984 of the venerable Avro Shackletons 
and, in 1993, of the smaller P166S Albatross maritime patrol aircraft purchased 
in the late 1960s, the SAAF has relied for maritime patrol primarily on five an-
cient, though upgraded, Second World War–era Douglas C-47TP Turbo Dakotas 
(referred to affectionately as the “TurboDaks” or as “Dakletons,” in reference to 
the Shackletons they replaced).43 Even setting aside their frailty, these senior citi-
zens of the air lack the necessary range to cover the far reaches of South Africa’s 
maritime area of responsibility. As one analyst points out,
In September 1996 the South African Air Force flew its last long range patrol to the 
South African owned Prince Edward Island group in the South Atlantic. The aircraft 
that undertook this flight, a Boeing 707, has since been retired from service because 
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of a lack of funding to maintain it. Since that time it is estimated that nearly a million 
tonnes of Patagonian toothfish have been illegally harvested from the area because of 
a lack of military control over the area by the South African Government, resulting in 
a substantial financial loss to South Africa.44
The air force’s Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft once offered a secondary 
maritime patrol capability, but they have been discarded and not replaced. There 
is no evidence that the SAAF plans to employ its new light, multirole SAAP 
Gripen fighters in this role; given their relatively short range, these aircraft are not 
particularly suited for maritime patrol, even as a secondary function. Some ca-
pability is provided by the SAAF’s Cessna C208 Caravan light turboprop aircraft, 
for which three sets of Argos 410-Z airborne observation systems were purchased 
in 2007.45 However these aircraft, along with the “Dakletons,” are scheduled for 
retirement in 2015, with no certain replacements on the horizon.
Budget Constraints
The creation of the South African National Defence Force in 1994 was, in domes-
tic political terms, a considerable success. While there were inevitable tensions 
among former enemies, the process was achieved relatively smoothly, and sig-
nificant follow-on hostilities were averted. In purely military terms, however, the 
SANDF has been less successful. Perhaps inevitably, the impressive war-fighting 
capability that it inherited from its primary predecessor, the apartheid-era SADF, 
has been eroded by such factors as the higher priority accorded to the ten-year 
process of integrating the various former apartheid-era forces into one national 
defense organization; downsizing of the SANDF (particularly the army) and the 
slow pace at which it is proceeding; the increasing obsolescence of military equip-
ment (despite big-ticket purchases for the air force and navy under the Strategic 
Defence Procurement package); and severe budgetary constraints in the face 
of pressing national social and health problems, especially a high rate of HIV/
AIDS. In addition, the SANDF, particularly the army, has faced an unexpectedly 
high operational tempo in its contributions to peacekeeping missions across the 
African continent.
All of this has meant that, as has often been the case in its eighty-eight-year 
history, the SAN currently finds itself low on the budgetary priority list. Defense 
expenditure in South Africa is a mere 1.3 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP);46 this amounts to a paltry ZAR 30.4 billion (about U.S.$4.4 billion) for 
the 2010–11 financial year.47 Approximately 7 percent of the defense budget is al-
located to the navy’s operational budget, around ZAR 2.1 billion (about U.S.$308 
million). In a briefing to South Africa’s parliament in March 2010, a Department 
of Defence spokesperson announced that this budget meant that in 2010–11 the 
SAN would be able to spend only ten thousand hours on patrol at sea. According 
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to a media account of the briefing, “in 2012 and 2013 this would be cut . . . to just 
9000 hours. Divided between the operational fleet [not including inshore patrol 
vessels or support vessels,] . . . this translates to just over 41 days per ship for the 
financial year . . . ; or about one ship or submarine patrolling SA’s 71,460 square 
km territorial waters on any given day. Each ship will spend about 324 days in 
port.”48
Lack of Political Will
Limitations in budget and capability, while obviously important, do not alone ex-
plain why the South African Navy has not contributed to such maritime security 
efforts as the multinational effort to combat piracy in the waters off the Horn of 
Africa. In a briefing to Parliament’s Defence Portfolio Committee in November 
2010, Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg (SAN Director Maritime Strategy) 
stated that the SAN is capable of mounting antipiracy operations off the coast of 
Somalia (though he warned that this would be difficult to sustain for more than 
six months and that even a short deployment would have “implications”).49 To 
paraphrase an old saying, where there is political will, there is a way. For example, 
“in December 2004, SAS Drakensberg deployed to Haiti with SA Police Service, 
SA Special Forces, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Service assets to provide 
logistic support and protection for the South African and Haitian Presidents 
during the . . . island’s 200th Anniversary of its independence.”50 That round-trip 
journey of over twelve thousand miles illustrates the South African government’s 
willingness to order significant naval operations when it deems necessary. So 
what accounts for South Africa’s lack of willingness to employ its naval assets for 
significant maritime security operations, particularly beyond its home waters?
One possible contributing factor for South Africa’s reluctance to contribute 
to antipiracy efforts is that it has virtually no merchant fleet (the only vessel on 
the commercial register, SA Oranje, will soon be retired). Political rhetoric aside, 
therefore, policy makers may have felt that South Africa has little vested interest 
in antipiracy operations in international waters. This view would unquestionably 
ignore the broader impacts of piracy on trade affecting the South African econ-
omy.51 (The newly commenced antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel, 
as well as other developments I will discuss below, suggest that this perception 
that “piracy is not our business” is now starting to change.) Another factor in the 
short and medium terms has been the continuing effects of South Africa’s focus 
on the FIFA World Cup, which ran to its completion in mid-July 2010. Prepara-
tions for the World Cup included large-scale government investment in public 
works, from new and upgraded stadia to public transport infrastructure, at an 
estimated cost of U.S.$3.5 billion.52 This included a very significant investment 
in security, with the SAN playing its part in Operation KGWELE (the SANDF 
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World Cup security mission) by deploying three of its Valour-class frigates off 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban in support of army special forces and 
the navy’s own MRS. The frigates also provided radar feed to assist the air force 
in securing the skies over the World Cup venues against a 9/11-style attack. Two 
submarines were also sent on patrol, and a number of other vessels were deployed 
as support platforms.53 This operation, while apparently successful, absorbed 
considerable resources, leaving the SAN, already suffering under the budget con-
straints outlined above, somewhat anemic. 
Perhaps more significant is the fact that recent defense decisions under South 
Africa’s current president, Jacob Zuma, suggest a shift in policy. Under his pre-
decessor, Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s foreign policy was driven by the notion 
of an emerging “African Renaissance,” to be made possible in part by a vigorous 
commitment to peace and stability operations on the continent. President Zuma 
was elected to the leadership of the ruling ANC in an acrimonious contest with 
then-president Mbeki in 2007 (thereby effectively reducing Mbeki to lame-duck 
status), largely riding on a wave of dissatisfaction over Mbeki’s perceived lack of 
focus on domestic issues. Zuma was elected president in 2009, and since then 
South Africa has maintained its existing peacekeeping and related commitments 
but has notably taken on no significant additional external missions. This is 
particularly noteworthy in that June 2009 marked the end of the SANDF’s ten-
year deployment to Burundi.54 That effectively reduced the number of externally 
deployed troops by around a third.55 The Zuma administration has preferred to 
commit troops to secure South Africa’s borders, reversing a decision made under 
Mbeki to turn over border security entirely to the SAPS. Currently it is planned 
that under Operation CORONA over 3,600 SANDF troops, a significant propor-
tion of the South African Army’s deployable manpower, will be on South Africa’s 
borders by 2014.56 Taken together, these factors suggest that South African na-
tional policy is shifting away from expeditionary engagements involving military 
forces and focusing more on domestic priorities.
INTO THE FUTURE
Despite the many negatives outlined in this article, there have in recent times 
been signs of movement in the right direction. One has been the emergence of a 
new, as yet unpublished, maritime security strategy. While the value of this strat-
egy will obviously depend on its content, the fact that maritime security has re-
ceived high-level attention is itself encouraging. Comments made in Parliament 
relating to the content of the strategy also give reasons for hope. For example, 
Minister Sisulu indicated in response to a question posed by a member that there 
are plans afoot to cover all of South Africa’s EEZ with “some form of sensor, or 
combination of sensors that will produce the most optimal coverage.”57
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Another potentially positive development is the possible revival of Project 
BIRO, a program to replace the SAN’s ageing and limited inshore and offshore pa-
trol capability. By Minister Sisulu’s admission, BIRO had been “shelved,” but a re-
cent media report indicates that the Simon’s Town–based Institute for Maritime 
Technology has been issued a “request for quotation” by the SAN for “strategic 
technology and engineering support services during the project study phase of 
the acquisition of a multi-mission patrol capability.” Furthermore, “the Estimates 
of National Expenditure (ENE) tabled by Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan in 
February noted that the National Treasury will fund the acquisition of new ships 
for the Navy from the 2013/14 financial year,” specifically “the replacement of the 
offshore and inshore patrol vessels, procurement of new harbour tugs and the 
replacement of small boats.”58
Further potentially good news concerns Project SAUCEPAN, the South African 
Air Force’s program to replace its almost septuagenarian Douglas C47 Dakota 
maritime surveillance aircraft. In the words of the chief of the SAAF, Lieutenant 
General Carlo Gagiano, SAUCEPAN has been “pulled to the left”—that is, pushed 
higher on the agenda—by the arrival of piracy in southern African waters and is 
now considered “urgent and important.”59
While these are certainly encouraging signs, they do not necessarily indicate 
that South Africa is moving toward a comprehensive and well designed approach 
to ensuring its own maritime security and contributing to that of other African 
nations. For one thing, there is every chance that these developments will founder 
on the rock of budgetary constraint. Perhaps even more importantly, there are 
worrisome indicators that the new maritime security strategy is an ad hoc, knee-
jerk reaction to the fact that piracy has finally reached SADC waters.60 While pi-
racy is one of the things the SAN must be capable of addressing, it is by no means 
the only, or even the main, security threat that must be considered. 
Ultimately what is needed is a broad and comprehensive rethinking of South 
Africa’s approach to securing its borders, people, and interests. A recalibration 
of this kind will have to be realistic about the level of defense expenditure South 
Africa can afford (given the pressing social challenges that must be addressed 
by the government on a very small tax base) and must be set against a realistic 
assessment of the threat environment that South Africa is likely to face.61 These 
considerations together will likely point to a reduction of South Africa’s ability to 
contribute to peace and stability operations on the ground in far-flung parts of 
Africa (as mentioned above, this reduction seems already to have begun, under 
the current administration’s policy priorities), but this must be weighed against 
the impact that a more stable and economically successful South Africa will have 
on the southern African region in the long term. 
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As I have argued elsewhere, South Africa should focus to a considerable 
degree on engagement with neighboring countries, with the goal of ensuring 
their viability as secure and prosperous democratic states.62 The primary tools 
in achieving this goal will be economic, legal, and diplomatic. The SANDF and 
other security organs of the state will have roles to play as well, through such 
activities as offering training and assistance and sharing intelligence. The tools 
of so-called developmental peacekeeping will be critical here, though employed 
preemptively rather than only when an emergency arises that requires the de-
ployment of a traditional peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission.63 From 
another perspective, this approach is what one counterinsurgency expert has 
called “anti-insurgency.”64
Critical in this approach is, first, the fact that it could potentially have a far 
greater impact on African security in the long term than the current “firefighting” 
model (in which South African efforts go primarily toward addressing conflicts 
that have already broken out). Second, though self-interested, this approach does 
not represent a shirking of South Africa’s international responsibilities. For as 
South Africa’s neighbors grow in prosperity and security they will develop both 
the desire and the capability to sustain that success by seeking the security and 
prosperity of their own neighbors. What should ideally emerge is something like 
the “ink-spot theory” of counterinsurgency, in which “spots” or areas of security 
and stability spread and eventually merge with other zones of security and stabil-
ity, just as drops of ink coalesce on paper.65 
Like those of most African nations, South Africa’s military has historically 
been, and is currently, “army heavy,” most of its budget and capabilities invested 
in (largely conventional) land forces. A reconceptualized force would undoubt-
edly better serve South Africa’s interests. Given that a conventional military threat 
emerging from one of South Africa’s neighbors or any combination thereof is 
extremely unlikely, even more so from a power outside the region, South Af-
rica should redirect a significant proportion of its current military expenditure 
toward the formation of a gendarmerie-style border guard (with a secondary 
counterinsurgency capability) and the development of a significant coast guard 
—what, together, I call “Shield forces.”66 The remainder of the SANDF should be 
converted into a small but well trained and well equipped joint expeditionary 
formation—a “Spear force.” 
Under this “high-low” model, the SAN would have two primary functions— 
namely, providing a coast guard–style Shield capability as well as assets to en-
able and support Spear forces. For the Shield capability, “coverage” will be more 
important than “clout.” Airborne surveillance assets, such as maritime patrol 
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, will be vital for situational awareness of 
the nation’s vast EEZ. An adequate number of naval platforms, split between 
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inshore and offshore patrol vessels, will be required to take advantage of the 
situational awareness these aerial surveillance assets provide. Significantly more 
platforms than are currently in the SAN inventory will be necessary to ensure that 
the nation’s EEZ is adequately patrolled. Here the navy’s 2030 forward-planning 
process, as articulated in November 2010 by its Chief Director Maritime Strategy, 
Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg, seems to point in the right direction, propos-
ing adding three inshore patrol vessels to the currently mandated force structure
—an increase of 100 percent.67 Funding indications from the government, how-
ever, suggest an inclination toward maintenance of the status quo, replacing, but 
not adding to, the current patrol vessels.68
Expeditionary (Spear) missions would in all likelihood primarily engage land 
targets, but naval forces nonetheless would have a critical role to play, particu-
larly given the fact that 70 percent of African states are littoral. Recent examples 
abound of operations of kinds likely to be undertaken. In the first three months 
of 2011 alone the SANDF stood up forces for one actual and two potential non-
combatant evacuation operations, in South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya. 
Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire led in January to SAS Drakensburg’s being diverted from 
its duty as a communication and guard vessel for the 2011 Cape to Rio yacht race 
to the Gulf of Guinea to render “possible assistance to SA diplomats, designated 
personnel and other South African citizens in Ivory Coast.”69 A special operations 
force was also put ashore in Guinea. One might hope that similar situations in the 
future, if political circumstances and SANDF capabilities are appropriate, will see 
intervention by South African forces. (It is arguable that early intervention by an 
African force in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2011 could have saved the lives of many of 
the hundreds, if not thousands, who were killed in what is now being called the 
Second Ivorian Civil War.) The noncombatant evacuation actually conducted by 
the SANDF, the extraction of South African embassy personnel and other citizens 
from Libya, could well also have involved maritime assets, Libya being a littoral 
state. In the end, though, lack of appropriate capabilities forced the SANDF to 
rely on goodwill from the Qadhafi regime (itself an embarrassment) and a char-
tered Boeing 767 to fulfill its mandate.
What is clearly missing from the SAN’s current capabilities is the ability to 
offer strategic lift, firepower, and force protection for joint Spear forces. The abil-
ity to project significant force from the sea is in general of inestimable value for 
deterrence, dissuasion, denial, disruption, and defeat of potential adversaries, and 
to the SAN it would be of equal value as a means to contribute to African mari-
time security and deliver humanitarian and other support to neighbors and allies. 
This fact is not lost on its leaders, and their plans for 2030 include, under Project 
MILLENNIUM, the addition of three “strategic sealift and sustainment (SSS) ves-
sels” within a planned fleet of twenty-two warships and submarines.70 No official 
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details have yet been given as to the nature of these proposed SSS ships. If, as has 
been suggested by some, the vessels are to be like the twenty-seven-thousand-
metric-ton Canberra-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs) being built for the 
Royal Australian Navy by Navantia, or the similar but smaller French Mistral-
class LHDs, the idea of adding three of them is probably overreaching somewhat, 
given their cost (though perhaps the idea is to ask for three in hope of securing 
one or two). Smaller vessels, perhaps even in the range of the 1,500-metric-ton 
Spearhead-class Joint High Speed Vessel, are more likely to be affordable and may 
even be of greater utility for the kinds of Spear operations the SANDF might re-
alistically conduct, and are more likely to contribute significantly in a secondary 
Shield function.71 Whatever vessel, or mix of vessels, is chosen, there can be no 
doubt that adding a capability to project force from the sea, even on a relatively 
limited basis, would radically shift and enhance the utility of the South African 
Navy’s force structure in a way appropriate to the nation’s position as a regional 
power. To add this capability will, however, require a significant rethinking of ap-
proach and resource allocation within the South African National Defence Force 
and the government.
CLEARER POLICY AND MORE FOCUSED ENGAGEMENT 
African maritime security forces are currently misaligned to meet the security threats 
they face. They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and train ing programs but have 
a predominance of coast guard missions, operate in coast guard zones, and require 
coast guard partnerships. . . . Accordingly, they are not efficiently organized and 
trained to meet their challenges. They are also hampered by their dependence upon 
the poorly matched foreign equipment they purchase or are given. Inefficiency and 
small budgets reinforce each other, allowing maritime security challenges to remain 
substantially unchecked. Billions of dollars of fish are stolen ev ery year from a con-
tinent facing some of the world’s highest levels of malnutrition. International drug 
syndicates are gaining a foothold among what are already some of the world’s most 
fragile states.72 
This statement is as true of South Africa in particular as it is of African nations 
in general. Given the additional need for South Africa, as a regional power, to 
be able to project force where necessary within its sphere of influence, it is clear 
that the SAN of today is inadequate to the task of carrying out South Africa’s 
maritime security mandate. There is, however, currently a window of opportu-
nity by which just such a significant change could come about. On 20 April 2010 
President Zuma appointed members to a newly devised national planning struc-
ture, the National Planning Commission (NPC), which is to “produce reports 
on a range of issues that impact on our long term development, such as water 
security, climate change, food security, energy security, infrastructure planning, 
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human resource development, defence and security matters, the structure of the 
economy, spatial planning, demographic trends and so forth.”73
It is at least conceivable that the influence of the NPC could lead to the reshap-
ing of the SANDF, and South Africa’s national security forces in general, into 
structures that are equipped, trained, and employed in ways calibrated to the 
actual needs of the nation. It is very much in the interests of the United States 
and other members of the international community having an interest in Africa’s 
maritime security, and in African security more generally, to assist the NPC and 
the South African government in developing an appropriate national security 
strategy and matching structures. 
What can the United States, and other members of the international commu-
nity, do? Vogel suggests a useful first step when he writes that
for Africa, a series of threat as sessments would be highly beneficial, as no one really 
knows what is going on in African waters. Many of the statistics frequently advanced 
on drug traffic, illegal fishing, illicit commerce, and other prohibited activi ties are at 
best educated guesses. It is also not known how much activity is occurring relatively 
close to shore (within territorial waters) or over the horizon in EEZs. A comprehen-
sive survey using satellite imagery to quantify ship traffic would be a good place to 
start.74 
At a more general level, more purposeful engagement with the SANDF and 
the South African government could help to bring about constructive change. 
Regular exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard would be of benefit in reshaping 
the philosophy and operational approach of the SAN, more than is, for example, 
the hosting of SAN personnel at U.S. Navy “schoolhouses.” Diplomatic assistance 
in such projects as collaborative southern African production for the navies of 
the region of inshore patrol vessels (craft that the SAN greatly covets, to ensure 
the viability of Project BIRO) could also be of great benefit. Other opportunities 
would emerge, given clearer policy and more focused engagement. Clearly it is 
in the long-term interests of the United States and allied nations to expend the 
resources necessary to ensure that this happens.
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A RELATIVELY INDECISIVE WAR
Jack A. Gottschalk
Daughan, George C. 1812: The Navy’s War. New York: Basic 
Books, 2011. 411pp. $32.50
This is an excellent book about a relatively unknown war. Perhaps only the Mexican 
War (1846–48) is less known to Americans. The War of 1812 was America’s first de-
clared war, one that neither side really wanted and that resulted in a military draw.
Beginning with the introduction, George Daughan, a distinguished academi-
cian and recipient of the 2008 Samuel Eliot Morison Award, has created a work 
that is almost the equivalent of an exciting novel. The first three chapters provide 
a clear understanding of the relationship between the United States and Great 
Britain in the years following the Revolution. The political scene in America is 
also examined to show the deep differences that existed between the Federalists 
in the north, particularly in New England, and the Republican interests. These 
differences were to persist throughout most of the war. 
From the earliest days of the nation, the Federalists 
held that a positive relationship with England was of 
benefit to the United States given, among other things, 
a common language and an established history of 
trade. Southern leaders, including Thomas Jefferson, 
were hostile toward Great Britain and highly sympa-
thetic to France and its perceived democratic ideals. 
Daughan notes, as he sets out the prewar years, that 
the Jay Treaty (also known as the Treaty of London) 
was a disappointment to George Washington. One 
important point was its restriction on American trade 
with France, a fact that eventually led to the unde-
clared maritime conflict between the United States 
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and France, the Quasi-War (1798–1800), during the John Adams administration. 
The American navy grew rapidly during that conflict, but once the war ended the 
Navy became a political issue and fell into disfavor in the eyes of Thomas Jeffer-
son, even though he had deployed warships against Tripoli’s pirates.
By the time Jefferson took office in 1801, the problems caused by Napoleon 
were major and growing, and the questions of sailors’ rights and free trade in-
creasingly came into focus. In 1806, Napoleon sealed European ports to all British 
ships. Great Britain responded by restricting neutral shipping with France, and 
at about the same time British warships off the New Jersey coast seized American 
merchant ships and impressed sailors.
American political disagreement on the issues of ship seizure and impress-
ments only gave way to a united front in June 1807 when there was a confronta-
tion between the USS Chesapeake and HMS Leopard that resulted in the seizure 
of several seamen aboard the American ship. Tensions ran high, but Jefferson 
avoided a war by successfully having Congress pass the Embargo Act in December 
1807, which was a crippling blow to American foreign trade since it prohibited 
all shipments abroad. 
The intent had been to force Great Britain to end its seizure of seamen and to 
cancel its neutral shipping restrictions. The measure failed on both counts and 
was so unpopular that it was replaced after James Madison’s election with the 
passage of the Non-Intercourse Act, which allowed Americans to trade with every 
nation except Great Britain and France. 
Meanwhile, the British continued to impress sailors on American merchant-
men despite warnings from Madison and attempts to resolve issues by negotia-
tion. By the end of 1811 Madison was convinced that the only action that would 
force meaningful negotiations was a declaration of war. With the exception of 
the Federalists, in June 1812, both the House and the Senate voted for war, even 
though America was ill prepared. 
The Army was small, with too much reliance placed on the militia; however, 
the Navy, which Madison initially believed to be of little use, proved instead to be 
of enormous value on the lakes and rivers, and as a blue-water force. Experienced 
naval officers and hundreds of privateers were used to raid British commerce. 
Despite the lack of preparation, the author notes that Madison did have a war 
plan that called for the invasion of Canada, a move motivated by the fact that the 
British Army was tied down in Europe. The British strategy called for invasions 
from the north and south, a naval blockade along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, 
and coastal raids.
The Canadian land actions were marked by a lack of American success—
notable campaign examples were those of Generals William Hull and Henry 
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Dearborn. American naval actions on Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake Cham-
plain were, however, critical to the prosecution of the war. 
On the ocean, well-known American victories included such blue-water ship-
to-ship contests as those between the USS Constitution and HMS Guerrière; the 
USS Constitution and HMS Java; the USS Hornet and HMS Peacock; and the 
USS United States and HMS Macedonian. Naval officers to include Commodore 
Oliver Hazard Perry, Captain Stephen Decatur, Commodore Thomas Truxtun, 
and Commodore William Bainbridge all gained permanent historical notice in 
America.
Daughan points out that it was a relatively indecisive war, marked by events 
of which neither side could be proud. Those incidents included the American 
burning of York (Toronto); the later burning of Washington by the British (in 
retaliation for York); the unnecessary shelling of Stonington, Connecticut; and 
the raid—complete with rape and pillage—by the British at Hampton, Virginia. 
Finally, it seems somehow fitting for a war that neither side wanted that the Battle 
of New Orleans took place two weeks after the war ended. 
Almost until the end of hostilities, the political division in America between 
the antiwar Federalists and the Republicans continued. So deep were antiwar feel-
ings among some that New York and Vermont farmers openly provided supplies 
to British forces along the Canadian border, and New England merchantmen 
carried supplies to Field Marshal Wellington’s armies in Spain. 
By the autumn of 1814 both sides were looking to end the conflict. The war 
was unpopular in Great Britain and some Federalists were urging secession of 
New England states and a separate peace. Discussions about the war took place in 
Hartford, Connecticut, in December, but secession was either not on the agenda 
or not seriously discussed. 
On Christmas Eve 1814, the Treaty of Ghent was signed by American and Brit-
ish representatives and ratified in Washington in February 1815. Many issues over 
which the war had been fought were not addressed in the treaty, such as British 
blockades and impressments, these having ended with the defeat of Napoleon.
This work is marred by some editorial errors that are unfortunate since they 
tend to jar the reader, who is otherwise proceeding happily through the book. 
They are as follows: on page 212 “ordinance” is incorrectly used instead of “ord-
nance”; on page 278 “coarse” is incorrectly used instead of “course”; on page 400 
“manage” is mistakenly used instead of “managed”; and on page 416 “initiating” 
is used instead of “initiated.” 
However, despite these lapses, the book should win a place on the shelf of 
any student of American history. There are an excellent glossary, many relevant 
maps, and a helpful illustration that shows the names and locations of sails on a 
square-rigged ship. 
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Singapore Harbor, 1845—Commodore 
Henry Ducie Chads, Royal Navy, is 
rowed over to an American frigate visit-
ing the port where he is senior officer. 
Chads is met by the second in com-
mand of USS Constitution and ushered 
below to pay his respects to the captain. 
After a friendly chat, Chads notes that 
he has been on the ship before, in 1812. 
He had then been first lieutenant of 
HMS Java, and he had stood on that 
very spot while surrendering his ship 
to Commodore William Bainbridge. 
This opening scene is a poignant and 
accurate account of an actual meeting. 
So begins this outstanding and fascinat-
ing novel by Steven E. Maffeo, a retired 
U.S. Navy captain and author of two 
previous books on the age of sail.
During the war between Britain and 
France, both countries routinely 
violated American neutrality at sea. 
The stakes were high, and the sensi-
bilities of small powers were easily 
overlooked. The depredations of the 
British were much worse, however, 
than those of the French, and in June 
1812 the United States declared war. 
The two sides were not a match. The 
Royal Navy possessed 180 ships of the 
line—the battleships of the day, sport-
ing at least seventy-four guns (some 
had over a hundred). The U.S. Navy had 
nothing so large, but its pride was six 
frigates, some carrying over fifty guns. 
The most famous of these was USS 
Constitution, nicknamed “Old Ironsides” 
during a victory over HMS Guerrière 
when British round shot bounced off its 
thick oak sides. The Royal Navy hoped 
to redress this embarrassment, but the 
frigate HMS Java, commanded ably by 
Captain Henry Lambert but saddled 
with a raw crew, left Portsmouth in 
November with a load of passengers 
and cargo, hoping to avoid a fight.
In contrast, Constitution was newly 
commanded by Commodore William 
Bainbridge. Not well liked, Bainbridge 
was known throughout the service as 
“Hard-Luck Bill.” He had been the first 
U.S. Navy captain to surrender his ship 
to the enemy; indeed, within a period 
of five years Bainbridge “hauled down 
the flag of the United States three times 
in the face of the enemy—without any 
fighting.” Nonetheless, Constitution 
BOOK REVIEWS
“OUR FIRST TRUE WAR”
Maffeo, Steven. The Perfect Wreck—“Old Ironsides” and HMS Java: A Story of 1812. Tucson, Ariz.: Fire-
ship, 2011. 382pp. $19.95
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left Boston in late October to seek 
out and engage British shipping.
Maffeo alternates between the two 
vessels and their crews, providing an 
outstanding primer on the workings 
of a large warship two centuries past. 
He is adept at describing everything 
from victualing to lading and storage, 
rigging, discipline, sail maintenance, 
and gunnery. In a clever device, the 
author uses three British Army of-
ficers traveling aboard Java as props. 
These men—who were actually pres-
ent on the voyage—are tutored by 
Chads on the strategy and tactics of 
naval warfare. The reader listens in on 
these chats and learns a great deal.
The climax of the book occurs on 29 
December 1812, when the ships meet 
off the coast of Brazil. The description 
of the battle itself is masterful. Lambert 
worries about his largely untrained crew 
of “landmen,” but Maffeo implies that 
he had not trained his green crew nearly 
often or rigorously enough. Bainbridge, 
a stickler for discipline, had made no 
such mistake. The sea battle at close 
range, with heavy cannon disgorging 
round shot, grape, and canister—as 
well as the continuous musket fire of 
the marines on board both ships—takes 
a murderous toll. Although initially 
Constitution suffers worse and Bain-
bridge himself goes down twice with 
wounds, the battle slowly and in-
exorably reverses. The bigger guns and 
thicker sides of the American frigate, 
combined with its more seasoned crew, 
allow “Old Ironsides” to wreak havoc on 
Java. Dismasted and its bowsprit shot 
off, Java’s ability to maneuver is lost. 
Lieutenant Chads, taking command 
from his mortally wounded captain, sees 
that all hope is illusory—an attempt 
to board Constitution so as to carry on 
the fight with cutlasses and pistols is 
skillfully thwarted by Bainbridge. Java 
is a perfect wreck and strikes its colors.
This ripping yarn fascinates, educates, 
and entertains. The exploits of the U.S. 
Navy in our country’s first true war 
after independence should never be for-
gotten. This terrific account is a must-
read for naval personnel of all ranks.
COL. PHILLIP S. MEILINGER, U.S. AIR FORCE, 
RETIRED
West Chicago, Illinois
Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transfor-
mation of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap of 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2011. 928pp. $39.95
For those seeking to understand 
China’s place in the world, Ezra Vogel 
has performed a great service through 
his meticulous decadelong work on 
this biography of Deng Xiaoping, who 
emerged as China’s leader following 
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. 
Vogel may be overstating the case when 
he suggests that Deng was the most 
important world figure of the twentieth 
century, but it is hard to find a serious 
rival for the last quarter of that century.
Deng ruled China between 1978 and 
1992, when he retired at the age of 
eighty-eight. Since his retirement, to 
the present day, Deng’s policies have 
continued, in contrast to the immedi-
ate changes that took place following 
the death of Mao. No Western scholar 
of China in 1976 predicted the “rise 
of China” that resulted from Deng’s 
leadership. How did Deng come to be 
central to the transformation of China?
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Born in 1904, Deng took the reins of 
leadership at age seventy-four, long 
after most give up trying to change 
the world. Despite many hurdles, he 
energetically steered China back on 
track, continually pursuing his vision. 
He was an unwavering nationalist as 
well as a communist. His focus was on a 
competent, proud, and successful China, 
not the humiliated China into which 
he had been born, the descendant of 
literati in Sichuan Province, to which 
he never returned. His years in France 
and Moscow in the 1920s developed in 
him a mind cognizant of the ways of the 
world, well before his leadership role be-
gan. Deng went on to do political work 
with Zhou Enlai, his mentor, during 
the 1930s, and he jointly commanded 
the 129th Division of the Eighth Route 
Army from 1937 to 1949 in Shanxi. 
Although he worked side by side with 
Mao to become general secretary of the 
Central Committee, Deng was purged 
by Mao as a “capitalist roader” early in 
the Cultural Revolution. Vogel offers a 
vivid account of Deng’s exile in Jiangxi. 
The author emphasizes that Deng was 
very successful in his conduct of foreign 
affairs. While many scholars consider 
Deng a student of Zhou Enlai, less 
polished and capable than his teacher, 
Vogel turns this idea on its head, us-
ing the example of how Deng broke 
through the U.S.-China normalization 
impasse during the December 1978 
talks with American negotiator Leonard 
Woodcock. Despite Deng’s red-faced 
ranting that China would never accept 
weapons sales to Taiwan, he, perhaps 
realizing that Woodcock was unable to 
guarantee subsequent decisions by Con-
gress, in the end simply said “Hao,” fine. 
The deal was finally complete six years 
after the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives.
Regarding domestic affairs, Vogel out-
lines a mixed record for Deng. Once in 
control, he consistently moved China 
toward the First World and increased 
the country’s wealth. However, Deng is 
most remembered for the cloud he cast 
over what Vogel calls the “Tiananmen 
tragedy.” The author has come under 
attack by Fang Lizhi and others for 
glossing over Deng’s repressive role in 
crushing the demonstrations at Tianan-
men Square in the spring of 1989. 
While Deng was being elevated to the 
position of power over Hua Guofeng 
at the Eleventh Party Congress Third 
Plenum in December 1978, in what the 
author refers to as “succession without 
coronation,” Vogel was just publishing 
his best-selling nonfiction work Japan 
as Number One. Vogel directed the 
East Asian Studies program at Harvard 
University, subsequently publishing 
more on China than on Japan, until his 
retirement in 2000. Like Deng, Vogel 
wished to make an impact in his later 
years and so determined to write a 
detailed account of the man who had 
transformed China during his own 
lifetime of studying East Asia affairs. 
To prepare himself, Vogel spent a year 
refreshing his Chinese, so he could 
conduct his interviews unassisted and 
read primary sources more easily. He 
interviewed scores of Deng’s colleagues 
and most of his family. It took him 
ten years to complete the project. 
This work raises the research and 
literary standard for political biog-
raphy. We must thank Ezra Vogel for 
giving us this detailed and measured 
look at China’s great man at the 
hinge of history between the twen-
tieth and twenty-first centuries.
GRANT F. RHODE
Brookline, Massachusetts
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Swaine, Michael D. America’s Challenge: Engag-
ing a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2011. 690pp. $49.95
Since 2009, U.S.-China relations have 
lurched from crisis to crisis, jeopardiz-
ing the “long peace” that has enabled 
an extraordinary era of prosperity in 
East Asia and beyond. As Washington 
gropes for a new paradigm to structure 
this all-important bilateral relation-
ship, diplomats, military strategists, 
and concerned citizens on both sides 
of the Pacific would do well to reflect 
carefully on Michael Swaine’s new 
treatise, which is a masterpiece that 
will set the standard in the field of 
policy analysis for decades to come.
Among the book’s many virtues are 
the balance and objectivity of its as-
sessments. Swaine explores alternative 
strategies, such as a more zero-sum 
approach, on the one hand, that would 
rely on a “grand coalition of democra-
cies” to balance China, as well as, on 
the other, the possibilities of a more 
positive-sum approach that would 
emphasize both compromise and joint 
action against common, nontraditional 
security threats. Ultimately, Swaine 
concludes that the above approaches are 
both “extreme . . . because they do not 
share many of the assumptions underly-
ing America’s current strategic objec-
tives.” The judgment is based on dozens 
of interviews with this country’s most 
esteemed Asia hands. He reports that a 
consensus exists on a mixed strategy, in-
corporating a delicate simultaneous bal-
ance between hedging and engagement.
Another key strength of this volume is 
the extraordinary attention to detail—a 
feature that will make this work, with 
its more than two hundred pages of 
endnotes, an extremely valuable desk 
reference and a capable survey of 
what we collectively understand about 
U.S.-China relations. The fact that the 
book covers issues as disparate as naval 
strategy, trade negotiations, and energy 
cooperation—handling each of these 
complex topics and many others with 
admirable sophistication—is a tribute 
to the wide experience, intellectual 
depth, and solid research of the author. 
In this respect, the book is without peer.
What makes this work truly exceptional, 
however, is the bold and sober recom-
mendations that flow from Swaine’s 
dense analysis. To be sure, he offers a 
panoply of practical solutions, such as 
advocating the creation of a genuinely 
strategic (vice policy) planning entity 
in the While House and promoting a 
much-needed regular, trilateral forum 
bringing together Tokyo, Beijing, and 
Washington around one table. How-
ever, he also directly challenges current 
conventional wisdom among U.S. policy 
makers, asserting that “U.S. maritime 
predominance in the Western Pacific is 
probably unsustainable over the long 
term . . . [and] attempts to sustain this 
predominance . . . are likely to prove 
. . . destabilizing.” Also, breaking with 
longtime U.S. policy, Swaine is critical 
of Washington’s “hands-off” approach 
to the Taiwan issue, an approach that 
has traditionally included a refusal to 
negotiate with Beijing regarding arms 
sales to Taiwan. Finally, Swaine also 
boldly declares (contrary to deeply 
embedded U.S. political culture) that 
“China’s democratization should not 
be a strategic objective of the United 
States.” Such conclusions collectively 
offer American strategists a new ap-
proach and much food for thought.
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In short, this comprehensive volume 
offers a much-needed corrective to 
tendencies in American strategic dis-
course that significantly favor mili-
tary solutions to the dilemmas posed 
by China’s rise over the hard work 
of cooperation and compromise. 
LYLE GOLDSTEIN
Naval War College
Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: 
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World. Lanham, Md.: Ivan R. Dee, 2011. 
336pp. $27.50
Irregular warfare has been the topic du 
jour over the last few years. A search of 
any bookseller’s website turns up liter-
ally hundreds of recently published titles 
on the subject. While not a bad thing, 
this makes it harder for nonspecialists to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. Much 
recent literature in the field centers on 
irregular tactics and techniques, espe-
cially U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, while a smaller portion focuses on 
armed groups. John Arquilla, however, 
takes a different approach in Insurgents, 
Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Ir-
regular Warfare Have Shaped Our World, 
by focusing more on irregular warriors 
than on irregular wars. Like the figures 
he portrays, Arquilla attacks the 
conventional-war methods and heroes 
of military history. He laments 
continuing overreliance on tradi-
tional methods and classical theorists, 
given the evidence that the world 
is now far from conventional. As a 
Naval Postgraduate School profes-
sor, Arquilla has studied and taught 
this topic for over two decades.
At the time of this book’s publication 
there were more than thirty ongoing 
conflicts worldwide, all irregular in na-
ture, “primarily conducted through acts 
of terrorism or more classic guerrilla 
hit and run tactics.” This supports the 
argument that “irregular is becoming 
the new regular.” Arquilla asserts that we 
must now look closely at the masters of 
earlier times to understand the impli-
cations of this new age. The eighteen 
individuals chosen here come from a 
wide variety of backgrounds. Some, 
such as Nathanael Greene and T. E. Law-
rence, will be familiar to most readers. 
However, warriors like Abdelkader and 
Christiaan de Wet are probably largely 
unknown to all but specialists in the 
field. Instead of trying to categorize each 
of them, he draws out common themes 
they exhibited, most notably their 
“sheer indomitability” and recurring 
encounters with advanced technology.
In addition to thematic threads of 
continuity, the author weaves connect-
ing strands along national lines. The 
French appear in seven chapters, six 
times fighting against insurgents and 
once, during the American Revolu-
tion, on the side of the insurgency. The 
experience gained in these conflicts is 
another theme used by the author to 
bind several hundred years of warfare. 
A similar continuity exists among 
supporting actors. British involve-
ment in multiple insurgencies provides 
several opportunities to study Winston 
Churchill’s personal connections.
Of note, most of the irregular warriors 
highlighted in these chapters gained 
fame by opposing the conventional 
masters of their time. Commanders like 
Charles Cornwallis or Ulysses S. Grant 
usually found traditional methods 
insufficient when facing guerrilla or 
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other unusual techniques. In these 
cases, the raiding tactics of Greene and 
Nathan Bedford Forrest simply proved 
too effective. The obvious implica-
tions are made clear by the author and 
should give readers plenty to reflect on, 
in terms of evaluating the U.S. position 
in either regular or irregular warfare. 
This is a useful book for both special-
ists and general audiences, although the 
themes presented here in plain, clear 
writing have special implications for 
military readers. Insurgents, Raiders, and 
Bandits represents an important and 
unique contribution to the crowded 
field of books on irregular warfare.
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., USA
Naval War College
Stone, Peter G., ed. Cultural Heritage, Ethics and 
the Military. Woodbridge, Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell, 
2011. 228pp. $90
When the National Museum of Iraq 
(originally the Baghdad Archaeologi-
cal Museum) was damaged and looted 
in 2003, along with archeological sites 
across Iraq, international concerns were 
raised by a wide variety of political, mil-
itary, and other professional leaders re-
garding the protection of historical and 
cultural treasures. Observers around the 
world were reminded that the conse-
quences of military operations across 
the spectrum of war are far-reaching 
and long lasting. So too are the respon-
sibilities of political and military leaders 
during conflict. Proponents of the just- 
war tradition have long understood 
this and have thus shaped ideas regard-
ing the parameters of actions before, 
during, and after a conflict. But there is 
sometimes a failure to appreciate fully 
the breadth of responsibility. The editor 
of this collection, Peter Stone, addresses 
several of the many issues pertaining to 
protecting and maintaining the cultural 
heritage within the space of a battle. 
The work also addresses questions sur-
rounding the tension (and sometimes 
hostility) between the military and 
civilian specialists from, for instance, 
the archeological, anthropological, 
religious, and medical communities. 
Drawing from a wide range of Western 
and non-Western authors, the editor 
has assembled a useful volume for both 
military and nonmilitary professionals.
The volume consists of fourteen 
chapters on various ethical challenges 
and professional responsibilities of 
parties involved in the preservation of 
cultural heritage in war zones. After 
an introduction, in which the editor 
(who served as an archeological adviser 
to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of 
Defence in 2003) provides context, 
there are essays on restitution, World 
War II, African perspectives on cul-
tural preservation, academia and the 
military, archeology in war zones, and 
case studies from Lebanon and Iraq.
Three essays stand out as particularly 
helpful for gaining perspective: Mar-
garet M. Miles provides a historical 
overview of the issue of restitution in 
“Still in the Aftermath of Waterloo: 
A Brief History of Decisions about 
Restitution”; “Christian Responsibility 
and the Preservation of Civilisation in 
Wartime: George Bell and the Fate of 
Germany in World War II,” by Andrew 
Chandler, shows the influence of the 
Anglican bishop of Chichester, who as 
a member of the House of Lords and 
vocal cleric was an outspoken critic 
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of area bombing and the decision to 
pursue the unconditional surrender of 
Germany; and Fritz Allhoff ’s “Physi-
cians at War: Lessons for Archaeolo-
gists?” looks at ethical dilemmas of 
medical professionals with respect to 
military ethics, medical ethics, and tor-
ture in an endeavor to provide insight 
and parallels for other professions.
Whether one is interested in archeology 
and cultural preservation in a war zone, 
the archeology of military and battle 
sites, the erection of military monu-
ments, or considerations for military 
planners and those who subsequently 
execute their plans in combat zones, 
there is much to consider in this book. 
The final chapter consists of a series 
of responses from archeologists to 
queries concerning relations between 
them and the military during the 
war in Iraq. Some of the respondents 
have had experiences both in Iraq and 
with the military, and some have not. 
However, the respondents all have 
connections with the preservation of 
cultural heritage, and their comments 
show that professionals outside the 
military must also evaluate the ethics 
of their own disciplines with respect 
to war. For example, should a member 
of a community outside the military, 
such as an archeologist, provide in-
formation and advice before a conflict 
commences, or only later? Though 
these are not questions for the military 
professional, military professionals 
should be aware of them. Stone is to 
be commended for bringing together 
in a single volume essays and perspec-
tives on this important issue. Interested 
readers will not be disappointed.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY
Naval War College 
Tillman, Barrett. Whirlwind: The Air War against 
Japan, 1942–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2010. 336pp. $28
Over sixty years after its conclusion, the 
air war that was waged against Japan 
remains one of the most controver-
sial and brutal campaigns conducted 
by any of the Allied powers during 
World War II. The debate centers on 
the questions of the morality and 
necessity of the bombing campaign 
against Japan, primarily its cities, 
that culminated in the dropping of 
two atomic bombs, and whether the 
campaign hastened the end of the war.
In his richly detailed and well written 
Whirlwind, Barrett Tillman addresses 
these two arguments and the deci-
sion making that led the United States 
to wage aerial war. He starts by lay-
ing the groundwork with the surprise 
bombing of Tokyo by U.S. Army Air 
Forces (USAAF) B-25s led by Lieuten-
ant Colonel James Doolittle in April 
1942, relating how Japan’s leaders, 
shocked at the audacity of the carrier-
borne attack on the home islands, 
moved forward with a complex plan 
to eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet once 
and for all, thus setting the stage for 
Japan’s strategic loss at the battle of 
Midway less than two months later.
However, the USAAF and its chief, 
General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, had 
bigger plans of their own for Japan. 
Arnold, a disciple and friend of General 
Billy Mitchell, resolutely believed in the 
power of strategic bombing to bring 
about an enemy’s surrender. The Royal 
Air Force and USAAF had thoroughly 
tested this theory in the skies over 
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Germany, with mixed results. Despite 
a relentless and costly air campaign, 
the German Wehrmacht could only be 
defeated on the ground. A basic concept 
of strategic-bombing theory held that 
heavy civilian casualties would force 
enemy leaders to sue for peace, but 
the theorists and practitioners did not 
factor in the callous nature of despotic 
leaders who cared little for the welfare 
of their citizenry. (For more informa-
tion on this subject see Among the Dead 
Cities: The History and Moral Legacy 
of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in 
Germany and Japan, by A. C. Grayling.)
Japan was a different story. Arnold 
envisioned unleashing the as-yet-
unfielded B-29 Superfortresses on 
Japan en masse. The USAAF first tried 
conducting operations from China, but 
that proved untenable for a variety of 
reasons. Eventually airfields on Guam, 
Saipan, and Tinian, islands that were 
taken at great cost, came into exis-
tence for sustained B-29 operations.
The air war against Japan was much 
more than the story of B-29 raids on 
Tokyo and other targets. One little-
known operation went under the dark 
moniker of Operation STARVATION, the 
deployment of aerial mines by B-29s. 
These sorties proved quite effective 
in whittling down Japan’s merchant 
marine, thus devastating Japan’s morale 
and eroding its capability for war pro-
duction. USAAF crews delivered twelve 
thousand mines, sinking 293 ships 
between March and April 1945. Yet for 
all the successes that the United States 
had in the skies over Japan, the USAAF 
and U.S. Navy cooperated little in the 
planning and implementation of the 
overall campaign. Each service pursued 
its own air operations, the Army going 
after Japan’s cities and the Navy after 
Japan’s fleet and coastal shipping.
Tillman’s excellent book is well re-
searched and well written. He reintro-
duces the reader to the pivotal leaders 
who played a role in the execution of 
the air war on Japan. He rounds out 
his narrative with accounts from B-29 
aircrews and naval aviators who flew at 
the tip of the spear aimed at Japan; their 
observations and recollections add an 
excellent sense of humanity to the story. 
His account also serves to validate joint 
operations, a lesson borne out by the 
experience of this war and one that our 
military continues to observe today.
This book will not end the debate on the 
value and moral justification of the U.S. 
air war on Japan. Tillman clearly makes 
the point that while the air war against 
Japan did not end the conflict on its 
own, it did affect Japan’s ability to con-
tinue to wage war. In the end it is clear 
that Japan was willing to fight despite 
the destruction of its cities and that it 
was preparing mightily for the expected 
invasion of the home islands. However, 
it was the atomic attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki that finally forced Japan 
to seek peace and end the slaughter.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE
San Diego, California
Jordan, Jonathan W. Brothers, Rivals, Victors: 
Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership 
That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe. New 
York: NAL Caliber, 2011. 672pp. $28.95
This is an exceptional book. Although 
it has its share of strategy, logistics, 
and technology, it is primarily a book 
about relationships and leadership. 
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In what is ostensibly a triple biogra-
phy, George S. Patton, Jr., and Omar 
Bradley get their fair share of atten-
tion, but in the end it is Dwight David 
Eisenhower who dominates the pages. 
Jordan has produced what is in many 
ways a paragon of modern biographies. 
The darker sides of his subjects are 
not overlooked or glossed over, as in 
E. B. Potter’s Bull Halsey, nor does the 
book descend into the merely salacious 
and prurient, as sometimes occurs in 
Evan Thomas’s Sea of Thunder. Jordan 
paints pictures of whole men, and 
with remarkable fidelity. Meticulously 
researched, this work neither shies away 
from nor lingers on the flaws each man 
possessed. For example Patton’s philan-
dering and alcohol abuse in the 1930s 
are reasonably depicted as characteristic 
of an ambitious warrior trapped in a 
peacetime army, bored, restless, and des-
perately worried that his moment had 
come and gone. Likewise, Eisenhower’s 
relationship with Kay Summersby is 
addressed directly. The relationship was 
inappropriate and, from a security point 
of view, reckless. Bradley worried about 
this, as did Marshall and members of 
Eisenhower’s personal staff. However, 
Jordan concludes that Eisenhower 
needed Kay to maintain some sense of 
stability in his life and that whatever 
degree of infidelity it entailed was com-
pensated by Ike’s resulting performance. 
Jordan also discusses in detail the 
episode in which Eisenhower reached 
a point where he was willing to force 
his superiors to fire either Montgomery 
or him. This was an example of superb 
political acumen and the use of power. 
Jordan documents Patton’s remarkable 
churlishness and childishness, as well as 
his extraordinary drive and sense of the 
operational moment. Jordan displays 
both a keen understanding of and sym-
pathy for the flamboyant Patton, just as 
he does with Eisenhower. With Bradley, 
however, Jordan is just a touch less sure-
footed, perhaps because Bradley was by 
nature a more private man. Yet for all 
that, there are few passages more mov-
ing and superbly depicted than those 
describing Bradley’s reaction when, dur-
ing the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower 
took the First and Ninth Armies and 
assigned them to Montgomery. Brad-
ley’s rage and hurt were only magni-
fied when his threat of resignation was 
ignored. However, his rage was nothing 
compared to the mean-spiritedness of 
Patton, who, removed from command, 
savaged in his diary his boss and former 
friend, alleging that Eisenhower suffered 
from moral turpitude and cowardice.
Because Jordan understands the nature 
of these men’s relationships, he is able 
to convey the tragedy that accompanied 
them. Above all, he documents with 
marked sympathy the forging and the 
gradual undoing of the Eisenhower-
Patton friendship, as much a casualty of 
Patton’s selfishness and lack of empa-
thy as the inevitable consequence of 
friends occupying different levels of 
command responsibility. The friend-
ship between Eisenhower and Gen-
eral Bradley was equally damaged but 
much more rapidly, stemming from 
what Bradley felt was a betrayal.
These friendships would in time be, if 
not fully repaired, reconciled. Eisen-
hower, following the death of Patton, 
focused more and more on his late 
friend’s sterling qualities. Perhaps 
this was easier in Patton’s absence. 
Paradoxically, when Patton’s reputa-
tion had threatened to eclipse those 
185
Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 180  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of other generals, Eisenhower went 
out of his way to laud Bradley as the 
“best combat general of the war.”
Although the troika holds center stage, 
Jordan looks at other relationships these 
men had. The central role of George 
Marshall is explored, along with that 
which Bedell Smith played in sup-
porting Eisenhower. Junior combat 
commanders such as Lucian Truscott 
and Mark Clark are given their due.
If all this book delivered were a 
deeper understanding of these three 
iconic military figures, it would be 
well worth the read, but it provides 
much more. For, in addition to reveal-
ing the human side of three generals, 
it also compares and contrasts their 
very different leadership styles and 
methods. Although understated, this 
comparison elevates the book even 
further and makes it a must-have for 
any shelf of serious leadership texts.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College 
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as de-
scribed by their publishers:
Blake, John. The Titanic Pocketbook: A Passenger’s Guide. Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 2011. 128pp. $18.95
“The Titanic Pocketbook is a unique guide to all aspects of this great ship, incorpo-
rating authentic period literature from sources including White Star Line them-
selves, Harland & Wolff shipyards, and important publications from the period.”
Orsini, Alessandro. Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of Mod-
ern Terrorists. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2009. 317pp. $29.95
“This is a uniquely insightful and comprehensive account of one of history’s 
most fascinating terrorist groups, shedding new light on understanding the 
modern terrorist mind-set in general and the motivations of the Red Brigades 
specifically.”
Little, Benerson. Pirate Hunting: The Fight against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea 
Raiders from Antiquity to the Present. Sterling, Va.: Potomac Books, 2010. 357pp. 
$29.95
“More than just a vivid account of the war that seafarers and pirates have waged, 
Pirate Hunting is invaluable reading in a world where acts of piracy are once more 
a significant threat to maritime commerce and voyagers. It will appeal to readers 
interested in the history of piracy, anti-piracy operations, and maritime, naval, 
and military history worldwide.” 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s Manager for the 
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.
s Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other forms of communication have 
exploded in recent years, some have seen the Navy Professional Reading 
Program’s mission of advocating the reading of worthwhile books as rather 
“quixotic.” This term, derived from the great Spanish novel Don Quixote of La 
Mancha, in which the title character does battle with a windmill, is often used to 
describe wasted effort and foolish endeavors. But in fact, promoting literature is 
less quixotic these days than ever, in part because of technological developments 
in electronic reading devices. The popularity of such electronic readers as the 
iPad, Kindle, and Nook has actually revived the art of reading. These devices 
don’t replace the art of reading—they make it easier! They also make it, in the 
eyes of many, a “cool” thing to do. While reading a dusty old book from some 
library shelf is decidedly “old school,” reading the same material as an electronic 
book (e-book) on the screen of a high-tech tablet computer is somehow more 
socially acceptable. 
The purchase of an e-book reader, now costing less than a hundred dollars in 
some formats, opens the door to literally hundreds of thousands of books from 
every genre, most for a minimal fee and many for free. As a bonus, the wireless 
communications technology that makes such devices possible means that the time 
lapse between thinking about obtaining a book and beginning to read it can be 
measured in mere seconds. Never in recorded history have information and enter-
tainment been so readily available. So, if e-book readers make reading easier (and 
more socially acceptable), how do we encourage people to read books on these de-
vices and in hard copy? One way is to consider what some well-known and highly 
intelligent folks have had to say over the centuries about the value of reading. 
• One of the earliest recorded quotes about reading came from Chinese 
philosopher Confucius, who noted: “No matter how busy you may think 
you are, you must find time for reading, or surrender yourself to self-chosen 
ignorance.” 
A
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• Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536) wrote, “When I get a 
little money, I buy books; and if any is left, I buy food and clothes.”
• In the eighteenth century, columnist Richard Steele said, “Reading is to the 
mind what exercise is to the body.” 
• One of America’s greatest writers and humorists, Mark Twain, was quoted 
as saying, “The man who does not read good books has no advantage over 
the man who can’t read.” 
• At least two U.S. presidents have shared their thoughts about reading. Harry 
S. Truman noted, “Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers,” 
and Lyndon Baines Johnson once said, “A book is the most effective weapon 
against intolerance and ignorance.” 
• In more recent years, management consultant and best-selling author Ste-
phen Covey has written, “There’s no better way to inform and expand your 
mind on a regular basis than to get into the habit of reading good literature. 
. . . You can get into the best minds that are now or that have ever been in 
the world.” 
• The highly popular and prolific author Stephen King calls books “a uniquely 
portable magic.”
• Publisher Charles Scribner says, “Reading is a means of thinking with an-
other person’s mind; it forces you to stretch your own.” 
• Educator and reading expert Mortimer Alder says, “It’s not how many books 
you get through, it’s how many books get through to you.”
• Finally, motivational speaker Charlie “Tremendous” Jones has declared, 
“You’re the same today as you’ll be in five years except for the people you 
meet and the books you read.” 
Many of these pithy quotes would make great bumper stickers, and they serve 
an important purpose by helping to capture the joy and fascination that can be 
found in reading. The Navy Professional Reading Program is a focused effort to 
make books of consequence available at little or no cost to sailors throughout the 
fleet. Our hope is that they will be read, in hard-copy or e-book form, in order 
to improve the professionalism of the men and women of the finest navy in the 
world. 
JOHN E. JACKSON 
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